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Introduction--
Perhaps a topic that is always current and controversial
is u.s. and Japanese trade relations. U.S./Japan trade has
garnered headlines in major newspapers in both countries for
years, but it is not the only area of concern between the two
nations. In fact, when it comes to fishing, strained relations
between the U.S. and Japan are nothing new. But then that should
also not be very surprising.
U.S./Japan fisheries history spans over a half-century of
controversy. A variety of developments have taken place over
this period from past to present illustrating this point. This
paper will present this subject in three parts, corresponding
to the historical developments that have taken place. The saga
begins with u.s. post-World War II aid in rebuilding the Japanese
tuna, whaling and salmon fleets. Round two examines the rapid
expansion of the Japanese utilization of Alaska pollock and
the development of surimi trawlers in the early 1960s. Finally,
round three, which will encompass the majority of the subject
matter discussed, begins with the creation of the u.s. 200-mile
fishery zone in 1976 to the present, where 1984 brought the
whaling showdown between the two nations; the closure of the
Gulf of Alaska to the Japanese for a period of time: problems
with salmon interceptions by the Japanese: and, increased state
Department involvement in the fisheries arena. It is easy to
see that V.S./Japanese fishery relations are current and
controversial and will most likely remain that way.
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This paper will examine this relationship in some detail,
beginning with the post-World War II era until the present, and
try to present the rationale behind many of the moves that have
been made over the years, and where the future of U.S./Japanese
fishery relations may be headed.
Key issues to be discussed include the enactment of the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) of
1976 and how it radically altered the scheme of things in
relation to fishery allocations and practices by the Japanese
in the newly formed u.s. 200-mile fishery zone. Within this
new piece of legislation, new arrangements for allocations,
imports and exports, fishing fees and joint ventures were
developed to create a new dimension in U.S./Japanese fishery
relations.
Other issues such as: the commercial whaling moratorium,
have had a significant impact on Japan along with u.s. whaling
laws, which are linked to fishing allocations; the surimi
explosion in the u.s. and the Japanese involvement; and, the
increased rate of Japanese interceptions of "U.S." salmon on
the high-seas. All of these issues have international impact
and have played an important role in the ongoing controversy
and complexities of U.S./Japanese fishery relations. It is
easy to see that fishery relations between the two nations are
complex politically, socially and economically, and, therefore,
worth analysis and investigation.
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History--
Japan has had the largest history of fishing in United
States' waters and has also mounted the greatest effort in
these waters over the last half century. This fishing effort
has been concentrated in one major area--the coastal waters
off Alaska, primarily the eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Island
Regions and the Gulf of Alaska. The history of Japanese fishing
in these regions can be divided into three major periods of
time.
Round One--
The initial exploratory effort by the Japanese in the coastal
waters off Alaska took place in the eastern Bering Sea in 1930.
The Japanese sent two trawlers into the region to see if a
distant-water fishing operation was feasible. Following favorable
reports from the trawlers, the Japanese returned to the eastern
Bering Sea with a mothership-catcher boat type operation in
1933. 1 The Japanese employed small catcher boats in combination
with larger factory vessels. These large vessels or "motherships"
served both as floating processors of the fish catch and support
vessels to the small catcher fleet, permitting extended high
seas operations far from Japanese ports. 2
This fishery targeted on walleye pollock and flounder off
Bristol Bay, which were processed into fishmeal aboard the mother-
ship and then carried back to Japan via transport vessels. These
fishing practices by the Japanese led to disputes between the
u.S. and Japan involving jurisdiction over the fish and waters
- 3 -
involved. However, in 1937, the price of fishmeal dropped
and the fishery was terminated. Annual catches of pollock
(the primary species caught) and other species during this
five year period ranged from 3,300 to 43,400 tons. 3
In 1940-41, the Japanese returned to the eastern Bering
Sea with another mothership-type operation, this time targeting
on yellowfin sole. The catches of about 10,000 tons each year
were frozen for human consumption. 4
Although the Japanese fishing fleet was destroyed during
World War II, it was soon again to become the major fishing
power in the North Pacific. No international agreements
existed at the time to prevent other nations from entering into
the North Pacific halibut, Alaska salmon, or other fishing
operations in the area right after World War II. 5 This was an
important point because the halibut and salmon fisheries were
becoming increasingly important to the American fisherman in
terms of economic value. One can look next at the Truman
Proclamation of 1945 as a beginning in trying to prevent further
fishing disputes with the Japanese, such as had been experienced
in 1936 and 1937. 6 As a press statement released by the u.S.
government at the time of the delivery of the Truman Proclamation
explicitly stated:
"As a result of the establishment of this new policy, the
United States will be able to protect effectively, for instance,
its most valuable fishery, that for the Alaska salmon."7
But, at the same time, the u.S. government was aiding in
the reconstruction of Japan's war torn fishing fleets. Fishing
- 4 -
was seen as a means to rebuild Japan's shattered economy while
simultaneously providing its hungry population with food. 8
Included in this redevelopment project was the tropical tuna
fleet, the Antarctic whaling fleet, and by 1952, the high seas
9
salmon fleet. All three of these areas would later prove to
be cornerstones of controversy in future U.S./Japanese fishery
relations.
Certainly, during the occupation of Japan, such a protection
of Alaska salmon from Japanese fishermen was unnecessary, simply
because of the strict regulations imposed by the MacArthur Line,
which remained in effect until April 25, 1952,10 three days
prior to when the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective."
This area is diagrammed in Figure 1.
On the Alaskan scene, Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishermen
hoped they were coming out of a severe slump. The seasons
between 1949 and 1951 had been atrocious; 1951 had been the worst
year of the century. And while fishing had picked up in 1952,
it was clear to the industry that any recovery would largely
depend on keeping the Japanese off Alaska salmon. 12 Equally
concerned were halibut longliners and fishermen involved with
the king crab fishery.13
The result of all of this anxiety was the International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC). Instigated by the
U.5. J the Commission brought together the governments of the
14U.S., Canada and Japan. This organization and its role in
the complex web of U.S./Japanese fishery relations will be
- 5 -
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Figure I--The MacArthur Line was established June 22, 1946; beyond which Japanese
fishermen were prohibited from fishing. This Line enclosed the area
immediately around the Japanese islands and that portion of the high
seas lying due east of these islands for about 1500 to 2000 miles. It
did not include the Bering Sea, or any part of the Pacific in which the
North American spawned salmon can be found.
Source: Johnson, 1967.
discussed in more detail later in this paper.
The Japanese post-war fishery developed into four principal
components: the mothership fishery (responsible for 64 percent
of the total Japanese catch); the North Pacific trawl fishery
(responsible for 31 percent of the total Japanese catch); the
North Pacific long1ine-gi11net fishery; and, the land-based
trawl fishery. The first round of the struggle for supremacy
on the North Pacific ran until 1963. It was a period of
astonishing Japanese growth. The nation developed and expanded
fisheries for crab, salmon, bottomfish and shrimp. Had it not
been for the Soviets entering the picture, that expansion might
have continued unchecked. 1 S
Round Two-(1963-l976)--
By 1963 the concerted efforts of be1eagured u.s. fishermen
found champions in two u.s. Senators: Alaska's Bob Bartlett
and Washington's Warren Magnuson. The two pushed through
legislation giving the President the power to imprison and fine
The second round was about to begin.sea.
foreigners convicted of fishing inside the three mile territorial
16
This round began in 1963 with the Japanese (and the Soviet
Union) yielding to u.S. requests to limit their efforts in
certain fisheries in the Northwest Pacific Ocean, and did not
end until 1976, when the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA) was implemented. 1 7 Overall it was a period that
demonstrated to the u.S. just how resourceful the Japanese were
when it carne to creating opportunities for growth.
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As round two began, the Japanese had to be on the defensive.
Increasingly efforts were being made to push back or exclude the
Japanese from fisheries in which U.S. fishermen participated.
One of the leaders of this movement was Alaskan governor Bill Egan,
who pushed hard for a l2-mile fisheries limit. 1 8 The Japanese did
respond to the pressure of the Alaskan contingent by agreeing to
limit their fishing from the mouth of the Copper River (145°W) to
the islands of the Four Mountains (170 0W) and to return to the
sea any halibut, salmon or king crab they caught. 1 9
The pressure exerted by u.s. fishermen continued and the
concessions made by the Japanese were not enough to please the
u.s. fishing industry. Consequently, in May 1964, the Bartlett-
Magnuson Act was enacted outlawing foreigners from fishing in
the territorial seas of the U.S. The legislation also banned
fishing for designated creatures (like king crab) native to the
u.s. continental shelf regardless of their distance from shore. 20
Almost immediately the pressure from U.S. fishermen began
for a l2-mile fisheries limit. The Japanese were quick to grasp
this movement and quickly entered into a bilateral treaty with
the U.S.--that was to be renegotiated every two years. In return
for restricting its effort, access inside 12 miles would be secured
21for the Japanese.
The development by the Japanese of techniques for the
processing of minced fish flesh or surimi on motherships and
factory stern trawlers along with the decrease in abundance and
replacement of yellowfin sole with the walleye pollock as the
- 8 -
dominant species taken by Japan in the eastern Bering Sea, also
occurred in 1964. 22 The Japanese also expanded their fishing
effort into the Gulf of Alaska2 3 as well as off the coasts of
Washington, Oregon and California during this period. 24
Under the new quota system established by this treaty, the
Japanese did suffer some losses, especially in the king crab
fishery. This fishery fell from a harvest of 41 million pounds
in 1964 to just under 28 million pounds a year later. Simultane-
ously, Japan agreed to prohibit its crabbers from fishing their
d · · 1 . 1 d 25tra ~t~ona Br~sto Bay groun s.
The move to biennial fishing treaties showed good judgement
on the part of the Japanese authorities. In 1966, the U.S. pushed
its jurisdiction over fisheries to 12 miles, when a 9-mile fishery
zone was established adjacent to the existing 3-mile territorial
26
sea. However, by accepting the treaty approach, the Japanese
secured access to these grounds but also acquiesced to further cut-
backs in other fisheries.
These treaty arrangements also led to the establishment of
sanctuaries, where trawling by the Japanese was prohibited, in
order to reduce the incidental catch of juvenile halibut and
prevent gear conflicts with U.S. crab pot operators. 27
Over the next nine years, not only had Japan been forced to
end its king-crabbing, but it had agreed to quotas on tanner crab,
herring, pollock, Pacific ocean perch, black cod and several
other species of groundfish. 28 The Japanese also consented to
allow observers aboard their vessels and to further time-area
- 9 -
· t' , d t' t I' d 29restrlc lons ln pro uc lve raw lng groun s.
Nevertheless, u.s. fishermen were still dissatisfied by
the Japanese concessions. These fishermen watched the Japanese
pollock catch skyrocket as their own salmon and crab catches
plummeted. u.s. fishermen now began to become involved in the
new debate in the industry--a 200-mile fisheries limit. 30 It
was becoming increasingly clear that the u.s. fishermen wanted a
piece of this pollock action and that any new legislation would
have to include this objective. In fact, when the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and ~anagement Act (MFCMA) was finally passed in 1976,
the development of a u.s. bottomfishery (e.g. pollock) off Alaska
was one of only six purposes specified in the bill. 31
The remainder of this paper will concentrate on round three,
or what developments have occurred since the passage of the
MFCMA in 1976 in terms of U.S./Japanese fishery relations.
Round Three--The Magnuson Act (1977-1980)--
On March 1, 1977, the U.S. enacted the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 32 On the authority of
this Congressional enactment the u.s. unilaterally claimed ex-
clusive management authority over all fish, except highly migra-
tory species from its coasts. 33 This extension of national
jurisdiction, intended to protect threatened contiguous fisheries,
has special implications for Japan, a major maritime nation and
close ally of the u.s. The Japanese depend on continued access
to u.s. fishing grounds, especially the rich harvest off the
coast of Alaska, as a source for food. The passage of the
- 10 -
Magnuson Act threatened continued Japanese access to u.s. fishing
grounds.
The Act is organized in four titles. Title I authorizes
fishery management. Title II outlines the conditions under
which foreign fishing is permitted in the 200-mile fishery con-
servation zone (FCZ). Title III specifies the management powers
of the Act, including the establishment of regional fishery manage-
ment councils to prepare fishery management plans. Finally,
Title IV addresses the effort of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty on the Act. Titles I and II
have the most significance for the Japanese.
The FCZ established in Title I gives the u.s. exclusive
fishery management authority over all fish, with the exception of
highly migratory species as defined in the Act. This includes all
anadromous species (e.g., salmon) that spawn in u.s. waters except
when they are within foreign territorial seas or FCZs recognized
by the U.S., and all Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond
34the zone.
Title II enumerates the conditions under which foreign fish-
ing may be conducted in the FCZ requiring: (1) an existing inter-
national fishery agreement currently in force (such fishing may
continue until the agreement expires or is renegotiated) or the
nation enters into a governing international fishery agreement
(GIFA) with the U.S.; (2) a permit issued annually by the
Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
Commerce; and (3) reciprocity by the foreign nation to fishing
- 11 -
35
vessels of the U.S. Foreign vessels shall be charged reasonable
nondiscriminatory license fees for the issuance of a fishing
permit. The amount of such fees are to be based upon the costs
of management, research, administration, enforcement and other
factors relating to the conservation and management of fisheries. 36
The Japanese, on the other hand, were voicing their opinions
about this new 200-mile FCZ. The remarks made by the chairman of
Japan's Fisheries Association to members of the U.S. North Pacific
Fisheries Management Council, (a body which has a major voice in
establishing new quotas for foreign fishing within the FCZ) ill-
ustrates the significance Japan places on open fishing and its
opposition to the ~~CMA. The Council was warned that IIAmerica
would be playing into the hands of Japanese Communists if Japan
is not given special consideration in implementation of the 200-
mile limit ... 1137 The Japanese delegation reasoned that lI u s i ng
the extended offshore jurisdiction to reduce Japan's fishing
quotas in the North Pacific could cause massive unemployment and
political upheaval. 1I 3 8 Although, most of these pleas and warnings
fell on deaf ears.
One of the first hurdles, therefore, for the Japanese was
to secure a GIFA and fishing permits for the U.S. FCZ so that they
could continue to fish in U.S. waters. This task was easier said
than done.
The Japanese GIFA--
Each GIFA shall acknowledge the exclusive fishery management
authority of the U.S., as set forth in the Magnuson Act. 3 9 This
- 12 -
posed an initial problem for the Japanese, as they did not have
a 200-mile limit and were not ready to recognize them.
The Japanese acted slowly on the negotiations for a GIFA.
The U.S. provided Japan (and all other interested countries)
with a model GIFA, but it was becoming clear that the Japanese
were also going to be faced with constitutional problems in
approving such a GIFA. The original question was whether the
u.s. could enter into such a commitment with the Japanese govern-
ment without going into treaty formula. This is due to the re-
quirements of the Japanese Diet (government). It became clear
that the regular treaty implementation process for a GIFA would
not move through the Japanese Diet quick enough for it to be
approved in time for the deadline of the enactment of the MFCMA
on March 1, 1977. Therefore, the two governments decided on a
40
short-term agreement for the 1977 season alone.
The agreement with Japan for 1977 was different in form but
not in substance, from other GIFAs that were negotiated at that
time. It consisted of an exchange of notes. Attached to that
exchange of notes was an initialled long-term agreement covering
the period 1978-1982, which was transmitted to Congress for its
information. 41 The short-term agreement of unusual form was the
result of u.s. efforts to accomodate the Constitutional procedures
of Japan without foreclosing the option of fishing by Japanese
vessels in conformity with u.s. law during 1977. 42 The provisional
pact allowed Japanese fishing operations to continue uninterupted,
pending ratification and signing of the five year agreement by
- 13 -
both sides before December 31, 1977. 4 3 Although many in Congress
were concerned that this agreement was not a GIFA, as it was
missing an essential ingredient--the acknowledgement of exclusive
u.s. fishery jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, with time running out before the March 1 dead-
line, Tokyo agreed to the bilateral pact that permitted continued
Japanese fishing access to u.s. coastal waters in return for
observing the rules of the Magnuson Act. Negotiations had dragged
on for more than six months due to Tokyo's insistence that Japan
be exempted from any regulations until a long-term agreement could
be worked out. But with other countries including the Soviet
Union and South Korea having earlier reached agreements with Wash-
ington, and the March 1 deadline looming large, the Japanese were
forced to abandon their demands. 44
The major Japanese concern was that the new agreement would
be accompanied by stringent blanket quotas that would slash 1977
catches by as much as 40 percent. This was not the case. Japanese
quotas were reduced, but it was only a decrease of 11 percent,
permitting Japan to take 1.19 million metric tons of fish in 1977
compared to the 1976 total of 1.36 million metric tons. 45
Despite Japanese complaints, however, Washington did not
budge on its method of levying fishing fees. The u.s. charged
foreign fishermen for tonnage on vessels operating in the u.s.
FCZ and also on the dockside value of the catch. The u.s. did,
however, reduce the per ton charge on Alaska pollock. This type
of minor concession was probably made for fear that a tougher
- 14 -
stand might have serious economic and political repercussions in
Japan. Still, the Japanese paid about $100 million during 1977
46for the right to fish in u.s. waters. Nevertheless, the Jap-
anese did agree to these probisions and were secured access to
the u.s. FCZ until 1982. The next chapter in the GIFA negotiations
would bring more headaches to the Japanese as u.s. fishery legis-
lation changed substantially over the next five years. The text
of the GIFA agreements is found in Appendix I.
Foreign Loophole in the MFCMA--
At the same time the Japanese were negotiating for a GIFA
to give them access to the u.s. FCZ, Japanese investment in u.s.
fishing companies began to expand. In enacting the law reserving
priority rights to Americans within 200 miles from shore, Congress
apparently did not anticipate that a company wholly owned or
controlled by foreign interests could meet easily the legal re-
quirements for hoisting the American flag on vessels it owns and
fish at will within the 200-mile zone. The one basic requirement
was the ship must have been built in the U.S.; most other require-
ments were met by reshuffling the corporate board, as the extent
f f ' h i 1 47o ore1gn owners 1p was not re evant.
As one U.S. fisheries official stated, "like a net with a
rip, the United States' new 200-mile fishing limit regulation
48
seems to have a loophole big enough to steer a troller through."
Therefore, foreign countries which did not want to be shut
out of American waters began to buy stock in American fishing
companies. Some officials, including a Japanese member of the
- 15 -
board of directors of one u.s. processor, stated that the u.s.
200-mile FeZ, established by the Magnuson Act further stimulated
. t t 49Japanese 1nves men .
The second period began at this time and saw Japanese invest-
ment in Alaska alone triple in two years, in 1972 and 1973, with
Taiyo Fishery, the leading fishing company in Japan (with annual
sales in 1974 of $2.5 billion) out in front. Taiyo owned 49 per-
cent of Pacific Alaska Fisheries in a deal put together with Peter
Pan Seafoods, later incorporating Western Alaskan Enterprises as
a subsidiary of Taiyo California5 1 --and so on. Peter Pan was
later sold to Nichiro Gyogyo, another giant Japanese fishing
company, by the Bristol Bay Native Corporation for a turnover of
$23.5 million as the aggressive investment of the Japanese
. d 52cont1nue .
By 1974, foreign investments in the U.S. fishing industry
totaled $129 million in 47 different firms, with about one-third
of them in Alaska. Twenty-one processing plants in Alaska now
had 25 percent or more Japanese ownership. Most of these deals
were equity purchases, and they continued strong for the next
four to five years. 53 Marubeni, Japan's third largest trading
company and largest importer of marine products, invested $1 million
in three operations in 1974, and Mitsubishi, Japan's largest
trading company, joined with the New England Fish Company to form
Orca Pacific Packing Company in Cordova, Alaska. 5 4 By 1981, a
report to the Alaska State Legislature revealed that the Japanese
owned about one-third of the entire investment in Alaska processing
- 16 -
f 'l't' 55acl. l. l.es. Although by 1979 Japanese investment in u.s. fish-
ing companies had come to a halt.
The catalyst was clear enough--200-mile limit legislation
threatened to divest Japan at about half its annual consumption
of seafood. By 1978, 84 of the 100 coastal countries in the
world declared 200-mile nautical zones, in whose waters Japan
harvested over 40 percent of its catch. 5 6 Consequently, what
Japan could no longer secure at sea, she would have to try to get
on shore.
Although various Federal agencies collect data on foreign
investment, no single agency maintains a complete record of foreign
investment in u.s. seafood processors. Basically, foreign invest-
ment information is not available because: (1) data gathering
and reporting practices prevent collecting accurate data on for-
eign involvement; and, (2) the processing industry is relatively
small, thus receiving a low priority from these Federal agencies
, . f . ' , ' d ' 57monl.torl.ng orel.gn l.nvestment l.n u.s. l.n ustrl.es.
Certain state governments in important fishing areas also do
not have data on foreign investment since they do not require
firms to disclose any foreign affiliation. Even Alaska, a state
that requires foreign ownership disclosure, has not strictly
enforced the requirements. 58
Since neither the Federal nor State Government authorities
maintain complete data on foreign ownership or loans, the actual
extent of foreign investment may be significantly greater than
that presently identified. This lack of complete information on
- 17 -
foreign investment in the u.s. seafood processing industry is
likely to continue if current Federal data collection practices
and most State disclosure requirements remain unchanged. Figures
2 and 3 diagram the extent and complexity of Japanese involvement
in the U.S. processing industry.
TALFF and the Japanese Fish Allocations--
The MFCMA of 1976 provided that the total allowable level of
foreign fishing (TALFF) for a fishery within the U.S. FCZ is limited
to the portion of the optimum yield, or amount of fish allowed to
be taken, which will not be harvested by U.S. fishermen. 59 It was
hoped that this measure would stimulate the development of the U.S.
fishing industry and limit the catch of foreign fleets in U.S.
waters. But it became increasingly obvious that this was not happen-
ing. The Japanese had increased their investment in the U.S. fish-
ing industry during this period, and their allocations did not
suffer substantially. The fish that they lost in allocations did
not suffer substantially. The fish that they lost in allocations
they more than made up for with the benefits of their investments.
For example, Japanese allocations in the Alaska region have con-
sistently remained above the 1.1 million metric ton mark, with in-
creases occurring in both 1978 and 1980 in total allocations. In
addition, the Japanese catch in the U.S. FCZ was consistently be-
tween 65 to 75 percent of the total foreign catch in the U.S. FCZ. 60
But by 1979-1980 the Japanese investment era had ended. In the
mid seventies, investment passed what the Japanese call the "peril
point," the one-third equity after which, they knew from experience,
- 18 -
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Figure 2--Alaska's processing industry has a history of extensive interownership
among companies, now compounded by substantial Japanese investment.
These charts indicate ties between the firms shown; the connections may
be equity investment, control or both. Japanese companies such as Nichiro
Gyogyo and Kyokuyo Hogei are antagonistic competitors of the huge inter-
national trading companies, the most visible of which are the Marubeni
Corp. and Mitsubishi International.
Source: Dougherty, 1979.
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Figure 3--Since Japan's giant trading companies are thought not to compete with
one another, it is -interesting to note in these charts that .while the
fishing companies' investments overlap each other and those of the
trading companies, the trading companies in no way overlap each other's
investments but seem to maintain separate, inviolate spheres of
investment.
Source: Dougherty, 1979.
paranoia set in. In December 1978, a cover story appeared in
the Alaska Advocate entitled, "Who Owns Alaska's Fish?" The
answer was clear enough in the article: Japan did. The article
caused an uproar. Fishermen wondered how they could develop an
'd t h th J ' t 611n us ry w en e apanese own 1 •
By 1980, however, Congress, the fishing industry and others
involved with the industry assessed the performance of the u.s.
fishing industry since the enactment of the MFCMA and were dis-
appointed with what they found. The U.S. displacement of foreign
fishing in the FCZ had only been one percent per year, by volume,
62
and less than three percent per year, by value. It became
obvious that the Japanese were still catching about the same
number of fish as they did before the Act, and Japanese investment
in u.s. fishing companies had reached a peak.
The course to take was obvious to the u.s. In order to
develop their own bottomfish fishery, the Japanese would have to
move aside and more importantly the U.S. would have to prove that
they could catch these fish. But there was only one buyer, and
that was Japan. So the moves that followed had to be taken care-
fully.
The U.S., being influenced by increased Japanese investment,
large fishery allocations and denied access to important foreign
markets for U.S. fish products took action. This new direction
started a new chapter in U.S./Japanese fishery relations, and set
the stage for the next round of "fisheries warfare" between the
two nations. This new direction began with major amendments
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to the MFCMA and is still undergoing change and spurring controversy.
The New Direction--The American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980--
In December 1980, Congress passed the American Fisheries
Promotion Act (AFPA). In enacting the AFPA Congress wanted to
promote the development of the u.s. fishing industry by increasing
its share of the total harvest in the u.s. FCZ as well as to en-
courage greater access to u.s. fish products in foreign markets. 63
Congress had originally hoped that the MFCMA as written in 1976
would have stimulated the development of the u.s. fishing industry.
This was not the case, as a House Committee report details. Foreign
nations, like Japan, created tariff and other trade barriers
to the importation of u.s. harvested fish. 64 These barriers
hindered the development of markets for u.s. fish products and,
therefore, impeded the development of the u.s. fishing industry.65
The new bill, according to its author Representative John
Breaux (D-LA), gives the U.S., "the proper mechanism to achieve
self-sufficiency for our fisheries and to take care of the short
and long-term needs of the industry through immediate emergency
loans, by opening up overseas markets for our fish products, and
by expanding the amount of fish that could be harvested in our
waters by U.S. fishermen."66
In terms of how the bill would affect the Japanese and other
foreign nations fishing within the u.S. FCZ, the following are the
major provisions of the bill:
(1) Improved access to foreign markets by conditioning allo-
cations of surplus u.S. fish to foreign fisherman on favorable
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trade considerations by their countries. This condition has become
known as the "Fish and Chips" policy.
(2) Increased fees on foreign fishermen which is to be used
for temporary assistance to the u.s. fishing industry and long-term
reimbursement of costs to the federal government attributable to
foreign fishing. This provision also reduced the amount of money
paid by the u.s. taxpayer on fisheries management.
(3) Full observer coverage on foreign fishing vessels to
assure proper conservation and reduce violations of foreign vessels
within the u.s. FCZ.
(4) Assignment of fishery trade officers to six key foreign
capitals (including Tokyo) to promote u.s. fish exports. 67
(5) Increased joint ventures by restricting access of foreign
fleets to the u.s. FCZ. Many countries, such as Japan, are dependent
on the fish supply from the u.s. FCZ, and they had to realize that
access to supplies through joint ventures is better than no access
68
at all.
Therefore, the AFPA significantly changed u.s. Japanese fishery
relations in many ways; but, in some instances the Act had little
effect on prevailing relations. The balance of this section will
examine how these new provisions to the MFCMA changed the fisheries
relationship between the u.s. and Japan.
The "Fish and Chips" Policy--
Since the passage of the MFCMA in 1976, foreign fishing in
the U.S. FCZ has continued at a level between 1.2 and 2.0 million
metric tons per year, with Japan being the principal nation
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benefitting from this situation. As fishery development oppor-
tunities arose for the U.S. fishing industry in the late 1970s,
the U.S. developed a new policy regarding fishing allocations.
This policy, known as "Fish and Chips" requires foreign nations
which desire fishing allocations in the U.s. FCZ, to take actions
which will further u.s. fishery development objectives.
These include:
(1) reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers to u.s. seafood;
(2) actual increases in imports of u.s. seafoods;
(3) training and technical assistance for the U.s. industry;
(4) "over-the-side" purchases by foreign processing vessels
of fish caught by u.s. catcher vessel in the FCZ (also known as
joint venture sales);
(5) market development activities to assist u.s. exporters
penetrate foreign markets;
(6) cooperative research activities which provide needed
information about the size and location of U.s. fishery stocks. 6 9
The policy was first introduced by the Departments of State
and Commerce in late 1979 as part of allocations with the Japanese.
This was shortly after the initiation of a major federal government
initiative to develop u.s. fisheries, and let the u.s. industry take
over from the foreigners, the catching, processing and marketing of
the fishery resources in the u.s. 200-mile zone. To accomplish this,
the u.s. industry needed to adopt the catching and processing tech-
nologies, as well as the market shares, currently owned by those
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nations in u.s. waters. In order to expedite the required training,
technology transfer and foreign market development, the u.s. policy
stated that, henceforth, these nations would be required to make
measurable contributions to u.s. fishery objectives as a quid pro
quo for allocations. This "Fish and Chips" policy was subsequently
enacted law in December 1980, as part of the AFPA. 7 0
The "Fish and Chips" policy led to detailed negotiations with
each of the principal countries fishing in the u.s. FCZ, especially
the Japanese. The Japanese traditionally receive the largest fish
allocation in the U.S. FCZ. In 1980, this was over 1.4 million
. t 71metrlc ons. The bulk of this is Alaska pollock in the Bering
Sea, but Japan also fishes for squid in the Atlantic Ocean and a
host of other species in the North Pacific Ocean. Since Japan is
also the largest market for u.s. seafood exports, the initial
focus in implementing the "Fish and Chips" policy was placed on
the Japanese.
In 1978, during a visit to Japan by former Secretary of
Commerce Juanita Kreps, The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) began discussing reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers
with the Japanese. Talks continued over the next two years,
culminating in a fishery trade understanding in July 1980.
In that agreement the Japanese modified their import quota
system, with emphasis on pollock and herring, and agreed to expand
73
marketing opportunities for U.S. seafood exporters. The
Japanese also agreed to reserve 25 percent of the trading company
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portion of the quota for new U.S. exporters entering the import
system; set aside a portion of the quota for fisherman's organiza-
tions and joint ventures; and, set up a "contract point" system
for better Government to Government communications. 7 4
In return, the U.s. released 40,000 metric tons of Alaska
pollock which had been withheld from Japan in the 1980 fishery
allocation, in addition to the release of a substantial portion
of other unallocated fisheries surpluses. 75 But, as some inter-
preted the agreement, the changes in Japan's import regulations
that appeared to be directly beneficial to the U.s. were also
available to all nations, thus making the U.s. only one of many
competitors trying to gain inroads into the Japanese market. The
Japanese counter this point by pointing out that both the U.s.
and Japan are members of the Governing Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) and, therefore, they cannot discriminate favorably
against U.s. products, as this would violate GATT. 76 Consequently,
when the Japanese reduce a tariff, it must be across the board.
This will help the U.S., but it will help all other importers
as well. Therefore, the U.s. must achieve the quality seafood
product the Japanese desire to benefit from such tariff reductions.
Thus, the "fish and chips" policy plays a major role in
determining Japanese fishery allocations in the U.s. FCZ, imports
and exports of seafood products and reducing trade barriers to
U.s. fish products into Japan. What follows is a summary of how
this policy has influenced changes in the aforementioned areas.
- 26 -
Allocations--
The TALFF is determined by the Department of State, in
cooperation with the Department of Commerce. The MFC~~ requires
the Department of State to give primary consideration in its
allocation decisions to those countries which are actively con-
tributing to the development of the u.s. fishing industry. Other
criteria such as historical fishing patterns, cooperation in en-
forcement and exchange of scientific information have also been
taken into consideration. 77 However, economic factors such as
trade, tariffs and joint venture cooperation, receive the principal
. d t' . 11 t' d .. 78 I th d .conSl era lon ln a oca lon eC1Slons. n 0 er wor s, countrles
must cooperate with the u.s. fishing industry in order to maintain
their fishery allocations.
The Magnuson Act also requires the Department of State to
withhold 50 percent of a foreign nation's annual allocation to
be released during the year in order to allow the Department to
monitor that country's cooperation with u.s. industry and com-
pliance laws. Fish are released at intervals of 50 percent of
the TALFF on January 1; 25 percent on April 1; and, 25 percent on
79July 1, if the foreign nations are cooperating properly.
This type of situation allows the u.s. to evaluate the per-
formance of the Japanese four times a year and to request Japan
to do further actions in order to secure desired allocations.
From the Japanese viewpoint, this policy is developing an un-
reliable and untrustworthy relationship between the two nations.
In fact, it is possible that certain antagonistic reactions from
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from the Japanese are possible in other trade related areas
involving the two nations due to this allocation procedure. The
Japanese government and fishing industry would like to see a
stable long-term agreement between the two nations develop. The
Japanese state that they are willing to extend cooperation for
given periods of time to the U.S., in return for guaranteed access
d 11 t · . th U S FCZ th t . d 80an a oca 10ns 1n e .. over a same per10 .
Nevertheless, as a result of this greater emphasis on trade
and economic cooperation, the Japanese have been much more re-
sponsive to U.S. concerns. This is due to the fact that the
Japanese receive the largest allocation of surplus fish, primarily
Alaska pollock, in the U.S. FCZ, and they want it to stay that way.
The first formal trade related sanctions against Japan did
not occur until April 1982, when the Regan Administration placed
fishing restrictions on Japanese fishing rights. Japan's April
allocation was cut by 10 percent; therefore, instead of the normal
25 percent allocation, the Japanese received only 15 percent of
that a11ocation. 81 By the time the July 1 allocation period
rolled around, the Japanese were not going to take any more chances.
Japan's response was a package of 217 trade concessions, including.
three affecting fisheries. The most important concession dealt
with increasing the import quota on frozen herring roe and opening
82the market in Japan to a greater extent for this product.
In general, it has only been in the last few years where
major portions of the Japanese allocations in the FCZ have been
withheld. As of 1984, Japan was 28,000 metric tons (MT) below
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the average annual allocations it received during 1980-82,
(or 190,000 MT below its 1980-83 average) as a result of trade
and economic sanctions. In percentage terms, Japan's 1984
allocation was 2 percent below the 1983 allocation, 17 percent
83
off the 1980-82 average, or 14 percent of the 1980-83 average.
Many believe that this gradual cut back is not sufficient, and
that the phasing-out of foreign fleets, especially the Japanese,
is not occurring fast enough if at all. Figure 4 illustrates the
trend in Japanese allocations in the u.s. FCZ over a 13-year period.
Imports and Exports--
Headlines such as "Nakasone Urges Japanese People to 'Buy
Foreign',"84 and, "Can U.s. Goods Succeed in Japan?,"85 have
recently crossed many newspapers within the past few months. In
fact, U.S./Japan trade relations have been the subject of heated
debate in both Washington, D.C., and Tokyo for some time. Economic
relations with Japan have been in a state of perpetual crisis for
the last several years as the U.s. bilateral trade deficit has
grown. The important aspect of the crisis in the context is that
u.s. fishery interests must compete with a multitude of other
more vocal interest groups ranging from trade in high technology
products, to beef, citrus and pharmaceuticals. u.s. leverage is
limited relative to its negotiating demands and thus far been
cast in negative terms. 86 This limitation does not, however, apply
to fisheries. The u.s. has significant leverage with this sector
under the "fish and chips" provisions of the APPA, which amended
the Magnuson Act.
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Figure 4--
Japanese & Foreign Catch in the U.S. FCZ
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As of 1977, when the MFCMA was enacted, Japan replaced
the u.s. as the number one importer of fishery products (in
terms of value). During that year, Japan imported 1.8 million
metric tons of fishery products, which was an 80 percent increase
from the total a year earlier. These products were valued at $2.3
billion-- a 17 percent increase from 1976. 87
In the same year, Japanese exports of fish products also
dropped 17 percent in quantity and value from 1976 levels of 850
million metric tons and $630 million; or, less than one-third
the value of imports. This meant that the Japanese fisheries
trade deficit in 1977 exceeded $1.7 billion. Of this amount,
$79 million represented Japan's fishery trade deficit to the
U.S., marking the first time the U.S. had a favorable trade
balance in fishery products with Japan. Japan's imports of u.s.
fish products increased 131 percent from $96 million in 1976
to $222 million in 1977, while Japanese exports of fish products
to the u.s. fell by 26 percent over the same period. 88 Although,
in recent years Japanese exports of fish products to the u.s.
has increased in two major areas--surimi and cultured shellfish
(e.g., scallops). In addition, the strength of the dollar abroad
has also affected the increase in imports of fish products from
Japan. This same trend has continued until today, and is
diagrammed in Figure 5.
But these figures may be misleading. Especially in terms
of the variety of fish products imported by the Japanese. Japan
imports primarily three u.s. fish products: salmon, roe (herring
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Figure 5--U.8. Imports/Exports of Fi~hery
Products with Japan.
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and salmon), and crab. 89 This means that many other U.S. fish
products which are available for export to Japan are either not
desired or imported in small quantities. See Figure 6.
Based on fishery resources available to the U.S. industry,
one of the ways to expand export sales to Japan would be to re-
examine the various trade barriers to U.S. seafood products and
see if modifications can be made.
Trade Barriers--
A variety of tariff measures are deployed by the Japanese
on fishery products. Japanese quantitative restrictions limit
annual imports on several underutilized species of export interest
to the U.S. Notably quotas cover squid, Alaska pollock, Pacific
cod, herring, and cod and pollock roe. The structure of the
quotas, plus the procedures practiced in administering the quotas
combine to restrict imports to levels below those established by
quota. In effect, the quota system is stricter than the quantitative
limitations themselves. 90
The quantitative restrictions may be inconsistent with the
GATT itself, suggesting that the U.S. may be able to seek their
abolition. Although it might be better for U.S. interests to seek
liberalization rather than the abolition of the Japanese quota sys-
tem. 9 l In addition, the commitment of the Japanese government to
their fishermen is clear both politically and as a matter of
economic and social policy.92 Obviously, liberlization of the
quotas would be a more acceptable outcome to the Japanese.
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Non-tariff restrictions, such as import quotas, present an
even more important barrier to u.s. exports to Japan. Pollock
is one of Japan's import quota items. In 1978, the dollar-value
quota was $20 million for 98 countries, including the U.S. 99
The quality of U.S. processed fish concerns the Japanese
and may limit u.s. competition in the Japanese bottomfish market.
Some U.S. fishing industry officials believe that one way to
crack the large Japanese pollock market is through joint ventures.
Joint venture operations involve u.s. fishermen selling their
catch to foreign processing vessels, thereby providing u.s.
fishermen with a ready market. Joint ventures can provide more
jobs to the industry, but may also slow u.s. interest in the
development of a bottomfish processing capacity.
Joint Ventures--
In the fisheries field, a "joint venture" is typically
an arrangement where fish harvested by U.S. fishermen are sold
and delivered (over-the-side sales) to foreign processing vessels
operating within the u.s. FCZ: 100
In terms of U.S./Japanese fishery relations, joint ventures
are relatively new, but have expanded quickly. The MFC~~ as
originally enacted did not address the possibility of foreign
processing ships conducting fishing operations with u.s. fisher-
men. u.s. shoreside processors opposed formation of any type of
joint venture as it was just a way for the foreign fleets to
. . U 5 waters and hence take away possible revenues fromrema1n 1n . . "
the u.S. processing sector. u.s. processors were also worried about
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not having first priority for processing U.S. caught fish.
American fishermen, on the other hand, favored joint venture
arrangements, especially those involving species for which
there was little or no American market or processing capability.
This allowed the fishermen to continue to work and make a
living. In addition, new technology would be transferred for
harvesting and processing to the U.S. from these joint venture
arrangements.
In 1978, amendments to the MFCMA clarified many of these
issues. The 1978 joint venture amendments require a foreign
nation to submit a permit application to the Secretary of State
in order to enter into a joint venture. The application is also
transmitted to the Regional Councils and Secretary of Commerce
for approval. l OI
In addition, the Processor Priority amendment was signed
into law in 1978. This law gave U.S. processors first priority for
any fish harvested domestically. The second preference is given
to joint ventures, and the lowest priority is given to directed
102 , , d i.d t ' 'f' tlforeign allocations. But Jo~nt ventures ~ no s~gn~ ~can y
increase until the AFPA of 1980 was passed and the aforementioned
"fish and chips" policy was incorporated into the MFCMA. 1 03
Inasmuch as the U.S. joint venture program struggled to get
underway in 1978, the Japanese had consistently lagged behind
other nations in its willingness to offer markets to the U.S. trawl
fleet and become involved in over-the-side sales. Instead, Japan
preferred to have its own fleet harvest and process more than
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70 percent of all fish caught by foreign vessels l.'n U 5 t
.• wa ers.
But by the fall of 1981, Japan's refusal to seriously enter
into the joint venture program began to wilt under heavy political
pressure from both Congress and the White House. 1 04 In other
words, the U.S. Government told the Japanese to increase joint
ventures or lose directed allocations of fish in the U.S. FCZ.
The result was staggering. Over the first six months of
1982, Japan's joint venture tonnage tripled, surpassing 35,000
metric tons (the 1981 total was only 11,000 metric tons) .105 But
the 35,000 metric tons was only 3 percent of Japan's total 1981
landings within the U.S. FCZ. In comparison, South Korea's joint
venture landings from January to June 1982 equaled roughly 20
percent of its 1981 totals. 1 06
In attempt to solve the problem once and for all, an
industry-to-industry meeting was planned for June 1982. This
arrangement called for representatives of both nations fishing
industries to meet, discuss and decide on the target level of
joint venture activity for the two nations. Once an industry
agreement is established, a representative of the industry reports
back to their respective government with the details of the plan.
If the U.S. industry representative has a favorable report for the
U.S. government, then the Japanese can expect a good directed
fishery allocation: if the report is not favorable, then cut-backs
in the allocation are likely. These agreements were probably the
first indication that the Japanese finally realized that the size
of their directed fishery will indeed be linked to their joint
- 39 -
venture efforts. 107 These type of industry-to-industry agreements
have occurred yearly since the initial meeting.
The 1982 session led to an increase in Japanese 1982-83
joint venture purchases of almost 120,000 metric tons and a 1983-84
level of over 200,000 metric tons. The 1983 meeting projected the
1984 and 1985 purchases to be between 350,000 metric tons and
500,000 metric tons respectively. The 1983 agreement was valued
at about $44 million to u.s. fishermen. 1 08 Table 1 lists U.S./Jap-
anese joint venture activity through 1984.
The 1984 meeting was perhaps a cornerstone in future U.s./
Japanese relations. The Japanese agreed to purchase for the first
t ' 68 'II' d f US' , 109~me m~ ~on poun so .. processes sur~m~. A copy of
this agreement appears in Appendix II. Thus, the prospects for
the American seafood industry may have never been better. Even
surimi production is now possible--Alaska pollock caught, processed
and eaten in America. But there is a flip-side to this record.
Pollock Trade Deficit--
Essentially, the Japanese are buying Alaska pollock for
$.04 a pound and shipping it back to the u.s. as imitation crab
legs (kanibo) for $2.25 to $3.00 a pound. u.s. companies have
begun to purchase surimi for manufacture into second stage, kami-
boko, products for the u.s. consumer. But this market will bypass
the Alaska industry unless it can produce surimi of sufficient
110quality and price to compete with the Japanese.
Joint venture boats can afford to deliver fish for $.04-$.05
a pound when they transfer cod ends at sea to the Japanese, but
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(1 )
(2 )
Company Names:
AHL--A1yeska Ocean/Hoko
JHA--Jeff Hendricks/Hoko Fish
PAK--Pan-A1aska/Taiyo
PPS--Peter Pan Seafoods/Nichiro Gyogyo
UNI--Uni-Sea/Nippon Sui san Kaisha
WFS--Whitney Fida1go/0htori Sui san (Kyokuyo)
WTI--Westward Traw1ers/Taiyo
These represent just the initial requests by the companies
and do not include any formal or informal inseason aug-
mentations to the original request reviewed by the Council.
Source: Japan Fisheries Association
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they will need better pay to transport their catch to shore.
In addition, competition is already fierce among Japanese
producers who face declining demand at home and must expand in
u.s. markets to survive. Would-be U.S. processors fear that
these large companies will be able and willing to operate at a
loss long enough to starve out any u.s. competition. In 1984,
Japanese surimi prices ranged from $.35-$.80 a pound depending
I , IIIon qua lty.
The question then arises, how far can the u.s. push the
Japanese in the area of joint ventures? The way the situation
stands now, joint ventures are profitable to both sides. But
to the Japanese, joint ventures are much less lucrative than the
directed fishery, and competition and conflict of the u.s. joint
venture product with land-based processed product in Japan is
very real. If joint ventures cease to be associated with guaranteed
directed allocations then the future for joint ventures would be
bleak. The Japanese only participate in joint ventures in order
to secure a directed fishery allocation, and if the Japanese only
had joint ventures to rely upon for their u.s. FCZ fish supply,
then it would not be a reasonable assumption that joint ventures
would continue. Why? Because it is not economically viable for
the Japanese fishing industry to participate in joint ventures
alone. Joint ventures do not provide enough profit nor incentive
, , th U S FCZ 112 Therefore, it will befor Japan to remaln In e .• .
interesting to see the outcome of the next round of industry-to-
industry agreements between the U.S. and Japan; and, to see how
- 42 -
far the Japanese may be pushed.
The Observer Program and Violations--
The last major requirement of the provisions of the AFPA
was to strengthen the U.S. observer coverage aboard foreign
fishing vessels in the U.S. The observer program has two broad
objectives, which are to collect biological data on foreign fish-
eries conducted within the U.S. FCZ, and to provide a "compliance
presence" aboard the foreign fishing vessels. The operator and/or
owner of the foreign vessel must also pay the fees for the
observer. 113
When the AFPA was passed in 1980, Section 236 of the Act
(which took effect January 1, 1982) strengthened the observer
program provisions even more. This provision states that there
must be an observer aboard every foreign fishing vessel engaged
in fishing within the U.S. FCz. 11 4
The goal of such a program is to keep down the number of
violations by foreign vessels, while reducing the costs for
enforcement. It is hard to determine whether or not this program
has been effective, as foreign violations exhibit no clear overall
trend from 1978 to 1983. 1 1 5 The trend with the Japanese since
1980 states otherwise. Both actual violations of the MFCMA and
warnings to the Japanese have increased significantly since 1980,
. . d 116
with only actual seizures of vessels declining over thlS perlo .
Table 2 illustrates this trend.
With this increasing trend in violations, despite increased
observer coverage, one would think that allocations for directed
- 43 -
Table 2--Japan: Fishing Violation Summary
Year Vessel Seizures Violations Warnings
1980 12 6 16
1981 6 22 44
1982 3 37 65
1983 9 82 56
1984 0 71 101
Source: u.s. Department of Commerce
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fisheries for the Japanese might be affected. This is not the
case. Most of the violations committed by the Japanese are for
under logging the amount of fish onboard, fishing without a permit,
failure to return prohibited species (e.g., IIAmerican" salmon)
to the ocean, or observer harassment. 11 7 But there are a lot of
IIgray-areas" in the violation regulations. For example, harassment
of observers is not covered. The procedure usually followed with
Japanese violations is that they are either fined, threatened or
negotiated with to alleviate the problems caused by violations. 118
What has developed is that the Japanese are the only nation
served with a quarterly report on their actions in the u.s. FCZ
along with strong suggestions on how to improve their fishing
IItactics ll within the FCZ . But with this increasing trend in
violations, the State Department is now becoming more heavily
involved in negotiations between the two nations to try and
, b h J 119
reduce the number of violations comm~tted y t e apanese.
Just how serious is this problem getting? In 1984 alone,
segments of the Japanese bottomfleet were allegedly cheating on
reported catches of groundfish in the North Pacific Ocean and
Bering Sea. The Gulf of Alaska was closed to all directed foreign
fishing for a period of time due to violations, almost forcing
the Japanese to withdraw from scheduled industry-to-industry
t 'th the U S 120 And the largest single penalty everagreemen s w~ . .
assessed under the MFCMA for violations was imposed on the
Japanese. The Japanese fishing company Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha Ltd.
was fined $2 million and at least six of its twenty vessels fishing
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in the Fez were barred for three years. Nichiro and its related
companies underlogged 50 percent of the fish caught and transferred
to the firm's cargo vessel in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska in
1982 and 1983.
1 21
It becomes obvious that violations are becoming
a more serious problem in the U.S./Japanese fishery relationship,
and they may have to be dealt with in a more serious fashion--by
withholding directed fishery allocations.
Upon examing the violation data, it is easy to see that the
Japanese have the greatest number of violations, warnings, and
seizures in the u.S. FCZ, plus they pay the most in terms of fines
for these actions. Figure 7 compares the Japanese violations with
the rest of the foreign fleets fishing in the FCZ. But the Japanese
also have the greatest number of vessels and opportunity to commit
violations, so these figures can be misleading.
1980 AFPA--Other Developments:
A New GIFA--
The Japanese GIFA signed in 1977 expired in December 1982,
and had to be renegotiated. The State Department drafted a model
GIFA incorporating provisions of the AFPA and issued it to Japan.
In renewing a GIFA, a nation had to agree to work with the u.S.
in developing its fishing industry and increasing u.S. fishery
d e trade impediments, providingexports, by acting to re uce or remov
information to facilitate access of u.S. fishery products to that
country, provide economic data, share expertise and transfer
technology to the u .S. fishing industry, and facilitate joint
1 , bl 122ventures where app ~ca e.
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Figure 7--Total Foreign Fleet Violations & Japanese Violations in the U.S.
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The Japanese GIFA was passed in December 1982. The GIFA was
granted to Japan, but with enough strings attached to set far-
reaching precedents for future GIFA's with Japan and any other
nation. The U.S. linked compliance by the Japanese to the Inter-
national Whaling Commission's recommendations on whaling quotas
to GIFA allocations. Japan was also ordered to improve its
measures to protect Dall's porpoises in the Pacific salmon fishery
or risk losing the right to fish within the u.s. zone. The Japanese
had to consent to these conditions in order to cintinue to fish
in the U.S. FCZ as the new GIFA was passed just before the ex-
piration of their original GIFA. The new Japanese GIFA expires
in 1987. 1 23
The End of Japanese Investment--
With the AFPA and joint ventures in full swing, u.s. fisher-
men began to prove that they could catch the fish and process them
just like the Japanese. Consequently, no longer was Japan scrambling
to buy into Alaska, but was now scrambling to get out. Rick Lauber,
executive director of the Pacific Seafoods Processors Association
reported to the Alaska legislature in 1984, that "there have been
no major investments in the Alaska fishing industry in the last
seven years and all major Japanese companies are trying to sell
their Alaskan holdings."124 Thus, a new era in the U.S. fishing
industry is on the horizon with the reduction of Japanese
investment in Alaska and the increased capabilities of the u.s.
fishing and processing sector.
A summary of the years since the enactment of the AFPA shows
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that the U.S. industry has started to grow in some areas, while
the Japanese have held their ground in the area of directed
allocations, while making concessions in other areas, such as
joint ventures, GIFA negotiations and so forth. Up to this
point, this discussion has been based on the North Pacific fish-
eries. The Japanese still participate in the Atlantic fishery,
but it is now at a very limited level. The next section provides
a brief summary of the Japanese involvement in the Atlantic
fishery.
The Atlantic Fishery and Japan--
The Japanese used to participate heavily in the Atlantic
fishery primarily for three types of fish: butterfish, squid
and Atlantic bluefin tuna.
As of 1982, butterfish allocations to foreign fleets were
prohibited, thereby eliminating the Japanese from this fishery.
Japan is now forced to buy their butterfish from U.S. fishermen,
primarily from Rhode Island. 1 25
The squid fishery still exists, but not at the levels that
it had once attained. The Japanese used to have 20 to 30 trawlers
fishing squid off the east coast of the U.S. Today, with the
"fish and chips" policy in place, the directed fishery for squid
has been replaced by joint ventures and a limited directed fishery
allocation. The Japanese used to catch 30 to 40 thousand metric
tons of squid in the Atlantic in the early to mid-1970s. Today,
the directed allocation is for one to two thousand metric tons--
. 126
a drastic reduct~on.
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The third and most controversial fishery that has been
reduced drastically is that for Atlantic bluefin tuna. In the
late 1960s through the mid-1970s the Japanese deployed more
than 100 tuna vessels within u.s. waters, primarily in the Gulf
of Mexico. The Japanese market for bluefin tuna, a delicacy in
Japan, was expanding tremendously during this period, and both
Japanese fishermen and u.s. fishermen, selling the tuna to Japan,
made profits from the catch. 1 27
In 1966, the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was formed, with both the u.s. and
Japan as members. 1 28 But it was not until 1975 that the u.s.
passed enabling legislation for ICCAT with the Atlantic Tunas
Convention Act (ATCA), which allows the u.s. to carry out
ICCAT recommendations for bluefin tuna. 1 29 Both the ICCAT
Constitution and ATCA had one primary objective in mind--the
conservation of Atlantic tuna, especially the bluefin. The
u.s. responded with quotas for u.s. fishermen, but the Japanese
were not subject to the u.s. quotas because the fish was governed
under an international organization, and not under u.s. law. It
was also becoming obvious that overfishing by the Japanese long-
. . bl 130
liners in the Gulf of Mexico was becom~ng a ser~ous pro em.
When the Magnuson Act passed, it also appeared that there
was little this legislation could do to prevent the Japanese from
fishing for tuna within the U.S. FCZ. The Act specifically
exempts from its application highly migratory species, defined as
t
131 Tuna were thus the only species exempted from the
una.
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areas:
Magnuson Act's establishment of the U.S. 200-mile FCZ. However,
the Japanese, while in the process of catching Atlantic bluefin
tuna, were also catching in the same net species of fish specifically
covered by the prohibitions of the MFCMA; such as marlins.
What happened next was that the U.S. developed a fishery
management plan for billfish, prohibiting the by-catch of these
fish while catching tuna. This is an almost impossible thing to
do, as the long1ine gear used is not species selective, and it
sever1y limited the Japanese catch of tuna. 1 32 But the big blow
to the Japanese came from ICCAT, when the organization put a
fishing moratorium on b1uefin tuna in 1981, limiting the catch
to scientific research purposes only, and thereby eliminating the
Japanese, as well as the Americans and Canadians from this fishery.133
Today, the Japanese have at the most four to five vessels in the
Gulf of Mexico fishing for the b1uefin tuna. 1 3 4
The Atlantic fishery was at one time a strong area of
fishing for the Japanese, but it no longer is a major factor
in u.s./Japan fishery relations. But there are other areas of
concern that involve the two nations, surrounding four principal
Whaling, high-seas salmon, surimi, and the future of the
Magnuson Act. The last section of this paper examines these four
controversial areas in some detail.
The Whaling Issue--
Perhaps the most emotional issue that highlights U.S./Japan
fishery relations centers around the whaling issue. "Save the
Whale" bumper stickers, posters, buttons and other paraphernalia
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are commonplace in the U.S. where whales are viewed as creatures
to be protected, honored and saved from hunting. In Japan, the
whale hunt is part of that nation's cultural tradition and was
re-established in that country after World War II by General
Douglas MacArthur to help the ailing Japanese economy.135 What
has happened since the late 1940s is that Japan's whaling fleet
grew, and the U.S. ceased all whaling operations and led the
conservationist movement to save the whales. The culmination
of this debate occurred in July 1982, when a moratorium on all
commercial whaling was sanctioned by the International Whaling
Commission. What follows is a look at the U.S./Japanese struggle
over the whaling issue and how this might affect future relations.
The 1982 IWC Decision--
On July 23, 1982, an historic event occurred in Brighton,
England. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) voted to
begin a three year ban on all commercial whaling beginning at
, h I' 136 Th votethe start of the 1985-86 Antarctlc w a lng season. e
was a sweeping 25-to-7 victorYi 1 37 nonetheless, several nations
opposing the ban threatened to file objections and continue
. 138
whaling in spite of the moratorlum.
Some observers noted that the decision to ban whaling,
coming after a long ten year debate, meant that international
. ' 139
public opinion would increase pressure on the whallng natl0ns.
, d b th IWC's subsequent decisionSuch optimism was substantlate Y e
h number of whales that may be caughtto decrease drastically t e
each year until 1986.
1 40
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On July 24, 1982, Japanese officials expressed grave
concern over the moratorium decision. Kumio Yonezawa, the chief
Japanese delegate at the meeting observed that it was "quite
regrettable that the IWC took such an unscientific decision,,141
Several months later, on November 3, Japan, the USSR, Chile,
Norway and Peru filed objections to the moratorium, thereby liber-
ating themselves to continue hunting after 1986. 1 42 Upon filing
an objection for his country, Japan's foreign minister expressed
Japan's belief that no scientific justification existed for the
IWC's ban on whaling. 1 43
At the IWC's 1983 meeting, Peru agreed to follow the three
year moratorium, and Chile announced its intention to stop all
whaling. Japan, the USSR and Norway, however, reaffirmed their
'II' b i.d b h ,144unW1 1ngness to a 1 e y t e morator1urn.
U.S. Domestic Legislation--
During this same time period, U.S. legislation was being
implemented to stop whaling. The best examples of such laws in
the U.S. are the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969,145
the Endangered Species Act of 1973,146 the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972,147 the Pelly amendment to the Fisherman's Protective
Act of 1967,148 and the Packwood-Magnuson amendment to the Magnuson
149
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) of 1976.
The first three of these laws could be used at the time they
were passed to sanction domestic whalers who violated domestic
and IWC regulations. The last two laws are brought into effect
when it is obvious that an activity on the part of a national of
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one country or another diminishes the effectiveness of an inter-
national fisheries conservation program. 1 SO
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 was the
first large-scale measure passed by Congress to outlaw the trade
or killing of specific animal species. Pursuant to this act the
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to implement a comprehen-
sive program to conserve wildlife, including the preparation of
a list of endangered species which cannot be legally hunted or
lSItraded. In 1970, the Secretary was forced to place all
commercially valuable whales on the Endangered Species List, thereby
prohibiting domestic trade in all whale products. l S2 Although the
U.S. had nearly stopped whaling by this time, the action was more
than symbolic, as it deprived the Japanese of a large market (e.g.,
cosmetics, transmission fluid, ... ) and signaled the U.S. as a
lS3leader in the international effort to preserve whales.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, imposes
a moratorium on the commercial exploitation of all marine mammals.
Section Two of the MMPA sets forth the basis of present American
h d d . mammals.
l S4
policy on cetaceans and ot er en angere mar~ne
It states in part:
"Congress finds that certain speci~s and populatio~ st~cks
of marine mammals are, or may be, ~n danger of ext~nct~on
or depletion as a result of man's activities; ma:ine ma~als
have proven themselves to be resources of great ~nternat~~nal
significance, esthetic and recreational as well as econom~c,
and it is the sense of Congress that they should be p:otected
and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feas~ble
commensurate with sound policies of resource management and
that the primary objective of their manageme~t should be to 11155
maintain the health and stability of the mar~ne ecosystem...
The Act committed the U.S. to long term management and
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research programs to conserve and to protect marine mammals, and
imposed a ban on taking or importing marine mammals or their
products in the u.s. The Secretary of Commerce, acting through
the Secretary of State, was required to initiate amendments to
any international agreement for the protection and conservation
of marine mammals to which the u.S. is a party in order to make
such an agreement consistent with the purposes and policies of
the Act. 1 56
Because the whaling nations are not dependent upon the
American market, the MMPA and the 1969 and 1973 Endangered Species
Acts have been unsuccessful in limiting world-wide whaling simply
b 1 . th Am' k 157 h h f t dy c oS1ng e er1can mar et. Congress as t ere ore attemp e
to influence wildlife management policies of other countries
through the addition of two key amendments: the 1971 Pelly amend-
ment to the 1967 Fisherman's Protective Act and the 1979 Packwood-
Magnuson amendment to the 1976 MFCMA. Their intent was to enhance
6 . 158the enforcement of the Act's and of the 194 Convent10n.
The Pelly amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act was
enacted on December 23, 1971. 1 59 (The complete text of the amend-
ment is found in Appendix III.) This measure provides for an
embargo of fisheries imports from countries conducting fishing
operations which diminish the effectiveness of any international
S t a r y of Commerce cert-fishery conservation program upon ecre
. . 160
ification and subsequent Presidental d1rect1on.
This is a purely political decision by the President as to
whether or not the sanctions of the Pelly amendment will be
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carried out. 1 61
The Packwood-Magnuson amendment to the MFCMA was enacted
on August 15, 1979. 1 6 2 (The complete text of the amendment is
found in Appendlo'x IV). Thlo's m as d' de ure was es~gne to strengthen
economic sanctions against the offending country, provide for
reductions in fishing allocations in the u.s. 200-mile Fishery
Conservation Zone (FCZ), make a minimum of a 50 percent allocation
reduction mandatory for fish caught in the zone, and expedite
action under the Pelly certification process. This law is not
d ' , 163loscretloonary. The amendment also clarifies the certification
process:
"The term 'certification' means a certification made by the
Secretary (of Commerce) that nationals of a foreign country,
directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations or en-
gaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness
f 1 . of h I' "164of the International Convention or the Regu at loon W a long •..
between the U.S. and other non-whaling nations, on the one hand,
and the objecting nations on the other. The u.s. has the ability
to encourage compliance of whaling nations to the IWC regulations
and quotas through the use of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
amendments.
Because whaling is a matter of international concern, the
actions taken or not taken by the u.s. can have broad implications.
The focus of this section will then be to concentrate on these
two amendments and deal with the following aspects: the importance
of the amendments to the international and domestic communities;
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the workings of the amendments; the "legality" of the amendments
internationally; their employment or non-employment by the. U.S.
and the consequences that might follow; the Japanese viewpoint,
which is often overlooked; and, what lies ahead for the U.S.,
Japan, whaling and the intricacies this policy plays with fishery
relations between the two nations.
The Pe11y and Packwood-Magnuson amendments are an extremely
important part of the future for the IWC if the moratorium on
whaling is to succeed. One reason why this is so lies with the
enforcement provisions of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). The absence of an effective en-
forcement provision is one of the most distressing aspects of
the ICRW to conservationists, and is largely responsible for the
IWC1s inefficiency in curtailing the hunting of seriously en-
dangered species. According to the ICRW, if a nation disagrees
with an ICW regulation it must file an official objection within
90 days to be free of the regulation. After this is done, the
nation has fulfilled its legal obligations to the Convention
and is free to "violate" the regu1ation. 1 65 Perhaps the only
teeth in the ICRW lie in the promise among individual members
to "take appropriate measures to ensure the application of the
provisions of this Convention and the punishment of infractions
., ,,166 This promise, however, lacks sub-
against said prov1s10n ...
stance.
. t sIt have consisted ofIn the past, "appropr1a e measure
bonus or other renumeration ca1cu-
no more than withholding any
167
1ated on the basis of whales killed beyond the quota.
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This type of enforcement continued until the 1970s when
the U.S. took action. As of today, the only significant sanctions
that can be imposed by any nation on countries defying the ban
are based on U.S. legislation--the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
amendments. 168 E ' , k' hconom~c sanct~ons a ~n to t e Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson laws in other countries may be deployed. But, this will
be difficult because of Japan's economic muscle; although, it
might happen anyway. The countries most likely to deploy such laws
are: England, Australia, New Zealand, France, Sweden and the
Netherlands. 1 69
The U.S. Senate made it absolutely clear to whaling nations
and to the Administration that it would use the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson amendments to the fullest extent if the moratorium was
not followed. A recent letter that was sent to Secretary of
.. d b ;s ev;dence of th;s.170Commerce Baldridge, s~gne Y 66 Senators 4 4 4
In addition, the House of Representatives sent a similar letter
in June of 1982 to President Reagan asking for strong action on
dmi t' 171the whaling issue by the A ~n~stra ~on.
President Reagan has also made a strong personal commitment
h 1 , l' On July 17, 1981, the President wroteto the U.S. w a ~ng po ~cy.
a letter to the nations of the IWC "to affirm the united states
, t" commitment to whale protection and togovernment s con ~nu~ng
urge you to support our proposal for an indefinite moratorium on
h 1 , ,,172commercial w a ~ng.
of t he moratorium cannot be over-The domestic importance
stated. The moratorium on whaling has been the culmination of
- 58 -
a strong effort by such conservationist groups as Greenpeace,
the National Audubon Society, Defenders of Wildlife and many
others. The support of millions of Americans lies behind the
u.S. position on whaling.
Therefore, it became extremely important that the Congress
and the u.S. government could leave any doubt in the minds of
the representatives of those countries that objected to the IWC
decisions that certification is not only possible but probable
if any nation acts to diminish the effectiveness of the IWC.
The certification process itself is fairly complex and
time consuming. It is one of the reasons that implementation of
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments takes so long; hence,
the process interferes with the quick utilization of these two
1 d h he i ff' 173 Th t' f ' t'aws an ampers t ~r e ect~veness. e cer ~ ~ca ~on
process is outlined in Appendix V.
Partly due to this long and tedious procedure, certification
under the Pelly amendment has occurred on only two occasions, and
certification under the Packwood-Magnuson amendment has yet to
occur, although the certification procedure has been started on
a number of occasions against Japan and the soviet Union.
In 1973, Japan and the Soviet Union were certified under
the Pelly amendment for taking 3000 minke whales in excess of
f h However , the President didquotas established or t e season.
not exercise his authority to impose sanctions against Japan or
. 174 It was not until 1983, that
the soviet Union in th~s case.
further whaling sanctions were carried out against the Japanese.
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Up to this point in time, threats and verbal assurances
by the U.S. that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments
would be deployed against the Japanese, who were
"illegally"
whaling, have been very effective in curtailing such whaling
activities.
The International Legality of U.S. Whaling Laws--
One of the more interesting and controversial aspects
that involves the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments em-
bodies their "legality" internationally. These two laws are
laws in the U.S., but outside this nation a problem begins to
develop.
The intent of U.S. policy is clear: to conserve and to
protect marine mammals. International policy, though it has
been altered in recent years, has a different intent: to
maintain commercial whaling. The very title of the Convention
implies acceptance of commercial whaling. 17 5 Additional evidence
can be found in the preamble to the Convention, which says in part:
"Considering that the history of whaling has seen over-
fishing of one area after another and of one species of
whale after another to such a degree that it is essential
to protect all species of whales from further overfishing;
Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of
natural increases if whaling is properly regulated, and
that increases in the size of whale stocks will permit
increases in the number of whales which may be captured
without endangering these natural resources;
Recognizing that it is in the common interest to achieve
the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible
without causing widespread economic and nutritional
distress;
Recognizing that in the course of achievin~ these
objectives, whaling operations should be conf~ned to th~se
species best able to sustain exploitation in order to g~ve
an interval for recovery to certain species of whales now
depleted in numbers •.. "176
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Thus, where American policy emphasizes management for
protection and conservation and prohibits all commercial ex-
ploitation of whales, the Convention sanctions commercial
hunting of whales and stresses management in order to reach or
to sustain population levels at which whales can be taken for
commercial purposes.177
Consequently, the goals of conservation and industry
development are often contradictory. It is likely, however,
that in 1946 "conservation" was viewed only as a means to
achieve the larger end of industry development. 1 7 8 It is
possible that treaty drafters did not realize that there was
an inconsistency and, therefore, saw no reason to provide for
the resolution of conflicts between the goals of conservation
d . d h 179 1an ~n ustry growt . The ong-term consequence of such
juxtaposed goals, however, has been nearly forty years of conflict
.. rob 180
among Comm~ss~on me ers.
The U.S. Department of State, which is closely involved in
the preparation and negotiation of u.s. government positions re-
garding the IWC, sees its responsibility as follows: One, to in-
sure that other member governments of the IWC are apprised of
U.S. positions on issues before the Commission; two, to convey to
the u.s. delegation and government agencies foreign interests and
positions on IWC matters; three, to insure that IWC policies are
consistent with broader U.S. foreign policy objectives; and four,
to insure that U.s. IWC positions are consistent with other inter-
., 181
national treaties and negot~at~ons.
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The fourth point again fits the pattern of contradictory
policies, as u.s. anti-whaling pol;cy .~ ~s contrary to the objectives
of the IWC, to "provide for the proper conservation of whale
stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry. "lS2
The question of the international legality of the amendments
still remains undecided, and there are some interesting viewpoints
of this situation. The question has been raised whether or not
an objection by a whaling nation, which is legally allowed by the
Convention, is sufficient to invoke either the Pelly or Packwood-
Magnuson amendments. The answer to this question varies depending
upon who one asks. l S3
Under the terms of the Convention, the objection to a
position to establish a moratorium also is a legally recognizable
position. The U.s. position has been to look at the objection,
which the U.s. does recognize as being a legal statement, and
nevertheless pursue actions against a country that might ultimately
d . 184end-up resulting in Pelly or Packwood-Magnuson amen ment sanct~ons.
The next result of all of this controversy is that there is
seemingly an inconsistency between U.s. treaty agreements with
the whaling nations of the IWC, which gives them the right to object
to an IWC regulation, and the U.s. laws which compel U.s. agencies
of government to encourage these nations not to object.
Through the ICRW, Japan and other whaling nations have been
given the right to Object to decisions such as the moratorium.
Nevertheless, the privilege of fishing within U.s. borders and
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other privileges that f
may e fect some nations are indeed privileges,
which in fact, can be 'thdw~ rawn or increased or diminished depend-
ing upon this nations pol;c;es '~ ~ ~n encouraging people to do what
the U.S. believes is correct.
Therefore, U.S. policy may be inter-
preted as not being radically inconsistent internationally, rather,
these laws can be interpreted '~n a manner so that they do not
touch upon the legality of the t'
ac ~on of Japan or of the Soviet
Union or Norway. It ' 1 's~mp y ~s a means by which the U.S., through
congressional action, encourages whaling nations to adopt a policy
consistent with U.S. policy.
U.S./Japan Struggle--
Presently, the only actions taken by the U.S. government
against Japan has been to cut its fishing allocations within the
U.S. Fez. In 1983, the U.S. withheld more than 170,000 metric
tons of fish from the Japanese allocation--which amounted to about
10 percent of the total Japanese allocation within the FCZ for 1983.
This was also the only year that the whaling provisions of the MFCMA
were used to withhold allocations. 1 8S
The focus of the majority of U.S. whaling policy objectives
is on Japan for several reasons. First of all, Japan kills more
whales than any other nation does, and buys all the rest of the
whale meat except that which is killed by the Norwegians. It
stands to reason that should Japan have a change of heart and give
up whaling, most if not all other whaling nations would follow
suit. The Soviets have already indicated that they will quit
whaling when Japan does. Putting pressure on Norway may prove more
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difficult than leaning on Japan, since Norwegian boats do not
fish in u.s. waters to any significant extent. But the Pelly
amendment can have a great impact on Norwegian fish imports to
the U.S. if it is deployed against Norway. 186 The first real
moment of truth regarding the moratorium and a Pel1y/Packwood-
Magnuson decision, was to have taken place in the fall of 1984,
when the North Pacific sperm whale season was to begin for Jap-
anese whalers. The Japanese indicated that they planned to hunt
the sperm whale in accordance with their objection to the issue,
and therefore, "violate" the IWC ban. Consequently, the approach
that the U.S. planned to follow regarding this situation was being
closely watched world-wide. 187 The result appeared to be a compro-
mise. On November 14, 1984, the Commerce Department reported that
the U.s. and Japan had reached an agreement that would allow Japan
to continue whaling until the end of 1987. 1 8 8
According to the Commerce Department, the agreement allowed
Japan to continue the sperm whale catch until 1987 as long as
Japan withdrew its objection to the sperm whale ban by December
1984, and to the moratorium on all commercial whaling by April I,
1985. 1 8 9 This agreement implied that Japan would end all commercial
whaling by 1988.
The confusing part to this whole deal was, at that time, the
den ; e d that a pact to end all whaling had been made. TheJapanese •
;nd;cated that they only agreed to limit the sperm whaleJapanese. •
catch and that an accord to end all commercial whaling was not
190
agreed upon.
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Secretary of
amendments. 191
A third major participant;n h'~ t ~s decision, the U.S. conser-
vation groups, have stated that th
e agreement violates American
law. They asked the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to make Secretary of Commerce Baldridge and
State Shultz enforce the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
On one side of the argument were the
conservation groups and on the
other, the U.S. government joined by the Japan Whaling Association
and Japan Fisheries Association as defendants.
The Japanese continued to pressure U.S. fishermen with various
"arm-twisting" techniques 1 92 and have
even threatened to pullout
of the west coast fisheries both as a buyer and processor--a move
that could seriously affect the industry--pending the outcome of
the decision. In fact, this pressure forced U.S. fishermen to
lobby on the Japanese side on the whaling issue. In addition, in-
formation from the trade fisheries data shows that the use of these
sanctions may have a major impact on U.S. fisheries policy. Fishery
imports, joint ventures and FCZ revenues could all be affected. 1 93
The Japanese have also hired some very highly placed American
citizens to lobby for Japan on the whaling issue. These individuals
include: former congressman and cabinet member, Brock Adams;
former legislative assistant to Senator Ted Stevens, Steven Perles;
and, two appointees from President Carter's Administration--the
former U.S. commissioner to the IWC and head of NOAA, Richard Frank,
and the former head of NMFS, Terry Leitzell. These moves were
made to encourage resistance to U.S. government pressure on whaling
nations and to counsel the Japanese on the implications and likeli-
194hood of use of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments.
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Regardless of the Japanese efforts, on March 5, 1985, a
Federal judge voided the Reagan Administration decision to refrain
from imposing sanctions of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amend-
ments against the Japanese for the killing of sperm whales during
the 1984 season. 1 95 Th . d d d fe JU ge or ere Secretary 0 Commerce Baldridge
and Secretary of State Shultz to certify Japan as being in violation
of the moratorium on sperm whaling established by the IWC in 1981.
Judge Charles R. Richey stated that lithe Secretary of Commerce had
a clear and non-discretionary duty to certify the Japanese in excess
of the established IWC quotas. By not doing so, the Secretary has
ignored the plain intent of Congress, and the historic significance
of u.s. sanctions in the sphere of international whaling conser-
vation. lI l 96
The U.S. government and its co-defendants appealed the decision
immediately. Within two weeks, the appellate court ruled to stay
the decision of the District court. 1 97 The appellate court's de-
cision angered the conservation groups who continued the fight
against whaling with even more vigor than before. The decision also
d tl.' me to try and corne up with a solutiongave the U.S. an Japan more
to try and please everyone.
ld not be made which would please theBut an agreement cou
conservation groups. So on April
succumbed to strong U.S. pressure
5, 1985, the Japanese government
and agreed formally to end all
For Japan, the economic consider-
commercial whaling by March 1988.
ha~e to risk a fish harvest
at ions were overwhelming. Japan would
waters wo
r t h nearly $500 million and revenues from
in American
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fishery exports to the U.S. ranging from $200 to $400 million in
order to save an industry that might make $40 million a year. 19B
The way the situation stands as of the writing of this
paper, is if the Reagan Administration wins the appeal of the
lower court decision, whaling could continue for three more years.
Should appellate jUdges uphold the lower court rUling, Japan could
be forced to stop operations earlier or be certified under both
amendments.
The Japanese Viewpoint--
The Japanese perceive the whaling issue much differently
than the U.S. The majority of the Japanese have only limited
knowledge about the issue and are, more or less, biased national-
istically, as would be the citizens of any other nation. But, due
to the fact that the whaling issue in Japan is more of an economic
issue, the average Japanese is probably more informed on the issue
. 199than the average Amer~can.
Moral Aspects--
For the Japanese, it is very difficult to understand why it
h 1 t but appa r e n t l y all right to eat lambis wrong to eat w a e mea
and beef. The Japanese consider protests against whaling as, at
bl Instead they believe that whale asthe very least, unreasona e.
well as dolphin slaughter should be handled in a business-like
manner, based on scientific data and industrial requirements. In
addition, domestic environmental groups in Japan seldom lodge
h I , 200objections to w a ~ng.
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Economic Interests--
The strongest short-run . t t~n eres s of Japan in continuing to
whale are connected with preserving employment for the crews of
whale boats. Extremely high unemployment rates are reported in
the two small towns of Wakayama and Miyagi prefectures because
the crews of whalers have traditionally been from these towns.
A shut-down of the whaling bus;ness has d d'~ cause an ~s causing
devastation in the local economies--even though 5000 people, the
number of workers directly or indirectly employed in the industry,
does not seem to be a large number in light of Japan's giant
economy. But the majority of these whalers are in their 40's or
50's and must support a family. It will not be easy for these
people to find other employment regardless of training. 201 In
fact, some Japanese interpret the American drive for the moratorium
in an interesting way. The real intention of the U.S., they say,
is not to protect whales but to force Japan to buy more beef from
the U.S. This theory is widely accepted at a grassroots level in
202Japan.
U.S. Whaling Policy-Inconsistency at Horne--
Even though the u.s. promotes a moratorium on all commercial
whaling, U.S. citizens are whaling the most endangered of all ex-
ploited whale species--the bowhead whale. The history of this
policy is intriguing, but for the purposes of this paper a compari-
son of the U.S. hunt for the bowhead and the Japanese hunt for the
minke whale summarizes the situation.
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The Bowhead vs. Minke Whale--
One of the major commercial whales exploited by Japan and
th h 1 , t' . h . k h 1 203 h . fo er w a 1ng na 10ns 1S t e m1n e w a e. T e stock S1ze or
the minke has been estimated to lie between 400,000 and 700,000
animals; the latest estimate for the Alaskan bowhead stock is
about 3,900 animals. 204 The question then arises as to how the
u.s. can justify saying that we do not want anybody anywhere in
the world taking any number of minke whales, of which at least
400,000 exist, yet we have a position that is saying it is all
right for our Alaskan Natives to kill bowhead whales, of which
we have 3,900. Is that not inconsistent?
Not according to the u.s. government who maintain that the
needs of coastal aboriginal communities with respect to cultural
d b s i d 205 Lch h . . f' . d tan su s1stence nee s outwe1g s t e SC1ent1 1C eV1 ence a
hand.
At the 35th IWC meeting, the Committee on Bowhead Whales
recommended a much lower take; the u.s. rejected that and lobbied
for a much higher position. With regard to the minke whale, the
Scientific Committee says that a take in permissable, and did
not recommend a moratorium; the u.s. has rejected that position
and lobbied within the IWC for a moratorium. 206 From this one
example, one may conclude that the u.s. position is to accept a
proposal when she likes it, and reject one when she does not.
This course of action seems to be standard policy for the u.s.
in the IWC.
Questions such as: will the Japanese make it tougher to
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obtain bowhead quotas now that they have stopped whaling? Will
the Japanese fight for subsistence whaling for their nation,
such as the Norwegians and the Soviets have done, to save the jobs
of professional whalers? will the 35th meeting of the IWC be an
interesting one? The answer to this question is definitely yes,
and the outcome of this meeting may put whaling policies on a new
course once again.
In summary, the u.S. has taken on the role of enforcer
for the IWC. The 70 percent reduction in whaling since 1973 could
not have been achieved without the threat of u.S. sanctions. If
all commercial whaling is to be ended, it is absolutely vital that
the u.S. maintains the Pelly and Packwood-Magn~son amendments in
full force.
It is in everyone's best interest to avoid the use of
sanctions and the inevitable period of tension and uncertainty
associated with sanctions. All the efforts at this time to remove
objections by whaling nations are well worth the time and energy
when measured against the effect that the Pelly and Packwood-Mag-
nuson amendments would have once in effect to u.S. and Japanese
relations in general.
It has also become clear through the analysis of the Japanese
and American perceptions of whaling that not only political and
economic factors but also historical, legal, and even cultural
factors play roles in the formation of "national interests".
High-Seas Salmon and the INPFC--
Salmon, as opposed to the whaling issue, is not an emotional
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issue in the u.s. or Japan, rather it is an important economic
issue. The key to the salmon issue is that salmon lie outside the
normal allocation procedures and issues of the MFCMA. In addition,
the salmon policy of the MFCMA contradicts prevailing international
law, which the Japanese point out. What has evolved, due to the
far-reaching migrations of salmon, is the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) formed in 1952, to handle
salmon allocations and conservation for the U.S. and Japan (Canada
is also a member, but they playa minor role in the Commission).
The INPFC has an important role to play in terms of economics,
where the U.S. reports losses of up to $7 million due to Japan
catching "U.S." salmon; determining which salmon have American
flags on them, and which originate from Asia; and, trying to keep
everyone happy--which usually does not occur. This section will
concentrate on the efforts of the INPFC and on the continued U.S./
Japan struggle for high-seas salmon.
The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission:
The Beginning-(1952-l962}--
with a long history of fishing activity in the North Pacific
Ocean, the Japanese began harvesting salmon on the high seas in
the early part of the 20th century.207 Except for the period
surrounding World War II, Japan has continued to depend heavily
upon this high seas salmon harvest to the present.
In 1952, the Japanese expanded this fishery eastward and
for the first time, began commercial high seas operations in the
1 · 1 d h' 208 ThAlaska region, just south of the A eutlan Is an c aln. e
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Japanese employed small catcher boats in combination with larger
factory vessels. These large vessels or "mothershipsll served
both as floating processors of the salmon catch and support
vessels to the small catcher fleet, permitting extended high
209
seas operations far from Japanese ports.
In that same year, the U.S., Canada and Japan began work
on a treaty governing the exploitation and management of fishery
stocks of mutual interest to the three countries. 2 l O In 1952
Japan did possess the legal right and sovereignty to pursue fishing
operations wherever she chose, but did not possess sufficient
political strength or sovereignty to exercise independently such
legal rights. On the other hand, the U.S., being well aware of
her own superior position at the time, could exercise her full
political sovereignty, which permitted her to IIdisregard" Japanese
1 1 . h h' h 211ega soverelgnty on t e 19 seas.
The conference between the U.S., Japan and Canada produced
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the
h 'f' 212 h' h 'd M 9 1952 d h' hNort PaCl lC, w lC was slgne on ay, , an w lC
entered into force on June 12, 1953. 21 3 (The complete text of
the treaty is in Appendix VI) It also established the International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) to ensure the maximum
sustained productivity of a Convention area which includes all
the waters of the North Pacific Ocean. 2l 4
The most important function of the INPFC is to administer
the abstention principles of the 1952 Convention. 2 l 5 Under these
provisions, the contracting parties agreed to abstain from
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exploitation of designated species of marine life. Species to
which a party has agreed to apply conservation measures may not
be fished. The agreement includes authority to board and inspect
suspected violators and to seize and arrest vessels when they are
t 11 d . h'b't d t'" 216ac ua y engage 1n pro 1 1 e ac 1v1t1es. However, only the
authorities of the vessels flag state may penalize that vessel
and persons aboard. The enforcement tools provided in the Con-
217
vention are unusually strong for such an agreement.
The abstention principle also says that each government
agrees to refrain from entering the fishery on stocks already
being fully utilized by one or more of the contracting parties,
which stocks are under regulation purposes of achieveing maximum
sustainable yield. 2 l 8 When the agreement was negotiated, the three
governments understood that salmon of North American origin in
the North Pacific, halibut in the Northeast Pacific, and herring
stocks in the Northeast Pacific met the criteria for abstention. 2l 9
Accordingly, Japan had agreed not to fish these stocks in the
eastern North Pacific Ocean. The agreement provides for the
annual review of the extent to which these stocks continue to
qualify for abstention, and also for adding new stocks to the
abstention list. 220 The Commission has devoted the greater part of
its efforts to the administration of this abstention principle.
A third function of the INPFC originates in a Protocol to
the 1952 convention. 22l Under this Protocol, the Commission is
charged with the responsibility of determining the accuracy of
a line that in 1952 was considered accurate in separating salmon
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of American origin from salmon of Asian origin. 222 The Protocol
established a line in the Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean at
meridian 175 0 W longitude, east of which Japan agreed to abstain
from fishing for salmon. 223 (See Figure 8) This line was estab-
lished on a provisional basis subject to later Commission investi-
gation. In the event the Commission failed to recommend a line
within a reasonable period of time, the Protocol provided that the
matter would be referred to a special committee of three competent
scientists from a non-contracting party, to be selected by mutual
224
agreement.
Until 1977, the parties had not been able to agree on the
interpretation of the Protocol, with the result being that the
provision was not implemented. Japan insisted that while it had
agreed to abstain from fishing salmon east of the line, it could
legally fish west of the line without regard to the origin of the
salmon. They denied any adverse affect on the Bristol Bay salmon
run and insisted on joint conservation measures instituted only on
. bl d . 1 b . 225 Th S t d b C dan equlta e an ratlona aS1S. e u.. , suppor e y ana a,
took the opposite position and insisted that a high seas salmon
fishery is wasteful and contrary to good management and conservation
practices, impacting adversely on domestic measures to preserve
the salmon runs. 22 5
Organizationally, the INPFC is composed of a small Secretariat,
and it does not employ its own research staff. 227 Its role with
respect to research is limited to the drafting of joint programs to
the coordination of the contributors of member States to such pro~
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and Subsequent Protocol.
Source: Queirolo, 1982.
respect to research is limited to the drafting of joint programs
to the coordination of the contributors of member States to such
programs and to the exchange of their results--which are pUblished
each year in the INPFC Annual Report. 22 8 Many of the national
programs are interest oriented in the sense that they are designed
to support, or negate, certain national positions, e.g., where the
abstention line should be placed. Nevertheless, the Commission's
efforts have greatly increased the knowledge of the resources
and the fisheries of the North Pacific ocean. 2 2 9
The constitutive treaty of the INPFC had a mandatory life
of ten years, which elapsed on June 12, 1963, and is now terminable
on one-year written notice by anyone of the three parties. 23 0
Attempts to draft a new Convention have been unsuccessful. It
was not until 1977 when u.s. domestic legislation dictated that
major revisions occur within the treaty. Between 1963 and 1977
each nation involved in the INPFC would reiterate its position
at the annual meeting: Japan wanted a larger share of the North
American spawned salmon, the u.s. wanted the Japanese to have a
smaller share, and Canada wanted to continue the total exclusion
of the Japanese from Canadian spawned salmon. 2 3l During this 14
year period this was the highlight of each INPFC meeting, and
each nation agreed not to alter the status quo, where upon the
. ld d' 232meetlng wou a Journ.
The Abstention Principle--
Probably one of the most controversial provisions in the
INPFC and within all international organizations is the abstention
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principle. The abstention principle primarily reserved salmon,
halibut and herring stocks east of 175 0 West longitude for ex-
ploitation by Canadian and u.s. citizens. 223 The Japanese pro-
tested the location and the need for the abstention line established
234
under the 1952 agreement. Part of Japan's dissatisfaction with
the abstention principle stemmed from the position that the formula
was unfair because, in its view, it was designed for protection of
the Canadian and American fisheries industries rather than the
235
conservation of fishery resources. Furthermore, Japan desired
a larger share of North American salmon catches and objected to
the potential precedent the abstention line principle set with re-
spect to negotiations over Soviet jurisdiction in the Northwest
Pacific. Japan also objected to the determination of what con-
stituted the MSY by the u.s. and Canada, respectively, for stocks
of salmon originating in natural waters with no provision for Jap-
.. . . h d . . 236anese part~c~pat~on ~n t e ec~s~on process.
Canada and the u.s. argued that the principle was sound,
that it resulted in conservation of fish stocks and that it took
into consideration the contribution of the coastal state in the
. .. d . . h f' h k 237ma~nta~n~ng an ~mprov~ng t e ~s stoc s. An attempt to re-
negotiate the abstention formula foundered on the differences be-
tween these positions in 1963. 23 8
A problem with the Convention at the time, as viewed by the
U.S., was that the provisional line established at 175 0 West
longitude was biologically inappropriate, since an estimated ten
percent of the total catch of salmon in that area are salmon of
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N th Amer i . . 239or er1can or1g1n. No solution to the abstention line
has been found under the auspices of the INPFC that has satisfied
the contracting parties.
The INPFC-(1962-l977)--
By 1959 it had become apparent that certain herring stocks
did not meet the abstention requirements and were removed from the
protection of the treaty.240 By 1962, most of the remainder of
the herring stocks, and all the halibut in the "triangle area"
between the Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian Island chain (Eastern
Bering Sea) were removed from the protection of the treaty.241
The INPFC's measures concerning halibut in 1963 did not prevent
this species from being sever1y overfished. Discussions are now
held annually to fix a catch quota for halibut in the Eastern
Bering Sea. The INPFC has followed the conservation recommendations
made by the International Halibut Commission, which entered into
force in 1953. 24 2
The Halibut Commission has reduced the allowable catch for
u.S. and Canadian fishermen to arrest the decline of the halibut
resource off the North American Coast. However, the halibut
stocks have failed to respond to regulatory measures taken. There
is reason to believe that the large foreign fleets operating in
and around the continental shelf are the cause for this. This is
because halibut are vulnerable to trawl gear--the primary fishing
gear used by foreign fleets in the area. 243
Following the annual meeting of the INPFC in November 1974,
the Japanese agreed at a special meeting which included Canada,
- 78 -
during U.S./Japan bilateral negotiations, to ban trawling in
specified areas and periods during 1975 in the East Bering Sea
where halibut are taken in substantial quantities as an incidental
catch. 24 4
Numerous other developments have also occurred since the
treaty was signed in 1953 which suggest the need for review of the
treaty structure. 2 45 Thus, in 1963, when the ten-year mandatory
life of the treaty came to an end, pressure was initiated in both
the u.S. and Japan toward negotiation. Negotiatiors were appointed
and meetings were held. 246 Needless to say, the June 1963 nego-
tiations were not successful. Japan opposed the abstention formula,
the U.S. supported it. Two subsequent meetings between the con-
tracting nations in September-October, 1963, and in September-
247October, 1964, failed to produce a new treaty. No new nego-
tiations were held, and none planned until 1977. During this period,
both sides continued to express their dissatisfaction with the
present state of affairs.
By the 1960's it became apparent that few Canadian salmon
were swimming into Japanese nets. Consequently, the u.s. and
Japan have since carried on most of the research, negotiations
and controversy surrounding North American salmon origins and
. . 248m~grat~ons.
It was also during this time period that U.S. attention
started to rapidly shift towards the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon
stocks. In the spring of 1965, representatives of the fishing
industry from Washington, Oregon and Alaska met with State Department
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officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss methods of preventing
the possibility of Japanese high seas fishing for Bristol Bay
salmon during the summer of 1965. The representatives repeated
a request that in the future, American negotiators hold out for
a new treaty which would move the provisional abstention line
249ten degrees further west.
To try and increase pressure on the Japanese, the u.s.
Senate passed a bill on May 19, 1965, permitting the President
to increase import duties on fish products by as much as 50 per-
cent for any country whose practices were "found to be injurious
to u.s. fish conservation programs. 11 25 0 Although Japan was not
mentioned specifically in the bill, the sponsors made it clear
that Japan was the object of the legislation. 25l Also during May,
a national boycott of Japanese imports was threatened effective
June 1, 1965, unless the Japanese agreed not to fish for U.S.
spawned salmon, east or west of the abstention line. 25 2 About
the same time, Alaska's Governor Egan proposed a plan whereby
a low dam would be built across Bristol Bay which would stop the
migration of those salmon to the sea if the Japanese persisted
in their high seas salmon fishery.253 Although the Egan plan
was considered biologically absurd by U.S. scientists, it none-
theless seemed to exemplify the angry mood of the Alaskans con-
cerning the Japanese high seas salmon fishery.
Japan answered these charges in late May 1965, arguing that
its fishermen planned to fish only west of longitude 175 0 West in
accordance with their legal right under the INPFC. Japan reiterated
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its position that they never agreed not to catch salmon of North
American origin but only to refrain from taking them east of the
175 0 line. 254
The threatened u.s. action never did occur. The Senate bill
failed to pass in the House. The attempted boycott received
little support from the public and apparently had little impact on
Japanese trade with the u.s. 255 Whether or not these threats had
an impact on Japanese policy is difficult to determine. In any
event, during the summer of 1965 eleven Japanese motherships and
369 catcher vessels fished for salmon on the high seas west of
longitude 175 0 Wand took an estimated 6,168,000 Bristol Bay sock-
eye salmon, or 24.1 percent of the total estimated catch. 25 6
In the U.S., public criticism of Japanese high seas salmon
fishing dropped rapidly as the 1965 season progressed, when it
r
became apparent that a record run was in the making. The Japanese
stated that this record run demonstrated that the sockeye resource
was on a healthy rising trend, and that the u.S. had no grounds
for the argument that Japanese high seas fishing was depleting
the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon resource. 257
The heated accusations of 1965 were not repeated in 1966,
or at least they appeared in much subdued form, both sides
apparently resigned to a continuation of the status quo. From
1966 to 1976, u.S. concerns were similar each year at the annual
meeting of the INPFC. The u.S. expressed the view that there
was a lack of conservation management by the Commission and that the
intermingling of the stocks of North American and Asian origin west
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of the abstention line should be the number one priority of
h .. 258t e Comm1SS1on. The u.s. did propose a Salmon Conservation
Resolution in 1966, that was accepted by the Japanese, but had
little impact. 25 9 The Japanese position was that the poor sockeye
runs over the years were due mostly to poor climatic conditions
and that they understood the seriousness of the salmon problem,
but that the u.S. does not understand Japan's situation. 260
By 1975, the United States' concern was extended to ground-
fish stocks in the North Pacific, and U.S. delegates to the INPFC
suggested a need for an extension of coastal state jurisdiction in
order to conserve these stocks effectively.26l This suggestion
was a forerunner of things to corne in U.S. fisheries management
in the next two years, and also in the future of the INPFC.
The INPFC and the Magnuson Act--
With the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976 262 and its
implementation on March 1, 1977, conflicts arose with existing
international fishery treaties, and the INPFC was included. The
Magnuson Act calls upon the Secretary of State to renegotiate
those agreements and treaties which are considered inconsistent
with the Act itself. 263 The inconsistency between the MFCMA and
INPFC sterns from Section 102, paragraph 2 of the Act, which states:
"The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery manage-
ment authority, in the manner provided for in this Act over all
anadramous species (salmon) throughout the migratory range of
each species beyond the fishery conservation zone; except that
such management authority shall not extend to such species during
the time they are found within any foreign nation's territorial
sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the ex-
tent that such sea or zone is recognized by the United States."264
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This statement, in effect, says that the u.s. has complete
management authority over u.s. salmon until they reach another
nation's FCZ. Therefore, u.s. salmon on the high seas are now
subject to the provisions of the Magnuson Act and the INPFC.
Here is where the inconsistency begins.
From the u.s. viewpoint at the time, the INPFC was a con-
servation agreement, but it was not entirely consistent with the
Magnuson Act. The u.s. consulted with members of the Pacific and
North Pacific fishery management councils, as to what the councils
wanted to do about the INPFC. The councils were unsure whether
or not they wanted to renegotiate the INPFC or to dispose of it. 265
The value to the states of Washington, Oregon and Alaska of
the INPFC was also considered before a decision was made. Conse-
quently, the State Department decided it would try and re-
negotiate the INPFC treaty and retain what portions it believed
good and change those provisions thought inadequate. 266 The only
way the U.S. could renegotiate the treaty was to declare its intent
to withdraw from the INPFC. On February la, 1977, the u.s. served
Canada and Japan with the one-year notice required under the
Convention of its intention to withdraw from the Convention. In
following months, representatives of the three contracting parties
met in consultations designed to amend the Convention. 26 7 As a
result of progress in these consultations, the U.S., on February
9, 1978, withdrew its notice of termination to the Convention. In
April 1978 the Convention was amended by a Protocol signed by
representatives of the three governments at Tokyo. That Protocol
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,provided for the maintenance of the INPFC. 2 68 The text of this
Protocol is in Appendix VII.
The Protocol contained two major provisions that the u.s.
insisted upon. It authorized Japan to continue to fish for
salmon inside the newly established u.s. FCZ in return for
limitations on Japanese fishing efforts beyond the u.s. FCZ. It
further shifted the easternmost limit of the Japanese high seas
fishery from 175 0 W to 175 0 E longitude south of 56 0 N latitude
(Figure 8), a marked reduction in the range of this fleet. 2 6 9
The second provision was in regard to marine mammals,
specifically the Dall's porpoise. The requirement of the government
of the U.S. that Japanese fishing vessels engaged in the salmon
fishery have on board a Certificate of Inclusion relating to the
incidental catch of marine mammals was suspended until June 9,
1981, during which period the Governments of Japan and the U.S.
were to conduct joint research, and determine the effect of the
Japanese salmon fishery on marine mammal populations, and work to
reduce or eliminate the incidental catch of marine mammals in the
f ' h 2701S ery.
Although, the primary purpose of the agreement continued
to be the desire to allow Japan the opportunity to carryon its
traditional harvest of Asian origin, principally chum salmon, while
minimizing the interceptions of North American stocks, especially
Bristol Bay sockeye salmon. 2 71 Recently there have been questions
as to just how great an impact the Japanese mothership fishery for
salmon has on North American, and particularly Western Alaskan,
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salmon fisheries under INPFC regulations as well as increased
conservationist involvement in the Dall's porpoise situation.
The Scope and Impact of the Japanese Mothership Fishery--
The 1977-78 Protocol resulted in a Japanese high seas
mothership salmon fleet consisting of four factory (mothership)
vessels and 172 catcher boats. This was down from pre-1977 averages
of ten factory vessels and 332 catcher boats. 2 72 In 1980, this
fleet fished an average of 330 "tans" (of gillnet measure approx-
imately 50 meters in length. The Japanese are limited by agree-
ment to fish a length of a driftnet, set by one catcher boat, of
a maximum of 15 km., or 9.373 miles) of net set per catcher boat
for a cumulative season total of 3.1 million "tans," only slightly
more than either of the previous two years. 273 Figure 9 details
the mothership fishing area.
Estimates derived from several sources, including age compo-
sition data for sockeye salmon; tag recovery data for pink, chum
and coho salmon; and scale pattern alaysis for chinook salmon,
indicates that under the Protocol agreement eliminating Japanese
salmon fishing east of 175 E and south of 56 N, virtually all
North American salmon intercepted in the mothership fishery are
destined to return to western Alaska. 2 7 4 Table 3 illustrates the
magnitude of the Japanese fleets annual "physical" impact on
North American sockeye, chinook and chum salmon from 1975-1980.
Pink and coho salmon of North American origin are assumed not to
b t " h" f" h 275e presen 1n t 1S 1S ery.
The reported Japanese annual "catch" of North American salmon
- 85 -
Figure 9--Japanese Mothership Salmon Fishing Area, 1978 to
Present.
Source: 1983 INPFC Annual Report
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Table 3: Physical Impacts on North American Salmon
Japanese Mothership
Fleet Estimated Catch
(1000's fish)
Japanese Mothership
Fleet Interceptions
(1000's fish) (1)
u.S. Domestic
Catch Loss (1), (2)
(1000's fish-1000 1bs.)
North American Sockeye
1975 864.0 1,612.8 1,474.5 8,847.0
1976 1,001.0 1,868.5 1,708.3 10,249.8
1977 868.0 1,620.3 1,480.3 8,888.0
1978 360.0 672.0 614.4 3,686.3
1979 478.0 892.3 815.8 4,984.5
1980 861. 0 1,607.2 1,469.4 8,816.3
North American Chinook
1975 109.0 210.7 174.0 4,177.0
1976 168.0 324.8 268.3 6,437.9
1977 65.0 125.7 103.8 2,490.9
1978 31.0 59.9 49.5 1,187.9
1979 65.0 125.7 103.8 2,490.9
1980 380.0 734.6 606.7 14,651.3
North American Chum
1975 126.0 168.0 168.0 1,175.7
1976 218.0 290.6 290.6 2,034.2
1977 223.0 297.3 297.3 2,080.8
1978 8.0 10.7 10.7 74.7
1979 43.0 57.3 57.3 401. 2
1980 39.0 52.0 52.0 363.9
(1) Assumes 1 in 4 droupout loss for maturing; 1 in 2 dropout loss
for imrnatures.
( 2) Assumes 10 percent annual mortality.
Source: Queiro10, 1982.
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by species is believed to seriously understate the mothership
fleets actual impact on North American stocks. Research into non-
catch mortality caused by fishing, referred to dropout loss,
demonstrates that substantially greater numbers of fish are killed
in Pacific Ocean salmon fisheries than are actually landed. 276
Therefore, the more appropriate indicator of the total
physical impact on North American salmon stocks is "interceptions,"
i.e., reported catch plus dropout loss (See Table 3). This data
is interpreted as for every three maturing salmon of North American
origin reported to have been taken by the Japanese, one additional
maturing North ~~erican salmon was killed but lost. Similarly,
the reported Japanese catch of immature North American salmon
reflects only one-half of the actual total kill of these same
stocks. 27 7 The importance of including dropout loss in evaluating
the actual impact on North American stocks can be seen, for example,
in the 1980 chinook salmon statistics. The estimated Japanese
mothership catch of North American chinook in 1980 was reported
to be 380,000 fish while, in fact, evidence indicates that more
than 734,000 North American chinook were intercepted, Le. killed,
in this fishery.278 One study done for NMFS recently valued
spring and summer chinook spawners at $550 a piece,279 and if one
assumes a natural mortality rate of ten percent,280 a possible
$350 million was lost in 1980 in terms of the total chinook re-
h . d 281source to t e 1n ustry.
Notwithstanding these examples, U.S. officials credit the
revised Convention with reducing Japanese pressure on U.S. stocks,
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particularly Bristol Bay sockeye, but also pink, coho and chum
282
salmon. The Convention, however, offers little protection
for the chinook salmon taken by the mothership fleet. "The
potential for interception of Alaskan chinook remains high,"
according to Colin Harris, a biologist at the University of
Washington's Fisheries Research Institute {F.R.I.}. Harris
has spent the last seven years working up data to help improve
international salmon management. 283
The gaps in the knowledge are huge. Simple questions, like
how many U.S. salmon the Japanese catch inside and outside the
U.S. FCZ, lead to a statistical nightmare. Some estimates have
been made for the mothership fleet, as previously mentioned, but
the larger landbased driftnet salmon fishery, which operates south
of the motherships, is less closely monitored. 284 Figure 10 de-
tails the fishing area of the landbased driftnet fleet. It has
been harder to judge how the revised treaty has affected the catch
of U.S. salmon by the big Japanese landbased driftnet fishery.
The latest reports by Harris and F.R.I. verify that most of the
sockeye and coho salmon harvested by the driftnet fleet are of
Asian origin; but, there has been growing evidence that North
American sockeye, pink and coho salmon and steelhead trout inhabit
285parts of the large area.
In a recent report from F.R.I., scale samples have been
analyzed form both North American and Asian chinooks, and researchers
I ' d 'f h " f f' h h h h' h 286were ab e to 1 ent1 y t e or1g1n 0 1S caug t on t e 19 seas.
Among other things, the study found that chinook caught by the land-
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Figure 10--Approximate Locations of the U.S. and USSR 200-mile
Lines in Relation to the Japanese Mothership and
Land-based Driftnet "Fishing Areas.
Source: INPFC FEIS.
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based driftnetters in the North Pacific were primarily of Alaskan
origin. This report was submitted to the INPFC in 1984, and
has been at the center of discussion since that time. 2 87
The Dall's Porpoise Agreement--
The Protocol agreement on the Dall's porpoise research pro-
gram was not easily agreed upon. It involved a series of late-
into-the-night sessions involving the Marine Mammal Commission
and conservation interests, in an attempt to reach a satisfactory
porpoise agreement with the Japanese without sacrificing what U.S.
fisheries officials felt was a good salmon treaty.288
In addition, when the original agreement was negotiated in
1952, the U.S. did not have the Marine Mammal Protection Act on
the books. So at the time of the renegotiation, there was strong
support in the U.S. to make sure that the Japanese operating within
the INPFC area meet the same standards of marine mammal protection
that are required of the U.S. tuna fleet, if they are to enter
U.S. waters at all. 28 9
The result was a U.S./Japan memorandum of understanding (MOU)
outlining extensive research commitments on the part of the Japan-
ese. Among its requirements are thorough data collection, retention
of all porpoises taken within the U.S. FCZ and a sample those
taken outside U.S. jurisdiction, and provisions for U.S. scien-
tific observers on board Japanese vessels. 2 90 Japan also agreed
"to ensure that cooperative Dall's porpoise research be conducted
with use of an appropriate Japanese vessel not later than the 1979
salmon fishing season, unless it is agreed that such research can
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be accomplished in another manner. ,,291 The MOU also calls for
scientific consultations; the first was held prior to the 1978
Japanese salmon fishing season, to address such issues as methods
to reduce or eliminate the incidental catch of porpoises in the
gill net fishery.292 --which ranges from 5000-8000 naIl's
porpoises per year. 293 Figure 11 shows the distribution of the
Dall's porpoise.
In addition, an ad hoc committee on marine mammals was
established under the INPFC. The new ad hoc marine mammal group,
which reports directly to the commissioners, includes a representative
from each of the three nations, along with advisors as chose. 294
The INPFC also agreed to add an environmentalist to the Commission's
d . . tt 295a vlsory comml ee.
The memorandum of understanding regarding Dall's porpoises
was renewed on June 3, 1981, which extended the agreement until
June of 1984. 2 96 This amended version of the Protocol is in
Appendix VIII. Discussions at the 1983 annual meeting of the
INPFC centered on ways to reduce the likelihood of entanglement
f · l' 'II h h d i f' , 297o marlne mamma s ln Japanese gl nets t roug gear mo 1 lcatlons.
In 1984 25 percent of the catcher boats in each of the Japanese
mothership salmon fleets in the u.s. FCZ fished with this modified
gear. 29 8 The modifications will be increased on an annual basis
until 100 percent of the Japanese fleet is fishing with gear that
will help limit the incidental take of Dall's porpoises. 299
Although the reported take of Dall's porpoises decreased in
1983,300 the INPFC noted that ways are still being sought to
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Figure Il--Suggested Distribution of the Dall's Porpoise.
Source: INPFC FEIS.
minimize interaction between marine mammals and the salmon fishery.
The U.S. is working with Japan on research programs outside the
U.S. FCZ to develop more complete data on population distributions
and incidental take. 30 l
Negotiations are still underway for a new MOU between the
two nations regarding an acceptable research program to be con-
ducted under the auspices of INPFC that will include sampling,
monitoring, and analysis of Dall's porpoise data throughout the
mothership salmon fishery.302
The Japanese Side--
In tracing the history of the INPFC it becomes clear that
the Japanese have had a limited say about many issues concerning
salmon, and are blamed for almost everything that effects the
u.S. salmon industry in a negative manner.
The salmon issue in Japan is an economic issue. Ths fisheries
of the North Pacific account for about 40 percent of Japan's total
303
catches, of which salmon supply close to 10 percent. The salmon
fishery is one of the central themes of Japan's food policy and
culture; as these fisheries are almost a "matter of life and
304death" for many Japanese.
The mothership and landbased fishery are a substantial part
of the North Pacific Japanese fleet, and a great number of fisher-
men and workers make their living from those fisheries and their
related industries. 305 This is also a political issue for the
Japanese, as they state that the u.s. has no right to tell the
Japanese to give up Asian salmon runs in order to let the North
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American salmon return. They also believe that this represents
consistent u.s. policy in International Fishery Organizations,
in which the u.s. always requests the foreign country to abide
by what it wants done. 3 06
But the Japanese also have an enormous stake in making sure
that Japanese fishermen do not get blamed for illegal catches
they do not make. Japan spends millions of dollars on its own
salmon propagation programs, producing mainly chum salmon. 3 0?
Japan also outspends the u.s. by at least ten to one on salmon
research. They run nine huge vessels crewed by twenty people
and at least as many smaller vessels each year, as well as con-
duc t i . 1 b k 308t1ng extens1ve a oratory wor .
Japanese fishermen also contribute large sums of money to
Soviet salmon propagation programs--about $13.3 million in 1982
alone-- in exchange for the right to harvest more than 20 million
f i h h ., . h S . U· 3a9 J d th S . t1S t at or1g1nate 1n t e OV1et n1on. apan an e OV1e
Union together release in excess of 2.1 billion hatchery fish a
year into the North Pacific and Bering Sea. And, just as U.S.
fish swim as far west as the Kamchatka Peninsula (off the Soviet
Coast), these Asian salmon migrate well into the Gulf of Alaska. 3l O
Perhaps what the Japanese fear most from the u.S. is the
possibility of a crudely executed closure of vast areas of the
ocean, cutting off Japanese access to Asian salmon in order to
protect those of Alaskan origin. What they would like best is to
prove that the existing INPFC restrictions are more strict than
311they need to be.
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The Problems and the Future of the INPFC--
Many other problems plague the INPFC that involve the u.s.
and Japan. One of these problems involves lost Japanese fishing
gear. Many fisherman's organizations and conservationist groups,
such as Greenpeace, have been trying to get monofilament drift
t l ' k th d b th J h'b't d 312 P . t dne s, 1 e ose use y e apanese, pro 1 1 e . 01n e
out by Greenpeace and fisherman's organizations both are the
economic losses that result from monofilament nets that "ghost
fish" the seas in ever-growing miles and tons of plastic. Green-
peace cites these figures: 172 catcher boats in the Japanese
high seas salmon fleet, 209 in the landbased fleet, each setting
8 miles of gear per night (26 feet deep); add to that 500 squid
boats fishing 30 miles of gear--for a total of 18,048 miles of
net per night. At a 0.6 percent rate of gear loss over five
months, equals 1,624 miles of derelict net--not counting what is
lost by the South Koreans and Taiwanese. It is estimated that a
314
minimum of 277 miles of "ghost net" is left each year. NMFS
estimates that Japan and the Soviet Union together lose or dump
about 3 million pounds of plastic annually.315
Greenpeace and others have taken this problem to the INPFC,
to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),
and the World Fisheries Council. What action, if any, FAO will
take remains to be seen. Because it was FAO that introduced
monofilament to Sri Lanka in the 1960's; the country subsequently
producing 20 to 30 thousand monofilament gillnets. 31 6
An associated problem deals with the Japanese high seas
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squid fishery. Proof that interceptions of salmon are being
made by the Japanese is still lacking officially. But because
of a regulatory flaw, fishermen in the squid fishery do not log
any catches of salmon. 31 7 The Japanese government has restricted
the squid fleet to waters that are supposedly too warm for salmon--
15 degrees centigrade or warmer. But salmon are known to swim in
waters up to 18 degrees centigrade, and u.s. biologists flatly
state that there are salmon in the area being fished by the fleet. 31 8
The squid fleet works in waters from which Japan's landbased gillnet
fishery was banned in 1978, by the renegotiated INPFC treaty. That
th 'd f' h b 'th 319same year, e SqU1 1S ery egan 1n e same waters.
The real question then becomes how much--not whether--salmon
are being landed by the squid fishery and what is and what can be
done about it. Diplomatically, little can be done. But there is
a good chance that an unofficial agreement could reduce, if not
end, salmon interceptions by the fleet. 3 2 0 This is because the
Japanese have too much to lose in terms of u.s. groundfish if
they push the issue; and, also the squid gillnet fishery is not
very popular in Japan, as it is competing directly with the older,
landbased squid fishery that operates closer to the shores of
321Japan.
The INPFC will also probably not press the issue. This
would mean renegotiating the treaty in order to place international
controls on the squid fishery. This seems to be out of the
question. The slow process of diplomacy would likely delay im-
plementation of such new controls for years. Even then, enforcement
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would be no better than it would be under an informal agreement
to restrict the fishery. The Japanese have agreed to take
observers on board squid vessels, and hopefully this will help
1 d ' 322sett e some ~sputes.
A third problem gaining support and growing concern in
the U.S. is the problem of incidental seabird mortality in the
Japanese high seas gillnet fishery. Estimates of the total number
of birds killed per season by the mothership and landbased fleets
combined range from 214,500 to 763,000, representing 17 different
species. 3l 3 An annual mortality of one-quarter to three quarter
million seabirds in this fishery may have a devastating impact
on bird populations in particular areas, or it may have a minor
impact. The truth is no one knows what impact it is having, be-
cause, as of yet, no research to determine the impact has been
carried out. 32 4 Again it appears as if the INPFC can do little
with this problem, except to possibly include the problem of sea-
bird entanglement with the propoise studies. Therefore, this prob-
lem will most likely be solved by bilateral agreement between the
U.S. and Japan away from the INPFC.
A fourth problem that has been eluded to in this discussion
is that of enforcement. The U.S. patrols the U.S. FCZ but cannot
watch over the whole ocean. The main enforcement of INPFC pro-
visions comes from Japanese authorities, who appear to be thorough
about it. 325
According to the INPFC, the Japanese have imposed severe
penalties on their fishermen; there have been up to 79-day suspensions
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imposed--and that amounts to no fishing the next year for that
vessel. 3 26 Nevertheless violations occur, and sometimes go un-
prosecuted. For example, NMFS airborne patrollers found 13
vessels from the landbased fleet east of the boundary line last
May, and another ten in July. They all got away with it because
neither NMFS nor the Coast Guard could free up a vessel to go out
and board them. 3 27
A final problem involves other nations fishing in the area.
For example, Taiwan and South Korea both operate high seas squid
fisheries in the same as the Japanese, and most certainly are
h ' N h ' 1 328 h h ' ddcatc ~ng ort Amer~can sa mono Bot t ese nat~ons a
additional threats and pressures to the u.S. salmon industry,
but also to the INPFC. Should the INPFC add these nations or not,
is a question that is continually discussed. It may not be hard
to incorporate South Korea into the Commission, but Taiwan's legal
. . 11 ld h'b' h ' h h i . 329status ~nternat~ona y wou pro ~ ~t suc a move w~t t ~s nat~on.
Therefore, this problem will most likely persist for some time.
With all these problems and controversy surrounding the INPFC,
does the u.S. or Japan benefit directly from the Commission, and
is there a future for the INPFC?
In terms of the U.S., trying to stop the Japanese harvest
of u.S. salmon altogether is theoretically possible under the
Magnuson Act. But it would almost certainly backfire badly. The
reason is two-fold: first, the ban would be difficult to enforce;
second, it would disrupt the treaties and international trade-offs
that have so far managed to curb Japan's catch of u.S. salmon pretty
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well. Once freed of its obligations under the INPFC, the
Japanese could operate just outside of the U.S. FCZ, legally
within international waters, and capture substantially greater
numbers of North American salmon than is presently the case under
the INPFC. In fact, induced impacts would most likely reach every
level of the commercial salmon industry and disrupt fishery de-
pendent communities along the entire NOrth American west coast.
In addition, the INPFC has brought about more research on
Dall's porpoises and a possible solution and end to the killing
of porpoises by high seas fleets. Salmon research and information
obtained through the Japanese has been of an enormous value to the
U.S. and something that the U.S. could not have obtained without
the INPFC and the Japanese.
The U.S. is also remaining consistent with The Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Treaty provisions for salmon, specifically
t ' 1 66 h 4 d ,330Ar 1C e , paragrap on ana ramous speC1es. This article
suggests joint management schemes for situations of this nature
are necessary for the proper management of the fish concerned.
The INPFC helps satisfy this criteria, and keeps the U.S. in line
internationally.
Perhaps the most current issue at hand is the reauthorization
of the Magnuson Act. If the Act is reauthorized with provisions
for phasing out the Japanese from the U.S. FCZ, it is even more
likely that the Japanese would leave the INPFC and take salmon of
all types right outside of the U.S. FCZ.
On the other hand, what keeps the Japanese in the INPFC is
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a delicate balance of national interests. In part, they do not
want to jeopardize their u.s. Fez fishing rights by taking too
many u.s. salmon. Unlike u.s. fishermen, they cannot just catch
the fish inshore at river mouths. And the Soviet Union will not
1 h . . d he i f ' h 331et t em 1nS1 e t e1r 1S ery zone. So they fish where they
can, incurring the high fuel bill, the inevitable loss from har-
vesting immature fish, the restrictions of the INPFC and the
wrath of the u.S. fishermen. As long as the Japanese have fishing
rights in the u.S. FCZ for groundfish, it appears as if they will
abide by INPFC regulations, as it is in their best interest. In
effect, the Soviet Union's policy has made the Japanese a thorn
in the side of the U.S., forcing both nations to wrangle over the
dilemma of how to separate hundreds of Asian and American stocks
on the high seas.
The future of the INPFC seems to be secure for now. Addition-
ally, the status quo that the INPFC provides to both the U.S. and
Japan over salmon fisheries is much better than any scenario with-
out the INPFC for both nations. As long as the u.s. allows the
Japanese to have a directed fishery in the u.S. FCZ, the INPFC
will remain--and for the better. The future of the INPFC will
most likely bring needed research into the area of salmon
migrations on the high seas; gear modifications to save marine
mammals and waterfowl; an increased level of U.S. observers on
board Japanese vessels to aid in research gathering and enforce-
ment; and, perhaps a better understanding between the two nations
about a fish that means a lot to everyone involved.
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U.S./Japan Fishery Relations--A New Dimension-Surimi--
Known as surimi, imitation or simulated crab, or seafood
analogs, as well as by many brand names--Sea Stix, Sea Legs, King
Krab, Ocean Magic, DelicaSeas, NuWave, and Seafood Sections among
others--these products have gained a foothold in the U.S. market-
place, a foothold that is still expanding. Surimi-based imports
from Japan, first shipped to this country in minimal amounts in
1976, reached six million pounds in 1981, 16 million pounds in
1982 and an estimated 1984 consumption level of 75 million
332pounds.
Surimi is an odorless, almost tasteless, white, frozen fish-
meat block made of minced, rinsed flesh fish, primarily Alaska
pollock. In Japan, over 3000 companies make hundreds of surimi-
based food products, and the category accounts for one-quarter of
the total Japanese seafood consumption (1 3/4 billion pounds) and
is valued at over $2 billion. 33 3 Surimi, known as fish paste
in the U.S., is the Japanese term for any restructured food product,
most commonly seafood; such as crab, scallop, shrimp, and most
recently lobster. The flavor likeness comes from the addition of
real shellfish, a shellfish extract, or chemical flavoring. 33 4
Surimi products were introduced into the U.S. in the form
of kamaboko; which is highly processed surimi shaped into a variety
of forms. But the product that appeals most notably to the
American palate is the crab analog, kanibo. With estimates pro-
jecting U.S. consumption of surimi products by 1990 of over 1 billion
pounds annually and 3 billion pounds by the turn of the century,335
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it is no wonder that the age of surimi has brought a new dimension
to U.S./Japanese fishery relations. The keys for the U.s. surimi
industry over the next few years will be to develop the tech-
nology, quality, competitive price and other markets in order to
satisfy the U.s. and world demand; or, the U.S. might find itself
facing another trade deficit with Japan--this time in fishery
products.
The U.S. Market--
Surimi-based products are probably the hottest thing to hit
the U.S. seafood market since the introduction of fish sticks over
30 years ago. Imports have grown from minimal amounts in the late
1970s to as much as 80 million pounds, with a retail value of more
than $300 million in 1984. 33 6 Figure 12 diagrams the past and
predicts the future consumption of surimi based products by the U.S.
Thus far, simulated crab (kanibo) has represented 90 percent
of the market, but other shellfish analogs, and possibilities
with other food types (e.g., pork, cheese ham, mushrooms, ..• )
are almost endless. In Japan, the crabmeat analog did not meet with
great success; but, in the U.S., by 1982, imports of crab analog
from Japan passed harvesting levels of real crab. 3 37
The one billion pound market estimate by 1990 only takes into
account the U.S. market. Other countries also have increased their
surimi consumption. England, for example, has experienced a recent
increase in consumption of kanibo of 900 percent! In fact, experts
predict a significant role for surimi in the global diet. 33 8
Consequently, if the market is going to be present, then the door
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is definitely open for the U.S. to enter as a major producer of
surimi-based and surimi products.
The acceptance of surimi in the U.S. has been overwhelming.
It is now thought that crab analogs are displacing real crab in
traditional markets. For example, Jewel Food Stores, a supermarket
headquartered in Chicago, no longer carries king crab in the
frozen case. But the 200 stores move in excess of 400 cases
(30 pounds per case) of surimi-based crab sticks per week, and
the chain is now testing the shrimp and scallop-flavored surimi
products. Ten-ounce packages of simulated crab were featured
at the market recently at $2.39, backed by in-store demonstrations
on preparation of the product, have helped to escalate sales. 33 9
At Seafood America, a l4-restaurant chain in the Philadelphia
area, kanibo has been part of the menu for more than two years.
The combination take-out/eat-in restaurants bread and fry kanibo
sticks which sell at a $1.79 for three. More successful is the
seafood salad, made with surimi-based crab and shrimp. Consumer
acceptance, which is the key to success, has been overwhelming.
"If you saw this (flake/chunk combination) next to merus king
crab you could probably tell the difference," admits Bob Brennan,
Seafood America founder and president. "But it's the taste--if
you mixed each in a salad, I'd defy anyone to tell me the differ-
ence."340 This same trend is spreading throughout markets and
restaurants in the u.S.
Therefore, the acceptance by the American consumer is preva-
lent, the market is obviously present, but can the American fishing
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industry enter into this arena? Surimi is an international
commodity, easily stored and transported, and domestic countries,
like restaurants and food stores, in this country will buy surimi
as they buy fillet blocks--on the basis of price, quality and
consistency of supply (something that the Japanese can supply),
regardless of the fortunes of American fishermen or the imbalance
of American fisheries trade. 3 4l
The Resource--
The fact that the u.s. owns the best source stock, in the
form of Alaska pollock, has not gone unnoticed and the u.s. govern-
ment is undoubtedly facing great pressure from its own fishermen
and entrepreneurs to put the American industry on an equal footing
with the Japanese.
In addition, domestic production of one billion pounds of
surimi-based foods would greatly increase the output of the u.s.
fleet. It could provide domestic utilization for the Alaska
pollock resource; for Pacific whiting from Washington, Oregon,
and California; for Gulf croaker; and, for red and silver hake
from New England. It could also provide a higher value for Gulf
and Atlantic menhaden. In effect, surimi could provide a use for
the bulk of the underutilized species that occur along the coast of
the U.S. 3 42 (See Figure 13).
The potential is present, as NMFS has designated $1.5 million
in Saltonstall-Kennedy funds to be spent on development of the
u.S. surimi industry. The bulk of the funds--$1.3 million--has
been allocated to the Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation,
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GULf CROAKER. While the Nlchlbel enterprise In
Bayou LaBatre . Louisiana. has proved that high-
quality surimi can be produced from croaker.
questions of species availability - and conse-
quently economic feasibility - remain. landings
In 1982 were 14 million pounds. with an ex-vessel
value of 37 cents per pound, Croaker has a uon-
sient iodine flavor. which. while not a major bor-
rier to the species' use as surlml. could present a
problem In manufacturing delicately flavored
shellfish substitutes , The stock has been low for six
years. and no immediate improvemenl Is ex-
pected, The shrimp fleet. which catches croaker
Incidentally. has been blamed for the decline.
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... RED HAKE
~tW FRESHWATER CATFISH
_ MENHADEN
.. GULF CROAKER
FRESHWATER
CAfFISH. More Ihan
80,000 acres, mainly In
the Mississippi della re-
gion. are being farmed
Intensively for catfish. pro-
ducing approximately 140 mil·
lion pounds. most of which is fil-
leted. Minced catfish recovered
from filleting wasles produces a ,
very good surlml wilh while color and
excellent gelling properties (as good
as pollock), Suriml production would be
a tremendous boost to the catfish Indus-
try. as II currently has almost no food
market for minced fish,
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methods have already been devised to produce a very WhitefA surimi from menhaden's dark ftesh. Menhaden surlml performs. admirably in the manufacture of products for which proc-~' '_ . - ' -. essing temperatures do not exceed 50-75. ~~ _ . =1t degrees C lor a significant period, Bar-,. :.-rr",,-.r "f: . . ring the development of a tood-qrooe,..~~i).;~/" I /f) .1~1! additive to inactivate the protein-. >JI'.; . . .' .. • ,~ , , degrading enzyme responsible for the.. '~';'.. " , ._~.. . . ,: " ~. temperature sensilivlty . menhaden surlmi
.....~~:- " " . is not recommended for use in meat-
~ . ' ,-'i i" type sausage items. such as hot dogs.
which are processed almost entirely at
undesirable temperatures. An coven-
lage 10 using the species is the existence
of large menhaden rendering plants
already equipped 10 handle wosie and
effluent from a surlmi operation.
t-'
o
.....:J
Figure 13--Und~rutilized species and surimi use.
Source: Seafood Business Report, 1984.
which is working to familiarize the u.s. food industry with
surimi by distributing the new product to interested food
companies. 343 According to North Pacific Fishery Management
Council Director Jim Branson, Alaska pollock alone could generate
one billion pounds of surimi annually. Whiting could add 216
million pounds to the yearly total, and East Coast species such
as menhaden and croaker could increase the output another 1.5
b ' l l ' d 3441 lon poun s.
The Open Door-U.S. Opportunity--
One of the keys to entering into the surimi business are
the yearly industry-to-industry agreements between the U.S. and
Japan. It was at the 1984 meeting in which the Japanese agreed to
buy U.S. processes surimi. This is a must for any U.S. surimi
operation to be successful, as Japan is one of the major markets
for surimi. This agreement could possibly add another $50 million
dollars to U.S. seafood revenues as well as increase employment
within the processing sector. 3 45
In January 1985, surimi operations began at the Alaska
Pacific Seafoods plant in Kodiak, Alaska, the result of the
Saltonstall-Kennedy funds used for the project. The plant is
positioned close to the large spawning grounds of the Alaska pollock
near the Shelikof Straits. This plant's aim is to produce quality
surimi and to out do the land-based Japanese surimi plants on
Hokkaido. 3 46
But the venture suffered a major setback when the first re-
cipient of the grant, Royal Alaska Seafoods, had to close its
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doors in 1984, which leaves the current recipient, Alaska Pacific.
The irony being that Alaska Pacific is a subsidiary of the Japanese
trading company Marubeni. This means that the u.s. has subsidized
the Japanese. Albeit, Marubeni is not a factor in surimi pro-
duction in Japan, rather they view the Kodiak experiment as a
means of getting into the game in the u.s. with an advantage over
h . h 347t e compet1tors at orne .
The Kodiak plant hopes to utilize several advantages over
the Hokkaido plants in Japan. First of all, the U.S. plant is
much closer to the Pollock resource. The Japanese plants must
depend upon refrigerated fish that has been stored on a ship for
five days or more, while the American plants can have fish that is
only hours old. 348 The Americans also believe that a more nu-
tritious surimi product can be produced by eventually eliminating
additives like sugar and making an all-fish surimi product. In
fact, this is being done today by a Rhode Island company that is
using krill as a binding material. 349
Problems and Obstacles--
A number of obstacles stand in the way of u.s. surimi pro-
duction. One of the initial problems involves the vessels used
in delivering pollock to the U.S. shore. A vessel that must bring
the product aboard, transport and store the fish has a much higher
production cost than a joint venture vessel. Processing costs
are now at about $.80 per pound at Kodiak, and raw material costs
are about $.25 per pound to the plant. Japanese surimi, on the
other hand, sells for $.60 to $1.00 per pound, depending upon
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quality. Therefore, it is already becoming hard to compete with
1 duc t i t b .. f' 1 350Japan un ess pro ct10n cos scan e cut S1gn1 1cant y.
Existing u.s. conversion plants producing surimi-based
products still rely on Japanese raw material. This means that
American operations are still dependent upon the Japanese market
at present. In addition, it is becoming highly unlikely that
the u.s. can produce enough u.s. processed surimi to satisfy the
1984 industry-to-industry agreement. If this occurs it may mean
that the Japanese will be less willing to enter into such an
. 351
agreement aga1n.
There are also financial uncertainties associated with
trying to create a fleet of u.s. surimi trawlers. Present con-
struction costs and domestic construction requirements of the
Jones Act represents a sizable risk for a new u.s. production
. 352
operat1on.
Other obstacles involve those quotas and duties on surimi
imports to Japan. The Japanese government established strict
quotas and a 7.5 percent duty to protect the operation by domestic
land-based surimi processors. On the u.s. side, quality and cost
of the product will be the major factors limiting u.s. surimi
exports. The u.s. must also worry about labeling laws. In the
u.s., surimi must be labeled as imitation fish, and this might be
a marketing obstacle as well. 35 3 These factors will have to be
dealt with quickly, especially those dealing with costs, in order
for the u.s. to become competitive in the world, and more importantly
for now, the Japanese surimi market.
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Surimi and the Sugar Embargo--
One of the interesting sidelights to the whole surimi issue
occurred on January 28, 1985, when a sugar embargo was imposed
by Presidential order. This embargo was designed to thwart the
entry of products believed to be "interfering" with the Agricultural
Department's sugar price-support program. Included in this embargo
was "minced seafood containing 20 percent or less sugar by dry
, ht " . th d ' , 354we~g , or ~n 0 er wor s, sur~m~.
Acting on a recommendation by Secretary of Agriculture John
Block, President Reagan issued a proclamation that eases--at
least temporarily--import quotas on certain sugar-containing
articles. 3 55 This proclamation allowed surimi to be imported into
the u.S. once again.
But one of the interesting points about the whole situation
is that u.S. importers had already imported enough surimi to last
six months when the embargo was imposed. Apparently u.S. importers
saw the handwriting on the wall with the "illegal" sugar import
problem. 356
Surimi and the Future--
The Japanese are looking to overseas markets to develop
and maintain industry growth. By using technology developed and
tested in their own market, the Japanese are stimulating the u.s.
market and are hoping to grow with it . Kibun Products International,
the largest Japanese kamaboko producer, has constructed two plants
the u.s. to manufacture surimi-based products for the American
market. One plant is operating in Redmond, Washington, to take
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advantage of the large pollock resource. The other plant is
near Raleigh, North Carolina, home of North Carolina State
University, where much surimi research has been undertaken
and where the Atlantic Coast offers potential surimi sources
from the menhaden and red hake industries. 357
The U.S., on the other hand, needs Japanese cooperation
in the surimi business in order to be a factor. This cooperation
may be in the form of establishing companies with majority owner-
ship by U.S. entities that would either build new factory
trawlers in the U.S. or use existing Japanese processing vessels
converted to the U.S. flag and employed as motherships in con-
junction with U.S. trawlers. A cooperative arrangement in terms
of marketing the product in both the U.S. and Japan would also
have to be finalized. 358
The Japanese may have to enter into an agreement like this
in order to continue to receive directed allocations in the U.S.
FCZ. But once again, if the pressure is too great, the Japanese
may leave the area and find other frontiers. In fact, research
is being funded in Japan to develop consumer fish products which
can be made from sardine and similar species. Sardine is seen as
a likely substitute, existing in quantity in Japan's home waters,
for Alaska pollock. The recent development of a machine able to
remove head, tail, bones and dark meat may have brought this a
359great deal nearer.
It appears as if the future of U.S. involvement in the
surimi industry is in the hands of the U.S. fishing industry.
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This is because the u.s. Fez holds 60 percent of the pollock
d · th J . . . d 360 e 1 huse 1n e apanese sur1m1 1n ustry. onsequent y, t e
moves made in the near future by both the U.S. and Japan in
the surimi industry may dictate future relations in areas such
as allocations and joint ventures. Whatever the outcome, the
future appears to be exciting.
The Magnuson Act and its Future--
The Magnuson Act is up for reauthorization in 1985, and
once again the cries of phase-out all foreign fishermen are
heard on Capital Hill. Support for a phase-out ranges from
fishermen and processors to Congressmen and industry representatives.
In fact, in this years draft proposal of amendments to the Magnuson
Act, an actual phase-out date was established. It is rumblings
such as these that make the Japanese and other foreign fleets
worry about their future in the FCZ. Therefore, the future of
any further U.S./Japanese fishery relations may very well hinge
on the future of the Magnuson Act and the proposed amendments.
The Japanese have accepted the idea of a gradual phase-out
and cut-back of their allocations in the U.S. FCZ. If the phase-
out is gradual, the Japanese will have time to find alternatives
(perhaps North Korean pollock or sardines) to the resource now
available in the FCZ. Japan recognizes the fact that the u.S.
fishing industry is expanding and that a phase-out is imminent,
but if Japan is phased-out too fast, before the U.S. industry can
utilize all the resources in the FCZ, then the results will be
harmful to the Japanese economy and fishing industry as well as
- 113 -
to relations between the u.s. and Japan in general. 3 6 l
As previously mentioned, the proposed draft amendments of
the Magnuson contained a phase-out date. This amendment was
quickly removed in House Committee mark-up sessions due to
pressure from foreign interests as well as U.S. fishermen in-
volved in joint ventures, especially in the North Pacific. 3 62
But what does exist in these proposed amendments is a possible
solution to the phase-out option as well as the Japanese request
for guaranteed access and allocations in the U.S. FCZ.
Section 201 of the Magnuson Act would be amended to read as
follows, "relative to the authority of the Secretary of State and
Commerce to enter into long-term bilateral fishing agreements with
f . . "363ore1gn nat10ns ... The purpose of any agreement would be to
foster closer cooperation between the U.S. and the participating
foreign nation in fisheries trade and to encourage greater efforts
on the part of foreign nations to assist in the development of all
segments of the U.S. fishing industry. In order to promote such
cooperation, the U.S. would:
(1) exempt foreign nations from current TALFF release prac-
tices;
(2) guarantee foreign nations a specified percentage of
TALFF;
(3) lower that nation's share of the foreign fishing fees
otherwise required to be collected; and,
(4) offer other incentives otherwise allowed by law to
364foster an appropriate agreement.
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In return, the foreign natiops (Japan) are expected:
(1) to specify what actions it will take to benefit the
u.s. fishing industry, with particular emphasis placed on certain
of the existing "fish and chips" policies;
(2) to refrain from increasing exports to the u.s. where
the u.s. industry is attempting to develop a domestic market
(e.g., surimi);
(3) to offer incentives deemed appropriate by the u.s. to
foster the development of the u.s. fishing industry (e.g., tech-
365nology transfer, ... ).
The new bilateral agreement authority and paragraph makes
it clear that allocations granted under the new authority are
subject to sanction under the Packwood-Magnuson amendment to the
MFCMA as are allocations under the existing law. with respect to
the new bilateral agreement authority, several provisions of the
paragraph set forth the parameters of that authority and are worth
. 366not~ng.
First, these agreements may only be effective for all, or
any portion, of the period that a GIFA is in effect. Second, the
agreement must contain the specific requirements of each party to
implement those commitments. Third, the agreement must provide
for, and specify the procedures by which disputes that might arise
between the parties will be resolved. The specificity of these
elements of the bilateral agreement are most critical to the suc-
cessful use of this authority to further "fish and chips" policies
in a way that will lead to the further development of the u.s.
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f i h i . d 367~s ~ng ~n ustry. In particular, the procedures for the quick
and impartial resolution of disputes is important if the fishing
industry of both the u.s. and Japan are to have any confidence in
the effectiveness of the agreement. 3 6 8
Whether or not this amendment passes, it shows that an al-
ternative may be present for a complete phase-out of foreign fish-
ing interests in the U.S. FCZ. The new bilateral agreement proposal
allows the u.s. to work closely with the nation involved--more on
a one-to-one basis--and can tailor its needs more to this type of
agreement. The agreement seems to be a more complete method of
negotiation as compared to the GIFA/fishing permit arrangement now
in use.
The Japanese, on the other hand, will have achieved guaranteed
access and allocations for the u.s. FCZ in return for their coop-
eration. Japan has stated on numerous occasions that they would
be willing to extend their cooperation to the U.S. for given periods
of time in return for an arrangement such as the proposed amend-
ment. 3 6 9 In any case, it will be interesting to see what happens
in 1987 when the Japanese GIFA expires, and what type of agreement
a new GIFA will bring.
Conclusion--
Perhaps one word can sum-up U.S./Japanese fishery relations--
complex! This paper has demonstrated that a variety of factors,
policies, and people are all involved in trying to evaluate and
manage this fishery relationship. The issues that have been
touched on in this paper only scratch the surface of the overall
- 116 -
complexities involved in this relationship. Most of the issues
discussed could be dealt with in much more detail, but the gist
of this paper concentrated on a more general overview to try and
show the types of intricate relationships that have evolved between
the two nations.
The future of U.S./Japanese fishery relations remains a
question mark. Japan depends heavily upon the u.s. FCZ for much
of its fishery resources. In fact, 40 percent of the total distant
water catch of the Japanese comes from the u.s. FCZ, which amounts
to 10 percent of all Japanese production. 370 This might be just
too much of a resource to give up for the Japanese.
The U.S., on the other hand, has yet to expand its fishing
industry enough so that it can utilize the vast fishery resources
of the FCZ. Consequently, at present we have foreign nations,
especially Japan, fishing heavily within the U.S. FCZ, while the
u.s. tries to augment its fish catching and utilization capacity.
How far will the u.s. fishing industry expand and when will
a phase-out of foreign fleets occur, are questions that remain for
the future. But the Japanese have a limit to how far they can be
cut-back in terms of allocations in the FCZ. If the u.s. goes
beyond that limit, than the Japanese must look for alternative
sources of fish. The limit is based on economics. When it ceases
to become economically viable for Japan to fish in u.s. waters
with only limited allocations, then Japanese fishing interests
could not endure the expense of joint ventures alone. Joint ventures
do not provide enough profit nor incentive for Japan to remain in
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the FCZ.
If one were to make a prediction about Japanese involvement
in the u.s. FCZ five years from now, the Japanese would probably
still be fishing in the FCZ but at reduced levels. Ten years
from now will probably not bring the same answer. Japanese
officials believe that in ten years time, alternative sources
will have to be found, and that the U.S. industry will have ex-
panded enough to reduce Japanese allocations significantly within
the FCZ, forcing Japan to make a move.
What should the next step be for the u.s.? A complete
phase-out of Japan, a continuation of the present policy, or a
modification, such as the bilateral agreement amendment? In the
interests of both nations a bilateral agreement may be the key
to continued fishery relations by both nations. Both the u.s.
and Japan depend heavily upon each other in the fishing industry,
and to jeopardize this relationship might jeopardize other facets
of the overall U.S./Japan trade picture.
In any case, the future is happening now; the surimi revo-
lution; whaling and salmon developments; and, the re-authorization
of the Magnuson Act. And, as this paper has shown, fishery re-
lations between the u.s. and Japan are many-faceted. A maneuver
by one nation in one area may have an affect on many other fishery
matters, as the "fish and chips" policies have shown. Although,
one must remember that fishery relations between the two nations
is just a small part of an even more complex web of U.S./Japanese
relations in general. But as the whaling issue has shown, an
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alteration in the workings of the U.S./Japanese fisheries
machinery can trigger a number of side effects in other aspects
of trade and relation. Overall, the u.s. and Japan have proved
that negotiations can work, and the next round in 1987 may be
the most significant yet.
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APPENDIX I
Governing International Fisheries Agreement
with Japan, 1977
This Agreement regulates fishing by nationals
and vessels of Japan in the 200-mile u.s. fishery
conservation zone. Fishing quota regulations are
issued on a yearly basis. This Agreement was
pursuant to section 203(a) of Public Law 94-265.
Source: House Document No. 95-79
Came into Force: March 1, 1977
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EXB..\SSY OF JUAS,
..t.:*~:Jt L ':" If''asMngto'fl., February 10, 1977.
HiialE3ceUency CYRUS V.-L..-CE, . ' ..
~'Qf State of tlte United States of America. . .
..·~.~Cr, I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held
·tlie representatives of the Government of Japan and the
Goftrnment'of the United States of America. concerning fisheries mat-
&eiSbetween·the two countries and to confirm, on behalf of the Gov-
ediine'nt of Ja.pan, the following understanding reached between the
twQ:60:vernments, taking into account the Agreement initialled this
day~,th&con.stitutionalprocesses of both countries and the spirit of
JIiIitual cooperation and understanding between the two Governments:
•·:,£.Uiltil the Agreement enters into force and in no C3.S6 after Decem-
htil1,'·!91i!,:Ja.pa.nese fisheries off the coast of the United States will
blf~ductad:in accordance with international law and in accordance
Yitltfie;l&W8 and regulations of both countries, taking intoaccount the
eGiIditioM oi: the resources and past fishing practices. '
'~]l) The Ja.panese authorities will provide the authorities of the
tiDified:-~~iththe names,' the re~strntionnumbers, the names of
dlIi:~rs :and .the numbers of the fishing crews a.nd any other
~t~o~tlon concernmg any Ja.p~ese vessels that propose~'~'lB 'fishmg off thecoast of the United States.· .
'.;~rOn~ipt of the information referre<! t~ in subparagraphf L]~~"'Paragraph, the- Government of the United States WIll, as ap-
~i make necessary administrative arrangements to facilitatetW?'~on'of those vessels in accordance with the provisions of this
,~t~ request of either Government, ~he ~wo Governmen~swill
, .._.1»fiSnltations in respect Of any matter concerning the implementa-
. .~f.~ arrangement including the determination ofcatch amounts
, . (&l'>ahesevessels. .
~~~hing; in this arrangement shall be deemed to prejudice the
:L.Iioa'of either Government in regard to any question under nego-
.. .., . at theLa.w of the Sea Conference. . .
.~ve'fIlrt~er the hono~ to ,propose that this ~ote an~ Your Excel-
'SiNot'.e m reply contirnung the above understanding on behalf
of, Go~ernmentof the United States of America. shall be regarded
lI:~tnting an agreement between the two Governments which~~ter into effect ~Ipon notification by the Gm~ernment of the
~'¢O~~~::Lhatthe internal procedures of the United States have
!:':~myselfof this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the
~,ofmy highest consideration. .
; :! I .1 Frnrrmao Toco,
Ambassador Eztraordinary and,
Plenipotenziar-p oj Japan,
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His Excellency FUMIHIKO TOGO,
Ambassador of Japan.
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge
receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's
date, which reads as follows:
"Excellency, I have the honor to refer to the
recent discussions held between the representatives
of the Government of Japan and the Government of the
Unived States of America concerning fisheries matters
between the two countries and to confirm on b.ehalf
of the Government of Japan, the following understand-
ing reached between the two Governments, taking into
account the Agreement initialled this day, the
constitutional processes of both countries and the
spirit of mutual cooperation and understanding be-
tween the two Governments;
"1. Until the Agreement enters into force and in
no case, after December 31, 1977, Japanese fisheries
off the coast of the United States will be conducted
in accordance with international law and in account
the conditions of the resources and past fishing
practices.
"2. (1) The Japanese authorities will provide
the authorities of the United States with the names,
the registration numbers, the name of the managers
and the numbers of fishing crews and any other
pertinent information concerning any Japanese vessels
that propose to engage in fishing off the coast of
the United States.
"(2) On receipt of the information referred to
in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, the Government
of the United States will as inpropriate, make
necessary administrative arrangements to facilitate
the operation of those vessels in accordance with
provisions of the arrangement.
"3. Upon the request of either Government, the
two Governments will hold consultations in respect
of any matter concerning the implementation of this
arrangement including the determination of catch
amounts for Japanese vessels.
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"4. Nothing in this arrangement shall be deemed
to prejudice the position of either Government in
regard to any question under negotiation at the Law
of the Sea Conference.
"I have further the honor to propose that this
Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply confirming
the above understanding on behalf of the Government
of the United States of America shall be regarded
as constituting an agreement between the two
Governments which shall enter into effect upon
notification by the Government of the United States
that the internal procedures of the United States
have been completed.
"I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to
Your Excellency the assurance of my highest con-
sideration."
I have further the honor to confirm the above
understanding on behalf of the Government of the
United States of America and to agree that Your
Excellency's Note and this reply shall be regarded
as constituting an agreement between the two
Governments which shall enter into effect upon
notification by the Government of the United States
that the internal procedures of the United States
have been completed.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration .
For the Secretary of State:
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~\(;J1F.DIEXT n~:T'YF.EX .T H E GO"ERX~rEXT OF' TilE UXlTED STATES OF
.\~rERI("A AXD TilE Gon:nx~rEXT Or" .l.vt-.... s COXC!::RXIXG FiSHERIES
On' TIlE C\).'ST:> Of' TilE U'xrrr;o STATES OF A:\IERlCA
The Government of the United St:l.tes of .\merica and the Govern-
ment of Japan:
Considcrimr their common concern for the rational mnnacement,'
conservation -and opt imum util iznt ion of fishery resources 'off the
coasts of the United States,
nt'co~lizin.~ that there han' been new international developments
on the law of rhe sea •
•Acknowlcdainrr that the Unitod Stutos has established a. fishcrv
couse rvnt ion Z ()n l~ wit h in :2\)0 nuut icnl iuilcs of its coasts within which
the T'nitc.l Sr:Hl'~ oxcrcisos fi-herv 1ll :1Jl:l::l'nlt'nt nnt horitv over all fish
nnr] rhat the {-n irl"! Sratt':' abo eXI' rl" i": l's ':3 ;l('h aut hority over the living
rc-ourccs of t lu- co nrinvntu l "hl'l f :1['l', 'rr :liniJl~ to the United Suucs
nn.l over :1u.ul roruous ::pt'cie:3 of Iish of l-nirl"! :::tat l's origin through.
our t hei 1'111 i::ra ron' 1':1n::e,
Acknowle,l;..:-ing' nlso that J apan ha:: hcen cooperat ing' for the
r nt ionn l 1ll:1n:l::('llll'~l[ a n.l ('Oll:-I'I'\':lrion of t he livirur resources of the
hi::!l ~l'a~ OIl' till' l'I);!:'t,.: of r he Cllitl'd Srall':; and that the nntiouu ls
:\lld vessels of .Iupun hnve r rnd ir ionnllv been enga g inf! in the elt~ " e l op .
rncnt a ud ut i liznt ion of t hcse 1"(' '' 0 11,., '' '0'. and
T>,'-iroll"; of t, .~ra hli ,.:hin!! I"(':l,,:oll able n-ru.s and conditions portniniug
to Ii-Iu-ries of mut un l concern.
Hu ve agrct'd :15 [011',\,5:
.\I:Tll 'LF. r
The GO\"l'rllllll'llt of t lic T'n itod ~tarl':: an.I the (Iovcrnmcnt of Japan
uu .h -rtn ko ro C'Il": l lr~ rfl"l'('rin' conscrvu rion. optimum utilization :i,l d
rnt iona l 1II:1Il:J!..:·l'IIIl'nt of rhc fi"IIl'IT n -sources of mur unl interest oti' tile
(,O ;I ~t ;; of rhe 1-llitrd States mu] I ;) es tahlish a common undcrstnndimr
of rhe p rinciplos and procr-duri- s 1I11lkr which fi::hing may he con':
d uct r d b." nar ion .il« nnd ve-scls of .Inpun for the livinz resources off
tho ('On;;t5 of rho {"Jlitc,-} :'1:lrrS O\"l'I ' \\'Lio-ll the C'nitC'cl States exercises
fisher .... IlIall:lf!I'lIH'n t nuthoriry.
. \ :" used in this .\~"('('ll\{'Ilt.thr t orm
(1 ) " ti"hl'!T «ou-crvnr ion ZOIlI''' III ,'all" nn nrr-a of wnr ors cont izuous
to rl.e ret-rir oiin l ;:~:l of rho T'n itr«] :'r :ltr;:. rho se.iwn rd bounrlnrv of
whi ch is a lim' .l ra wn in such :l 111:1 1111"" that each point on it is' :;00
nn ur ir-n I rn i lcs From the h:l::rlillr from wh ich the breadth of the terri-
toriu ! ~ra.oft he 1-11 it <><1 S t:l t(';.: is meu s u rcd :
(:2) "Ii" ill!! rc-ourcos otT the coast s of the T'nitcd States" means all
fish wit h ill i ho n;=';H'!'," co nservn t ion zone, all a nndromous species of
fish th at spawn ill the fresh or estuu rine waters of the Lllited States
and micrntc to 0"\':111 w.uo rs (herr-in» Ii cr rofcrrod to as the "n nndro-
mon s :';l)pcies of {'lIitl' l! Srarl';; ori;;in"),. thrnlJ;:hollt their JIl~gratol'.'"
I'all~e. and ~l'Clenr:ll'.'" species of the ro u t iut-ntn l shelf nppert:lIlllll!! .to
the United ~tates whi ch a re. at t ho hn rvc st able st nge, cither inuuoliile
on or uuder the ;-.(·:11 1('<1. or unn l.le to 1I100'e except ill const ant. physical
cont act wir h thc :,p:l1wd or snh-oil :
(;)) " fish" uu-un s a11 nllfbh. lllol1l1",k:-:, cl'll:-I:ll:rnlls. :1I 1l! othrr forlllS
of lll;ll'ill(' allilJlal :1Ilc! plallt life. orllt'l' t!lnn marillr lllnlllllla!s, Linls,
;lllcl ~ P( 'r: i l' :" of {lIll:1 \\'hich. in the l"(JIIl~(, of thcil' lifr cycle, :opa\\'ll ,IIlU
llli;:l':IIC' 0\',·1' ;:1'l':1r di,.:ral\l'('s ill walt'l':' o f tlte' ()c:pan:
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(of) "ti:-] 'lI'n' resources' nu-nus 01J(~ or more stocks of fish that call be
t reutr-d a =- a illlit for \"'lIrpo"I'S of con-crvntion and ,lI1nJ,l:IgpnH'lIt ,and
that a ro ident ificd 011 the basis of ~(,()~l"aplllcal: scientific, technical,
n'('I"\':\ t ionn] alld p('olwll1ic chnrnct pri;;t irs;
(;",) ';fbheJ'y" uu-nns allY fishillg' for fishery re-ources ;
(() "fh.:lling': means
(.\) till' cntdling, takillg or hnrvcst iug of fish i
(H) t lu- lIttpmpipd cutchinz. taking or harvesting of fish;
((') nllY ot lu-r acr iviry that can rcasonnblv be expected to re-
sulr ill t II(' (',I tr-hill;!, t a king- 01' linrvest ing of fish; or
(J)) l \ll ~' opcrnr ions at son rlirvct ly ill support of, or in prepara-
tion for, any acr ivity rlescril.ed in sub-pnrngruphs (.\.) through
(C) above,
!1ro\' id pc1 that sur-h term docs not include other Ipg-itimate uses of theli!!h ,,(';)" , iJl(~1\l(1ing any scientific. n-sea rch nct ivity conducted 0." a
scir-nrifir- rr-son rch vessel :
(7) "fishin~ \'ps<:{'r' means any vessel. boat , ship 01' other craft that
i:.:: u;,:('d fOJ', oquippcd to be used for : or of a type that is normally used
for
(A) fish ing :
(H) Jwrfol'lliing any activity rolnr inrr to fishin!!, includinz
pl"\'par:~tioll, sup ply , st ornge, re Irigcrntion, transportation or
IlrO('I''';':lng: 01'
(e) aiding 01' :1:.:: :.:: i:.:: t in ,!! om- or 1II0l'p ves sels at spa in the per-
formnnc« of all.'" ncr iv itv mcnt ionc.l ill (A) 01' (B) above :
(S) "mn riuc mammals" menus any mammn l that is morphologic-ally
adaptpd to t lio mn rins r-n vironmont , iuclud inz sea otters nIH1 members
of thp OI'{1<'I':, Sirr-n iu. Pinn ipcdin. and (>ta(:('a, 01' primarily inhabits
till' Illal'illP cuviromucnt . such as polar boars. '
ARTICLE In
Tho Govcrumcnt of thp T'nitorl St arr-s nnrl the Govorumont of .Inpnn
sha ll C':J1'1''Y our pcriodi- bilnr cral consultut ions rpgarding' the implo-
mcntnt ion of this . :\~T\'rJl\pnl, t ho determinations to he ninde 1)\' the
Government of the 'C nit pd States in accordnncs, with Article rv oC
this ~\.!!rl.'pmpnt and the development of further cooperation ill tho
field of fishr-rios of mur nn l concern. ine lud inz t hc estnblislrmcnr of
nppronriut o mult ila tern l organizations for thecollect ion and ann lvsis
of -cicnt ific .lnr a rcspvct inz such fisheries. .
,\ RTIC'LE 1\'
1. TIl(' Govormucnt of t he T'nitod St at os shall dr-terru ine each war,
w it h 1'l '~Jlpc-t to t ho lil' ing rc-ourccs ofT t he coasts of the 'United Smtcs,
t he follo\\"ing, t:1king into nccou nt , as a ppropr-int e, the consultations
wit h tit" \,o\'('J'JIlI1pnt of .In pn n rofvrrr-d to in Article III of this Azrce-
ment , :" lIb jr ct to such ad just mr-nt s ns mny be necessitated by unfore-
S\,('I\ ci 1'1'111\1:'1 :lI1l'CS:J [pct ing t he stocks;
(.\) t ho total nllown ble catch for cnch fishery resource to be
.lor ormiucd on the basis of the best. available scientific evidence
:J1Il1 with a vi ew to achieving on n cont inuing basis the optimum
yie ld of resources, taking inro account the intordependonce of
stor-ks, int crnn t iona l ly accepted critcrin, and all other relevant
fncrors : .
(B) the portion oC the totnl nl1o\\"aL1r c-ntc-11 for a sppcific fish-
rn' rpsolln'p thnt. on an :lnll1\nl h:Jsis. "ill not be harvestpd bv
fi;hi1\CT \"f'ssl'ls of the rnit('(l States and rna .. be made 8\"ailnbie
to fi:-hing yp;:sl.'ls of .T:1pan ; nJl(1 -
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( C) thI' measures nr-cessn I'y to prevon t ovorfish in~.
2. Tho Govermnout of r hr- T'nir cd Srnros shnll nor i fv t ho Govern-
nu-nt of .Iu pnn of tho dorermuuu ions referred to ill para'graph 1 above
on a t iiuulv hnsis.
.\RTICLE '"
III dcr orminimr tlH' portion that may bl' mn .le n vn ilnhlo to fi::hill:!!
n":,I'!,, of .Ta pnn in a ccorrln 11('1' wjt h •\ rt ir-lo n-, pn rn ,~I'n ph 1 (B) "of
this .\!!Tpl'lIIC'nt. t ho r;onl'nl11C'1lf of the Fuited St nres shall promote
thp ohjor-r ivoof o pt iiuum ut iliznt ion, and shall tn ko inr o nccount. infer
Id:'f, rrud it iouu l ti"hing by nut ionn ls and vessels of .In pnu. cont ribu-
I iOIl", to fi.~IH'ry · I ' ~ "l' n l'(; h. and til: idcur ificnt ion of stocks by .Inpnn.
prov rous ('(1(11WI':ltl011 by .Inpn n III enforcement. and with respect to
cons r-rv .i rion a nd ma nmroment of rishe r v resources of III lit 11:11 concern.
nn.l the lH\I'.! ro minimiz« er-onomic- .li slrx-nt ion ill en-os where f1,:hin~
l' I':,~C'I" of .Inpnn han' hnhitllally fi-ht-d for 1i\'ing" 1'\'."OII1'<:I'S orr t he
con,:r- of r ho '[-nit(',l Sr:ltC's.
., n T ICl.E vt
In vir-w of t lu- rart t lint rlir- nu.ul romous s]>pl'il':' of T'n in-d St;1[C':'
or izin illlt'I'llli1l.l!lr w irh such "lweiI':" of orhor origins in cerra in wnrors
of r hcir miirrntorv r;ln;:l-', t he Gove rument of the T'nirr-rl Stntl';: and
tilt' (;I)\'I'l'llIlIPllt (11' .Iu p.rn sha ll hold consult at ions cOllcernin!! nocos-
:;:ll'y ('OII,."I'\"a rion 1I1\':l~U res for t ho nu:ul rornous species in such waters.
.\RTtCU: \"11
The GO"C'I"IlIlIC'llt of .Iu pnn shn] l take all nvccssnrv measures to
ensure :
(.\.) that nu rinnn l« nnr] v.-ssr-ls of .Ia pn n refrain from fi::hin~
for li, 'illl; 1'<' ~OIII"(,C'" o tl' tilC'. eO:l;.t,;; of the T'n itcd States, except
:1:' uur horizr -d PIII ~tI:lIlt to till " .\gn,ellll'llt ;
(B) t luit nil "1Il·h ft~h ill~ vessels ellgaging in fl;:hill .~ nnder this
.\gn'C'nH'llt coiuplv with the re rrns and conditions established
1IIIlkr t h i s .\!!I'l'('IIlC'Ilt: and
(C) that tltc portion referred to ill Article TV, paragraph
1 I, U) of (1I i ~ .\ ,:;I"l'I'IIH'lll i- nor \'xcI'\'dcd for unv fi-hcry .
•-U:TICLE nIl
1. ThC' \,rjl'I'rlllll L'llt of .ln pnn sha ll provide the Govcrmuent of the
T'n itcd Srates with in forrnn t ion concerninz the identity and oper-
arion of l':) l'h f1 shin!! vessel of Japan thatw ishes to engng<' in fi;:hing
for liviuir rcsourvcs off the consrs of the Un it ed StntC';:, in accordance
w it h ~\.I;(lex I of this .:\gl'e(-,1l1ent, which forms all illtegr:ll part
hereof.
:2. On ror-o ipt of the informur ion refr-rrrxl to in pnragraph 1 nl.ove,
the Govcrumeut of the T'n ir ccl :--:r ntes sha l l tn ke the necessarv nrlmin-
isr rn t ive monsuros, inr lud inz the issurmre of permits I'tll::"Il ;lIIt to
nppl icnl.lc laws of rho rllitc(f~ratcs. to enable fi::hillg' vessels of .Tapn!l,
ill :11'l'OI"c] ;lllce with the pl'()\'i ;:ions of this ~\.greement, to engage In
fish iru; for li,'ill!! 1'(':"OIlI'('C'S o lf the eflnsts of t hv Cllitrd Stares. Such
Ill":l;;lll'(-,;'; may il;~III(h- r\'C[lIirl'lll<'lIt of rhe paYl11(-'llL of rcnsonnhle fees
to Incil irnte thl' illlp ll'lIll'lIt nt ion of this Al!.I'(,~'l11(·1lt :lilt! to t'H::illre
tit€' ('O Il ."I ' IT n t i o l\ :I ll d II I:11la!!('lllellt of the It\"lll~ rl'~"1l1"l'(,5 on the
CI):I"ts of tile l-I\it!:'d :-;tnl(-,ii. - ..
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Tho Gove-rnment of .Iupnn ~lJ:111 onsu ro thaI nut ioun ls nn.l \"('.: ,=rls
of .Inpnn refrain from har;l;:"ill,~~ hlilltin;:, cnpt urintr or k il linz. or
att('l1lptill~ IC,]I:lI':1:::::. hunt. capture or kill, nnv iuurinc mn nuun l wir hin
the fishr-rv «onscrvnt ion Zt)IIl~. r-xce pt ns mnv hp. otlu-rwise provided
by an international agrl'l'll1ellt )'l'sl)('djn~ mur-ine nuuurnnls to which
the United States is a party. 01' in nrr -ordance with specific nut lioriza-
t ion for n nd \'IIlItrol" 011 inr -i.loutnl tnkill!! of murine mnnunn ls estnb-
li-hed by till ' Government of till' Unit cd States.
ARTICLE :s:
ThC' Govcrumon! of .In pnn shul] en sure t hat in t.he conduct of the
fisheries under this A~rl:'P)lIenr~ fishi nz \'(';:;:('1" of .In pnn tom ply wit h
nnv nrlminist rnt ivc nionsures by t ho Government of the CnitE'>«1 SUItes
in ',I,:cUl"flaIlCr with Arr ivle YnI, paragraph 2 of this' ..\grl·cment.
AHTICLE XI
1. The Govo nuucnt of .In pn n shall tn ke appropriate nu-nsu res to
ensure that o.ir-h n:,hing- vosscl of .Iupn n fi;:hill~"lJllr;;:nant to this "\.!!ree-
mr-n] for li\'ill!! resources off the r-oasts of the CllitN] States. allow
and assist thC'hoardin~ nnd inspr-cr ion of such vessels by nny duly
nuthorizod cnforconicnt oiiil'ial of rho Tri ircd Srntcs, and cooperate in
such enforcement net ion ns mnv lx- undcrtnkcn.
2. III en-os of -r-izurc of a fi~llill;.! \,(':;:,,\:,1 of .In pn n and of arrest of its
crews by the nut lioi-ities of the Government of the T'nitcd States,
not ific.u ion shu ll he g iven prom pt ly t h rough diplomatic cha unols in-
fOllll ill;.! t lic Government of .Inpnn of rlie action taken.
~. ~(· jzC'd fi .~IJillp" vessels and arrested crews shall be promptly
J'l'll·n:,I'c1. subject to such rcnsona ble bond or other sccmity as mny be
dot ermined by the court.
AHTICLE xrr
The rnitcrl States will impose appropriate pennltics in accordance
wit h its law:" on fishinrr vessels of .l.i pn n or t lu-ir O\\'I1<'riO or operators
that rln not com p ly with the rcquircnu-nt s of this Agn'l'J1lent OJ' of ilny
udruin i-r rnt ivo mea sure taken hcrcundor.
ARTICLE xrrr
The Govo nuncut of t hc Triitod Sr at os and t he Government of .I npnn
un.h-rt :lkl' to coo pe-ra te ill the cOlldl1l't of scir-m ific re search l'l'qll iJ'C'd for
t h« purpo-o of 11I:lIIngill~ and couse rv iug tilt' li\ 'ing I'l'~ IlI1)"('I':" orf the
CO:1:;t~ of t he T'n it cd :)tntl'5. inclu .Iiuir t ho COIllpilal inn of 1)I';.:t nvn il.ibl«
:'l'il'lltill c in foru uu ion for the mu nruroruout and ('IlIl;':C'ITatioll of -t orks
of iuut un l concern. The competent ' :l,!.!l' lll'il':' of t hc t wo Govcrmuvnts
shn ll ont cr into sucl: :l1T:l1l!.!l'lllrllt :-: :I:; muv bC' 1l\' ('C':.":,aI"Y to f:lriliTatP
suvh l'llupern t ion. incl lid in~ 'the cxchn usrc of ill forrun t ion ':)nd sc ien t ist s.
rl'g1l1nrly scheduled mect iugs bCI\\\'C'n scient ists to prcpnrc rC';':\':lITh
plans and review pJ'ogress. and the implomcnt at ion and lllaintrllal1C'e
of :l st:lI1dardized sY~telll for the coll l'ct iOIl :lllll nrehi\"ill~ of rdl'Y:ll1t
~t :1ti::ricnl alld biol()!.!ic:J.l irlforlllntion ill a('l'o1'(lallcr widl .\llnC'x II.
\\"hi...h forllls an illtl'ir:ll part of this _-\gT(,cll1<'nt. '
ARTICLE ::tIT
Xothin~ contained in this Agreement shall affect or prejudice in any
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manner the positions of either Government with respect to the extent
of internal waters. of the territorial sea. of the hizh seas, or of coastal
state jurisdiction '0 1' authority for any purpose 'other than the con-
servation and management of fishery resources.
ARTICLE ]:\
The Annexes to this Agreement mny be modified by agreement
between the two Governments in the form of an exchange of notes.
Ar.TICLE xvr
1. This Agreement shall be approved by eachcountry in accordance
with its internal p rocedures, It shall enter into force through an
exchange of notes on a date to be mutun lly a~TPed upon thereafter
between the Government of the United Stntos and tho Government of
Japan. and shall remain in force nnt il December 31. If\fl~ unless termi-
nated sooner by either Govcrnrue nt n frer !!iyin!! notification of such
termination twelve months in advance. • •
2. This Arrrecmcnt shall be subject to review bv the two Govern-
ments two years after its entry into force 01" upon "the conclusion of a
multilatr-ml treaty rcsult ing from tho Third Tnitcd Xnr ions Con-
fcronco 011 t he La w 0 f the Sea,
In witness whereof. the unclcrsiuucd. bcinrr duly authorized by their
respective GO\"(·l"IlIIH'lItS. have si~n<-d this "\~l·e('m~·nt. .
Done at "':u:hingtoll, 011 the C'ight('('lIth day of ~!arch. IDj"j". in dup-
licate in the English and .Iapancse langnages. both equally uutheut ic.
For the Government of the United For the Government of Japan:
Stutes of America:
AxxF.X I
The followinrr procedures shall govern the application for and
issuance of ann~lal permits authorizing fi:oh ing vessels of J'lral~ to
engage in fishing for living resources off the coasts of the United
States:
1. The Government of Japan will submit nn application to the
Government of the United States for each fishing vessel of .Ia pan
that wishes to engage in fishing pursuant to this A!!I'eement. Such
application shall be made on forms provided by the Government of
the United States for that purpose,
2. Anv such application shall specify
(A) the name and official number Or other ideutificat ion of
each fishing' ves so] for wh ich a permit is sought, together with
tho name and address of the owner and operator thereof :
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(B) thc t onnnzc. capacity: speed, processing equipment, type
and q1\nntit~· of fishing g'l'nr, and such ot hor information relnt injr
to the fishing clm racr crist ics of the fishing vessel as may be
requested :
(e) n specificnr ion of each fishery in which each such fishing
vessel wishes to fish :
(D) the amount of fish or tonnaze of catch by species con-
tomplnted for each such fishing "¥C!'!'C1 duriug' the time such permit
is in force: .
(E) the OCE'an area in which. and the season or period during
which. such fish in!! would be conducted : and
(F) such other relevant information as ma:--' be requested,
~. The Government of the United States shall review each applies-
t ion, shn ll determine what conditions and restrictions related to man-
agcJnC'nt and conservation of fishery resources mav be needed. and what
fee will he required: The Government of the United States shn 11 in-
form the Government of .In pan of such determinations,
4. The Government. of .In pn n shall thereupon nor.ify the Govern-
merit of the T'nitr-d States of it" acceptance or rejection of such condi-
tions nnd restrict ions nnd, in the case of a rejection, of its objections
thorr-to.
!'i. Upon acceptance of the conditions and restrictions by the Gov-
ernment of .In pn n and the pavrnont of anv fees. the Government. of
the United ~tntE's shn ll approve tho npnlicntion and issue a permit
for e:lC'!1 fishing- '\"C'<:sC'l of .Ia pn n , which fishing VE'sSf'l shall thereupon
be nut liorized to fish in nccordnnce with this Arrrecment and the
tr-rrns nnrl conditions "C't forth in the permit, Such permits shall be
i~sllPn fOI" n spoci fil' fishing- w,,<:pI and shn ll not he transferred.
fl. In the evont the Government of .Inpnn notifies the Government
of tho United Stnres of its objections to specific conditions and ro-
sf ricr ions. thp two Governments mav consult with resnoct thereto and
the Government of .Inpnn may thereupon submit a revised application.
AXXEX II
. TI.\(, procedures clescribcd below are designed to cont ribute to con-
tlllllll1!! needs fOI' assos-mcnt of the st at ns of storks and mnnrurcment
of fl~! : 'C'I'\' resources , However. specific needs may develop from time to
t nne \\"hich l"('lIlIir E' a Ch:ll1!,!l' in stnmln rd procedures, or ucldit.ionu] data
fill' :,!'('C'i :t1 ~tlldiC' :-,..\1:'0. the pnr rern of fishe rios will cluuure, These
a ~ llt'd ;'; rE''1llil"l' that thC' procedures must be flcxiblo enough to accorn-
11l(ldatt' nC'l'l's~aIT chnrures. .
..\ll data dC';.:\,j·ilwd below shn ll be provided to the desiznnted reprc-
senrnr ivo of t.hE> Xnt ionnl :.\Ial'ille F'isherics Service of th; Depnrtruent
of Commorco of t ho Lnitcd States.
1. C_\TCH AX)) EFFlJIIT Sl'ATIgTICS
.-1. Atlantic CorM!
Throe month s after the clo:"e of onch qunrter, catch nnd effort statis-
tics for biweekly time periods for 30-minllte squa re areas shall be re-
ported by fi~hin!! vessel for the previous quarter. These will be reported
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using 30-minute Statlant 21 B Forms. magnetic tape, computer cards
01' printouts fOI' all species and g'<'al' types,
Fish in~ vessel logbook data is to be ava ilable for selected, specific
joint assessment studies, The collection of samples, specified in ~ below,
should also be annotated in the logbook.
E. Pacific Coast'
By ~In.y 30 of the following year, annual catch and effort statistics
shnll be provided as follows: catch in metric tons and effort in hours
t I'll\ding', effort ill muuber of Iongl ine (huchi) un its. effort in number
of pots. effort in number of hours of longline or pots soaking time,
e!lort in number of Dunish seine sets, und effort in number of d» , 'S
ti:'hill~ by vossoI class. by g'car type. uy month. bv half degree La.ti-
tude X one degree Longitude statistical urea , by the following species
grollp:;: .
Yellowfin sole j
Il ock sole:
Arrowtoorh flounder :
Flnthond sole : .
Dover sole:
Other flounders j
Pacific ocen n perch:
Other rockfishes :
Pacific cod ; .
Suhlefish ;
Pollock:
Atku mackerel j
Kill:! crab:
Tan'ncl' crab:
Herring : .
Ot hCI' ~i)l'~ie5 taken in excess of 1:000 metric tons;
..;\11 other species combined,
These annual catch and effort statistics shall be provided using
magnetic tape, computer cards or printouts,
In addition to the annual statistical report above, provisional
monthly fishery information shall be prodded by the end of the fol-
lowing month as follows: catch in metric tons and effort in vessel-days
0,11 the. grounds by gear type, by vessel class, by ~e specie.s ~\"o~ps
Iisted 111 (1) below. for each of the International l\ orth Pacific FIsh-
ery Commission (I~rpEC) statistical areas listed in (2) below :
(1) King crab
Tanner crab
Pollock
Pacific cod
Rockfishes
Flatfishes
Sablefish
Herring
Others
(2) Bering Sea; Subareas 1,2,3 and 4
Aleutian Region
Shumagin Region
Chirikof Region
Kodiak Region
Yakutat Region
Southeast Region
Charlotte Region
Vancouver Region
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Columbia Region
Eureka Region
~rontel'ev Region
Conception Region
ll,11(1 other designated areas
2• .BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS
A. Atlantic OOa3t
(J) Length-age com.positiot: 8ample8
9. Samples should be taken separately for each gear type (e.g.• bot-
tom trawl, pelagic trawl, purse seine)" and water layer (e.g., on the
bottom, midwater level) combina.tion even month for which fishino- is
pursued bv 30-minute square areas throughout the Agreement ,,;ea.
One sample should be -taken for every 1,000 metric tons or fraction
thereof within the above categories.
b. Data to be recorded for each sample:'
Y(,!"5E'1 classification, e.g., trawlervseiner
)[ethorl of fishing, e.z.• pelazic
Specific type of trawl, including referenceto its construction or actual
scale drawing
)Iesh sizes
Tonnage of the species sampled in the trawl haul
Total weizht of the fish sampled
Time of day of haul
Date -
Latitude and longitude of haul
c. Sampling procedures:
(i) Species for which the catch is sorted
(:l) From a single net haul take 4 random samples of np-
proximately 50 fish each. (For species with 1<>5s than 200 fish
in a single t rn wl haul accunrulutc samples over trawl hauls
uur il npprox imntt-ly :!Oo fish are tukr-n.)
(b ) .:'.ll·ll::'\lrC for'k lengt h for each fish to non rest centimeter.
"-hl'\'t' ot hr-r mcasurcmvnt systems nre used , nppropr-iute con-
version information must be supplied.
(c) Take a subsnrn p le of one fish from each cenr imcter
int crva l and remove sen les and otoliths as nppropriar c. Record
t ho sex of mature individunls.
(ii) Species for which the ca tch is not sorted
(a) From a sinf!'l<' net haul take 2 random samples of np-
prox imntely 30 kilojrrnms each,
(b) :'>[ vasu 1'(' fork l('ngt h for each fish to non rest cent imeter
by species, "'lll'r£' other mensuremeut syst cms art' USE'd, ap-
propt-iat o conversion in formnt ion must UP supplied.
(c) Take a subsa mple of one fish from ouch ce nt imeter
interval by species and. 1'('1110\'(' sea los and otoliths as appro-
piinte. Rl'l'ord the ~E.'X of mature ind ividua ls.
un LCII,qtll-l/"l·igllt sam ples
Jndividun ls of one sample of each principal species of fish (e.g.,
expected vourlv catch in t hc .'\.gr£'£'ment urea of 500 or more met ric
tons), pPI'-I nrernn tiona I Commission for the Xort h west At ln nt ic Fish-
cries (I('XAF) Division pel' mour h. should be weighed in grams and
measured ill mi llimetors, Each sa m p le will contn in 10 fish per cent i-
meter interval. Tho lerurth rall;.!t' of fish mnv bE.' nccurnulated if nee-
essnrv from small sam ples taken oyer several catches and days. "'ith
smn ll fish. where \\"eig'hing' at SE.'a of individuals is not uccnrate, appro-
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printe numbers of fish of the same length class shall be weighed in ag-
gre~ate.Sex shall be recorded for mature individuals.
B. Pacific Coast
Biological sampling by fishing vessels of Japan shall be conducted
and measurements from· sampling recorded as required according to
procedures developed and coordinated through consultations between
scientists of the L'n ited States and Japan so as to determine the repre-
sentntive lerurt h, a7e IIl1d weight of individunl fish in the catch.
"11en such samples are collected. the Government of .Inpnn shall
provide by ~1ay 30 of the following year the annual biological statistics
which shall include:
(1) Length f'requency data by vessel class. by gear type. bv
month, by half dezree Lat it ude x one de:!reE." Longitude statistical
arva. by sox, and by species previously identified in 1 B for an-
nun l catch lind effort st.it istics :
(2) Lentrt h-wcurht dnt n of ouch principal species (e.g'.. expected
yearly catch in the Agreement a ron of :iOO or more metric tons)
bv IXPFC srnt ist icn l nrea (previously identified in 1 B), As sci-
entific need arise", samples of scales or otoliths shall also be taken
for nge determinnt ion.
3. OTHF.R ST.\TISTI('.\L RF.QrmE;\IF.XTS
As further statistics are required for ann lvses lind should fisheries
for other species and areas be conducted (other than those identified
in 1 and 2). the procedures for such data collection and reporting'
shull be developed and coordiuatcd through consultations between
scientists of the United States and Japan.
• \Gln:EIl ~[IXCTr:5
The rcprvsvntnt ives of the Govormuout of tho rllited States of
.\JlH'ril'a und thl:' Goverumour of J:I[lan have a7l'l'\'U to record the fol-
lowiue ill connection w ir h the .\:!rpl'lIl('nt between the Government
of the L'u ired :-'tatp~ of Au.e rica ;lnd the Government of Japan Con-
c('ming Fisherio« olf the Coasts of t ho T:lIitpd States of America signed
t od .iv (here inn fter- r\'fplTpl! to a- the ;·.\:!I't'('nlenr~):
1. 'It is understood t hn t t lie (j,)\·prJll~pnt of the Tuitcd States and
the Govvrmuent of Japan will cooperate in tilt' vxcluuure of scientific
.uul t evhu icn l information relnt injr spccio- of tuna .uul ot hr-r h ighlv
Illig-ronory spel ' ip;, of 1I1l111lal inr r-rr-st with a view to tIll' o-tnbl islunent
of I"l':,:iona I arrallg-pIIH'lIt:'i. il1c-lIlllill.!! uppropriutc inr erunt ionn l orznni-
zur ions. to 1'1I~lln' con-o rv.rr ion of the s pecies. ~lIch exchnnges ~hall
im-In.h- the rcport inz of t unn and associut ed catches.
It is furt lu-r 1I11((;I·:-tood that ;•. t the outset of the .\greellll.'llt and
unr i l -uvh rime as a pp ropriur c, t he two Government will. in order to
l':<tahJ::ih a -Im:'1' of -c ionr ific in Iur-unt ion to furt hcr such arrungvrucnts.
prO\·;d\· ouch other s ra r isr ics 011 tunn und u-soeiared catches olf the
c O;I:-I :' of the Unitet! Stares.
~. Tho represont nr i ve of t he Gcvcrnnu-nt of the L'nitecl States stated
that it was the inronr ion of til(' Government of t ho United States that
allY en Iorcemonr ncr ion tuken wit II respect to uuud romous species be-
\'011<1 the fisherv conse rvn t ion ZOIl~' U\' Fllit('d :-,tates authorities wOII!d
only hI' tn lcen nfter consu ltur ion with the Government. of .In pan.
:1. It is understood t l iut wirh rp!!al'd to Article XII of the A!!ree-
mcnt. the appropriate ro prc-eutut ivos of the Government of the T:Jlited
;:'tatl',. will rvconum-nd to till' court in [lny case [lrisill)! out of fishing
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\\";\shington, D.C., :\bl'ch 18, 1077.
;wt i,' il il':' undr-r t ln- .\ ,~Tl't'I1H'111 11,:11 1III'I)('llall," fOl' vinl.u ion of li"]Il'l'y
1""~!Ihli()lIs 1l0! illl'llldl' ilIIJll'i~()I:II'l'1I1 01' all," oIlH'I' fo r II 1 of t'ol'pol'a!
pll 11i~ ] 1:111'1I!.
-L ] I is I1IH!"I'"lood t hat wit II n :'IH·( 't 10 all." lllall,'1' tll':l1t wit h ill t ho
.\:!l'l'l'lllPnt ",hil'h fu l l- w ir hiu its t'Olllpp!elwl'. t h« (iO\'l '/'lIllll'nt of
.Jap;11I i,'" !,1"l'p;ll'l't! to ,:w('ol'd to uut ionu ls al1d \' l' :':-' l' ! ~ of t ho T'n itvd
:-itat.':' wi:-:hin,:! to 1'1I~il!-!( ' in fi,..hin!-! for li\'ill!-! 1'l':-;OIlITl'S 011' t lu- coasts
of .1:1/1;111 t rc-nt nu-ut 110 Il':'~ fu vor-il.l« t hn n th :!t nrr-orrlorl 10 nut ionn ls
;Ind \'1':':'1'1,., of .In pun IIndl'l' t he "\;!Tt'1' IIll'lit in like sir unt ion. on the
1,:1 -i,.. of rl'C'i \!l'Ol'it y:
:" Tho (;O\'el'nlllt'nt of t h« l"l'ilpd St.uos unclertn kes to nut horize
fi:-,hillg- Yl's:-'I'l:; of .Ia puu eng'ag' ill:? ill n:,hing- pursuant to t he .\g-I'l·l'lI11'llt
to enter T'nitt-rl :-itatl'S porI:-; in :1l'l'Onlalll 'l' with L'n ited Srntes laws
for t h« plll'pO:-{' of pllreha"in,!! lmit , supplies, 0" outfits, or C'tt'C'ctiIlO'
rcpn i rs, or for such other 1>111'1'<1,.1'5 1\" mnv be authorized. e-
6. ,\"ilh respect to the conduct of ]o:Hlin,Z opcrnt ions by fi.~hill!!' \"'S-
:,, (.J;; of .lu pn n. the n'I'!"';:\ '!llnti"e of the Government of the l"lIil pd
,3r:IlI''' ,.r:lll'<! 111:11 ]o:\.lill;: :11'1' :1- would 1>1' provided. t:\kill;: into n~­
('fllIlIt pa,..t 1'1":\1 '11"(':'. and \\'0111.1 be set forth III pcrnuts or ot her apph-
,,:\1,1(, ill,..II'IIIJIl'lItS.
FOI' the Government of the United
States of America:
For the Gcvcrnmcnt of .In pnn :
o
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APPENDIX II
MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPANESE INDUSTRIES FOR 1985
Delegations of the commercial fishing industries of the
United States and Japan met in Seattle, Washington, · on
December 9-12, 1984 to discuss mutual cooperation in
fisheries development and trade during 1985. These
discussions have been held annually since 1982 pursuant
to the u.s. policy of "fish and chips" under the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976. The major issues discussed were Japanese
purchases of bot~9mfish and bottomfish products from the
U.S. industry and directed allocations to Japan within
the U.S. 200-mile fishery conservation zone during the
1985 calendar year.
Mr. Clement Tillion served as the meeting chairman. The
.
Japanese delegation ~as headed by Mr. Fumio Imanaga,
Managing Director o~ Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. and
Director ·of the Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Association.
The United States delegation was headed by Mr. Ronald R.
Jensen, President and Chief Operating Officer of Sea
Alaska Products. Cover~~ent officials from both the
United States and Japan attended the meeting. Members
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B.
of the delegations and government attendees are listed
in the attachments.
During the course of the meetings, the two delegations
reviewed and discussed the 1984 memorandum. Both sides
agreed that the 1985 memorandum would be based on these
premises:
1. That the U.S. delegation would assist in securing a
reasonable TALFF for bottomfish species where a surplus
exists. Domestic harvest for 1985 should be estimated
on the basis of a realistic evalua~ion of potential
domestic catch. Uncertainty with respect to the
possibility of a higher domestic catch is adequately
accounted for by the reserve system.
2. That the U.S.I delegation would assist in securing
an allocation to Japan in 1985 that will be consistent
with its historic percentage and be released fully and
in a timely manner. Releases of unutilized reserves, DAP
and JVP to TALFF should also be made on a full and
timely basis. The Japanese delegation based its
position on anticipated allocations to Japan of
approximately 900,000 MT of bottomfish for the North
Pacific and Bering Sea during 1985.
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3. That the U.S. delegation would assist in securing
by-catch restrictions at a reasonable level based on the
Japanese plan for conducting the fishery in a manner
that will reduce by-catch .t o the lowest practical
level. The Japanese delegation repeatedly expressed
concern with respect to the serious damage which would.
be caused by the recent proposal to close the Gulf of
Alaska to all foreign fishing and the area within twenty
(20) miles of the Aleutian Islands to foreign
. trawling. The U.S. delegation expressed understanding
of the serious difficulties which would be caused by
closu~e of these areas to foreign fishing and indicated
that it would try to cooperate to keep these areas open.
4. Economic feasibility on both sides and,
consideration of technical problems and resource issues
and the negotiation of contract terms agreeable to the
individual parties involved.
5. That the governments of both the United States and
Japan will support this memorandum and take the
appropriate measures to facilitate its implementation.
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The parties expressed their willingness and desire to
participate in the enhancement and development of the
mutually beneficial economic relationships in the
fisheries field which they have enjoyed for many
years. In the spirit of ~heir long history of mutual
cooperation, the parties agreed to the following:
1. Tne two delegations agreed that for calendar year
1985, Jap.nese over-the-side joint venture operations
arranged on an individual company basis would be as
follows:
a. Shelik9f Strait 120,000 metric tons (MT) of
pollock;
b. Other Areas - 310,000 MT; and
c. Species Other Than Pollock - 30,000 M~.
I
2. The Japanese delegation will make commitments in
< '
1985 to ourchase 140,000 MT of u.s. harvested and
processed pollock of which at least 35,000 MT will be
delivered in 1985 and the remainder in 1986 (it is
agreed that the conversion equivalent into surimi shall
be 22%.); orovided that at the end of 1985 the actual
performance for 1985 will be evaluated and the delivery
levels for 1986 will be reevaluated. The commitments
. - 137 -
for 1986 may be revised by mutual' consent of both
parties. It is the understanding of both delegations
that purchase arrangements must be consummated in the
first quarter of 1985 for a minimum of 35.000 MT. Both
D.
~
.
~.
•
sides agreed that these c~mmitments are conditioned upon
offers by u.s. processors of available processed
products of these quantities at a quality and price
mutually agreed to by the contracting parties in a
company to company basis.
3. The Japanese delegation agreed to purchase more
than 5.000 MT of marketable U.S. harvested and
processed botto~!ish products. ether than pollock. from
the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea. on an individual
company basis.
The U.S. delegation raised its concern regarding current
trade policies impacting the competitiveness of the u.S.
fish products entering Japan.
The U.S. "de l e ga t i on expressed the desire that the number
and variety of Japanese -companies participating in
U.S./Japan joint ventures will increase in 1985.
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It is the intention of both delegations that this
memorandum shall in no way affect existing fishing
agreements on other species. nor result in adverse
trade barriers on other species. This agreement relates
solely to aggregate proje~tions of purchases and sales
by the fishing industries of the United States and
Japan. The two delegations agreed that this agreement
shall not restrict independent actions by any company or
person.
DATED: This
71/
;J day of December. 1985.
Ronald R. Jensen
U.S. Spokesman
.I
Fumio Imanaga
Japanese Spokesman
...:. -139 -
APPENDIX III
PUBLIC L\\\' 92-219-DEC. 23,1971
Public Law 9~-~19
[HS STAT.
De-ccmbe-r 13, 1971
[H, R. JJO~ 1
Fi&hrormt'"n's
Pro recn e e Act
or 190';", ame:nd-
~t'"nt.
II l:SC 1~71
nor e ,
Fi s h erv
pr-odu c r s , ir:2porta-
tb.,n rpl4lri ..,tion.
iiI St at , D'S.
S, ., .
~otifical1on to
Congre-ss.
Pen.hies.
Forfeiture.
AN ACT
To nmend t he Fi"llt'rnh"Il 's Protl'c:II'I"1' Act (I( lfHii" to t'nllllncl' the t'tf't'eth't'Ilt'''1; 1)(
i III.. rna I jUllal tl.sht'r.'I" cUIl" .. rvu t ion Ilru"rlllll~,
Be l/ f'I/I/{'le,! by ,lI.· "",",1,' '/I"! Ilouse of R('prr,~(·"t"I;,'(·,. of tIll'
[""l/I'd SI"It'.• of .llll,·,'i"" in Cooqre>« ({,~semblerl. Thnr tlu- Fishcrtueu's
Protect ive .\I·t of 1%7 (Ii,., Stut, ~~:t as nmendcd : S~ :'tnt. 7~~J). is
nmemle.l In' ill:,,'!'rill:': at the end t hvrco f the fcllowinu new :,p(,tion:
":-'EC, l'l,' (a) "'111:11 the ~Pl'n'tan' of Connnerr« 'dl'tPI'lllilll''': rl.u t
uat ionu ls of a fOI', 'i:.:n countrv. dil'l'c-th' 01" iudirect lv. are l'Olllllll'till!!
tishing opernr ions iii :I nlalllll'l: or ulld"i, circumstunces which dilllilli"l;
,Ill' elfectin'llt'ss of all internut iouu l fishery couservat iou progr:llll.
the ~el'I,,'tal'\' of (ouuuerve shall cert ifv SIIl'1I fuct to the PI'l,,,j,klll.
Tpon l'l'c\'ipt of 5111'\1 ,','rtiti.'ation, tIlt' pj'l',,:idl'nt may din,(·t the :-'~I'I"I'.
tar)" of the Trensury to prohihir the lJl'illgillg or the importnr iou iut o
the Tuire.l ~tatt's of rish products of the otrenclill,!! country for such
durnt ion as he determines appropriate and to tlu- extent that :;lIcll
prohibit ion is snucr ionorl Ly . t h ~ General .\gn·ellwllt 011 T:Il'iti"" um l
Tradt>,
h(1)) 'W ithin sixrv duys following certification by tIll' :-',·,'r,-tar:, of
Co III III t-'I"l'l'. the Presi.lvut shnll uotifv the Congress of nnv .u-rion rukeu
by him pursuant to such cert ificntiou. III till' event th« President fails
to direct. the ~t'l'retar:, of the Treasury to prohibit the importur iou
of fish products of the orlending country. or if such prohibition does
not cover all fish products of the offending country. thl' President shall
inform the Cornrress of the reasons therefore.
., (c) It shnll be unlawful for nnv person subject to the jurisdiction
of the Tnited Stun-s knowingly to bnng or import into. or cause to be
imported into. tho Tnired States any fish products prohibited by the
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to this section.
"( d) (l) Am: person violur ing the provisions of this section shall
be fined not nim'!' than $10.000 for the first violation, and not more
than :::~5,onO for each subsequent violation.
.. (:t) .\.11 fish products brought or imported into the Tnited States
in violation of this section, or the monetary value thereof, may be
forfeited.
"(3) All provisions of 1I1W relating to the seizure, judicial for-
feiture, and condemnation of II. cargo for violation of the customs
1I1'''s, the disposition of such cnrgo 'or the proceeds from the sale
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thereof, anti tilt! remission or lIIiiig-:ltiollOf surh f()rfl'itlll'l'~shnllllpply
to seizures :llId forfvit u n-s incurred, 01' allt'g'I'd to han! I"'ell incurred,
under the pnJ\' isions 0 f this :,('.'t ion, inso fa \" as such provisions 0 f
luw an.. :lpplil":lhlt> uml not in-ousisrout with this section.
.. (I') (1) Ell fnr"l'I'n1I'nt of till' provisions of this section prohibiting Enforcement.
the Iwing'ill g or importation of fish produ.-rs into the rnited States
shall he tht- n-sponsihility of the Secretury of the Treasury.
.. (:!) The jlldg'es of the rllitcll Statf's district C01l1'ts. aru] Trrited
Stutes conuuissioners may, within their respective jurisdict ions, upon
propt'r oath or utfinunt ion "howiH~ pl'Ob;~hle vuuse. issue such war-
rants 01' or her pl 'oees,; I\S may hc !'I'(]IlII'l'd tor en forrr-ment of this Act
and I'l'g'ulatiolls issued thereunder,
"(:l) AllY person unrhorizod to carry out. enforcement activit ies
hereunder shall IU\\'e the power to execute unv warrant or process
issued by nnv ottker or court of competent jurisdiction for the enforce-
ment of th is section.
"(ol) ~Ildllll'r"oll:;ouurhorize.l shall luive the po\\"('r-
"(.\) with or without u wn rrnnr or ot hr-r Pl"o('t>,;s, to arre-t :III)"
(lel-:;olls subject to the jurisd ict ion of the t-Ilitt·d ~tatl'" cuuuujt-
till;! in his !lre"\'IH'I' 01' view a vinlnr ion of this sevr iou or the
\"l·glliations is.."IIl'11 rhereuiule r :
"( B) with 0 r without a wurrunt or other process. to "pa r ..]1 :lny
\"('s~el subject to the jurisdict iou of the United ~tat(·~. unrl. if as
a result of such seuri-h he has reusonuhle cause to believe that
such ve-se] 0" allY person on hoard is el.gag'ing in operut ions in
violation of this seerion or the regulations issued thereunder. t hen
to arrest such person.
;. (:.) :-\ut'h person so aut horized, may seize, whenever and wherever
lu wfullv found. all fish products brought or imported into the T'n itsd
~tlltes i"1I violation of this section 01' the regulur ions issued thereunder.
.\.I\Y fish products so seized may ht> disposed of pursuant to the order
of a court of competent jurisdiction, or. if pe r ishable, in a manlier
prescribed by l"l'g'ulutions promulgated by the Secreturv of the Treas-
ury after consultation with the Sec retary of Health, Edu~ation! and
"'elfare,
.. (f) The Secreta ry of the Treasury is aut horized to prescribe such Relulations.
regulations as he determines necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section.
;'(,2") As used in this sect ion-e- , Definillons.
"(1) The term ;pel'sOiI' means any individual. partnership, corpora-
tion, or nssociut ion.
"(2) The term 'Fnited States', when used in n geographical sense,
means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
and the United States Virgin Islands,
"( ~) The term 'international fishery conser-vation program' means
any ban, restriction, regulation, or other measure in force pursuant to
I . a multilateral agreement to which the United States is a signatory
party, the purpose of which is to conserve or protect the living
~': resources of the sea.
. . . " (4) The term 'fish products! means fish and marine mammals and~~;~:: all products thereof taken by fishing vessels of an offending country
,.'.; whether or not packed, processed, or otherwise prepared for export in
:~.\ such country or within the jurisdiction thereof,"
<;,'; Approved December 23, 1971-
:\';:,"
"i. ...
.~~-
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fl .... PUBLIC LAW 96-61-AUG. 15, 1979
t :Public Law 96-61
~_ ' 96th Congress
~ . An Act
r . ~
"
.~ 1'1 authorize appropriations to carry out the Fishery Conservation and Management
. Act of 1976 during fiscal yearll l:1ll0. 1981. and 1982. and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That section 406 of
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 116 U.S.C.
1882) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:
"(6) $;3:3.000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 30. 1980.
"(7) $-10.000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981.
"(81 $-17.000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 30.1982....
SEC. 2. Section 43Wa) of the Revised. Statutes of the United States
(46 U.S.C. 25110.)) is amended. by adding at the end thereof the
following new sentence: "For the purposes of this subsection. the
term 'fisheries' shall include the planting, cultivation. catching,
taking. or harvesting of fish. shellfish. marine animals, pearls, shells,
or marine vegetation at any place within the fishery conservation
zone established by s~ction 101 of the "Fishery Conservation and
Management .-\ctof1916(16 U.S.C.1S11l..
SEC. 3. fa) Section 2011e) of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1~76(16 U.S.C. 1821(e)) is amended-
(1) by redesignating paragraphs III through (4) as subpara-
graphs (AIand (D ), respectively;
(2) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "ALLOCATION OF AL-
LOWABLE LEYEL.-"; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(2l(Al For the purposes of this paragraph-
"(i: The term 'certifica t ion' means a certification made by
the Secretary that nationals of a foreign country, directly or
indirectly. are conducting fishing operations or engaging in
trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. A
certification under this section shall also be deemed a
certification for the purposes of section 8(a) of the Fisher-
men's Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C. 1978(a».
"(ii) The term 'remedial period' means the 365-day period
beginning on the date on which a certification is issued with
respect to a foreign country.
"(B) If the Secretary issues a certification with respect to any
foreign country, then each allocation under paragraph (1) that~
"(i) is in effect COl' that foreigp country OD the date of
issuance; or
" (ii ) is not in effect on such date but wdti'IH, withO'l:lt regard'
to this paragraph, be made to the foreign country within the
remedial period;
shall be reduced by the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary, by not less than 50 percent.
"(C) The following apply for purposes of administering subpar-
agraph (B) with respect to any foreign country:
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"(i) If on the date of certification, the foreign country has
harvested a portion, but not all, of the quantity of fish
specified under any allocation, the reduction under subpara-
graph (5) for that allocation shall be applied with respect to
the quantity not harvested as of such date.
Reallocation. "(ii) If the Secretary notified the Secretary of State that it
, is not likely that the certification of the foreign country will -
be terminated under section 8(d) of the Fishermen's Protee-
Infra. tive Act of 1967 before the close of the period for which an
allocation is applicable or before the close of the remedial
period (whichever close first occurs) the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Secretary, shall reallocate any
portion of any reduction made under subparagraph <B)
among one or more foreign countries for which no certifica-
tion is in effect.
"(iii) If the certification is terminated under such section
BId) during the remedial period, the Secretary of State shall
return to the foreign country that portion of any allocation
reduced under subparagraph (B) that was not reallocated
under clause (ii): unless the harvesting of the fish covered by
the allocation is otherwise prohibited under this Act.
"(iv) The Secretary may refund or credit, by reason of
reduction of any allocation under this paragraph, any fee
16 USC 1824. paid under section 204. .
"(D) If the certification of a foreign country is not terminated
under section 8<d) of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967
before the close of the last day of the remedial period, the
Secretary ofState-
"(i) with respect to any allocation made to that country
and in effect (as reduced under subparagraph IB)) on such last
day, shall rescind, effective on and after the day after such
last day, any harvested portion of such allocation; and
"(ii) may not thereafter make any allocation to that
country under paragraph llJ until the certification is
terminated.".
(bl Section 8 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C.
1978)is amended-
(11 by amending subsection (a) by redesignating paragraph (3)
as paragraph (4), and by inserting immediately after paragraph
(2) the following new paragraph:
"(31 In administering this subsection, the Secretary of Com-
merce or the Secretary of the Interior, as appropriate, shall-
"(A) periodically monitor the activities of foreign nation-
als that may affect the international programs referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2):
"IBl promptly investigate any activity by foreign nationals
that, in the opinion of the Secretary. may be cause for
certification under paragraph (I) or (2J; and
"(C) promptly conclude; and reach a decision with respect
to; any investigation commenced under subparagraph (B).".
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (g) as subsections
(e) through (h), respectively; and
(3) by adding immediately after subsection (c) the following
new subsection:
"(d) After making a certification to the President under subsection
(a), the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior, as the
case may be, shall periodically review the activities of the nationals of
the offending country to determine if the reasons for which the
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certification was made no longer prevail. Upon determining that
such reasons no longer prevail. the Secretary concerned shall terrni-
nate the certification and publish notice thereof. together with a
statement of the facts on which such determination is based. in the
Federal Register.".
SEC. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4132 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (46 U.S.C. Ill. or any other
provision of law, the Secretary of the department in which the United
States Coast Guard is operating shall cause the vessel Widow Maker.
owned by Strohe Brothers of Lake Charles. Louisiana. to be docu-
mented as a vessel of the United States. upon compliance with the
usual requirements. with the privilege of engaging in the coastwide
trade and the fisheries so long as such vessel is owned by a citizen of.
the United States.
Approved August 1.5. 1979.
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vDIPLOMATIC PROCESSING Q£ PELLYAND PACKWOOD-MAGNUSON AMENDMENT CASES:
Specific cables are sent to U.S. Embassies in IWC-member countries
and in non-IWC whaling countries whenever the passage of U.S. domestic
legislation might have an impact on the whaling practices of other
nations. This happened last in 1979 when the Packwood-Magnuson
amendment was enacted.
The following general procedural steps are taken by the U.S.
upon identifying an international whaling conservation concern:
(A) Communication to nations involved in an expression of U.S.
concern that specified alleged activities appear to be certifiable
under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments. The U.S. requests
information on such alleged activities from the accused nation (entity).
(B) Transmittal of requested information from the suspect
nation (entity) to the U.S.
(C) The U.S. studies the facts submitted and assesses the
impacts of the whaling conduct in question on international whale
conservation.
(0) The U.S. tommunicates to the accused nation (entity) that
the circumstances appear such that they would lead the U.S. to
certify under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments if the
actions in question do not cease.
(E) If the situation is not clarified or remedied, certification
by the Secretary of Commerce is made. This certification includes
a factual account of the circumstances which led to the conclusion
that actions by the nation or nations in question had diminished
the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.
A recommendation on action from the Secretary may accompany the
certification to the President.
(F) The certified nation immediately loses not less than 50
percent of its fisheries allocations in the U.S. fishery conservation
zone. This is a non-discretionary attion which occurs upon the act
of certification. This sanction became available with the passage
of the Packwood-Magnuson amendment in August 1979--it has never been
invoked.
(G) Study conducted by the President to determine the merits
of an embargo on fisheries imports from the nation (entity)
certified. The President has 60 days in which to decide.
(H) The President reports to Congress on the decision to embargo
fisheries imports. Neither of the two certifications under the Pelly
amendment have culminated in an actual embargo being proclaimed
since the nations involved gave what was considered adequate
assurances that compliance on the issues of concern would occur.
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Prior to the passage of the Packwood-Magnuson amendment, Pelly
amendment certification alone was a useful negotiating lever since
there remained a 60-day period following certification by the
Secretary of Commerce ~hen additional negotiations could be conducted
before the embargo on fisheries imports had to be decided.
However, the immediate imposition of sanctions under the provisions
of the Packwood-Magnuson amendment upon certification has ,a l t e r ed
the concept of negotiating "room l l in the 60-days following certifi-
cation. - -The -"room" now remaining for negotiation is where, between
50 and 100 percent, the loss of fishery allocations will be fixed
and whether a U.S. embargo of fishery imports will be 'imposed.
Source: 34th rnc Meeting
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APPENDIX VI
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
OF THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
Convention, with Annex and Protocol,
between the UNITED STATES OF A)fERICA, I
CAl'"AD.-\., and ]AP.-\.!'i
• Signed at Tokyo Ma~' 9, 1952
• Ratification advised hv the Senat~ of the
United States of America July 4. 1952
• Ra tified by the President of the
United States of America Jul}" 30, 1952
• Ratified by Canada and Japan Ma)' 15
and June 9, 1953, respectively
• Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo
June 12, 1953
• Proclaimed by the President of the
United States of America July 30. 1953
• Entered into force June 12. 1953
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By THE PRESIDe::-:T OF THE UKITED STATES OF AMERIC.\
A PROCLA~IATIOX
'YHERt: .... S the intcrnnt ional convention for the high seas fisheries
of the Xorth Pacific Ocean, together with a protocol relating thereto,
was signed at Tokyo on ~ruy 9, 1952 by representatives of the United
States of America, Canada, and Japan;
"'HERBS till' originals of tho said convention and protocol. in the
English and Japanese lunguuges, arc word for word as follows:
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Il\'TERNATIONAL CONVEl\TION FOR THE HIGH SEAS
FISHERIES OF THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
The Go vernrnents of the United States of America, Canada and
Japan, whose respective duly accredited representatives have sub-
scribed hereto,
Acting as sovereign nntions in the light of their rights under the
principles of international law and custom to exploit the fishery
resources of the high seas, and
Believing that it will best serve the common interest of mankind,
as well as the interests of the Contracting Parties, to ensure the
maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources of the X orth
Pacific Ocean, and that each of the Parties should assume an obligu-
tion, on a free and oqual footing. 10 encourage the conscrvat ion of such
resources, and
Recognizing that in view of tIH'S" considerations it is highly desir-
able (l) to establish an Int erna tional Commission. representing the
three Parties hereto, to promote lind coordinate the scientific studies
necessarv to escortain the conservation measures required to secure
the maximum sustuincd productivity of fisheries of joint interest to
the Contracting Parties and to recommend such measures to such
Parties and (2) that each Party carry out such conservation rocorn-
mcndat ions , nnd provide for necessary restruints on its own nationals
and fishing vessels,
Therr-forr- ll~n'C' as follows:
ARTICLE I
1, The area to whir -h this Convention applies, hereinaft.er referred
to as "thc Convent ion aron ". shall 1)(' all waters, other than territorial
wa ters , of t.hc :'\ art h Pacific Ocean which for tlie purposes hereof shall
include t ln- adjucr-nt seas,
2. Xo t hinjr in this Convention shull be deemed to affect adversely
(prejudice) the claims of 11IIy Contracting Party in rcgurd 10 t h e
limits of t errit.orin l wu ters or to the jurisdiction of 1I coustul stale over
fisheries.
3. For the purposes of this Convention the term "fishing vessi-l..
shall mean any vesscl en!-"al!"d in catching fish or processing or t runs-
porting fish loudcd on the high seas, or any vessoloutfitu-d for such
act ivit ics,
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ARTICLE II
1. In order to realize the objectives of this Convention, the Con-
tracting- Parties shall establish and maintain the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Com-
mission."
2. The Commission shall be composed of three national sections,
each consisting of not. more than four members appointed by the
governments of the respective Contracting Parties.
3. Each national section shall have one vote. All resolutions,
recomrnenda t ions and ot her decisions of the Commission shall be made
only by a unanimous vote of tho three national sections except when
under the provisions of Article III, Section 1 (c) (ii) only two partici-
pat e.
4. The Commission may decide upon and amend , as occasion may
require, by-laws or rules for the conduct of its meetings.
.5. The Commission shall meet at least. once each year and a t such
other times as may be requested by a majority of the national sec-
tions. The dut c and place of the first meeting shall be determined
by agreement between the Contracting Parties.
6. A t its first meeting the Commission shall select a Chairman,
Vice-Chairrnnn and Secretary from different national sections: The
Chairman. Vice-Chairman and Secretary shall hold office for a period
of OIl" venr. During succeeding- ypars selection of a Chairman. Vice-
Chairman and Svcrctury from the nu tional sections shall be made in
such 11 muuncr as will provide each Contracting Party in turn with
rcprcscntu t ion ill those offices,
i. Till' Commission shall decide on a convenient place for the'
establislmu-nt of till' Commission's headquarters.
8. Eu('!J Contracting Party may establish an Advisory Committee
for its national section, to be composed of persons who shall be well
informed concerning ~orth Pacific fishery problems of common
concern. Euch such Advisory Committee shall be invited to a t t end
all sessions of the Commission except those which the Commission
der-ides to 1)(' i ll camera ,
9. Tlj(' Commission may hold public hearings . Euch nat ional
SP('tiOlI rnuv also hold public hearings within its own country.
10. The offk-iu l lunguagr-s of t he Commission shall be JnpnIH'S(' and
English. Proposals and data may bp submitted to the Commission in
ei ther language.
11. Ear-h Cnut ruct ing Party shall determine and pay the expenses
incurred by its nat ionul section. Joint expenses incurred by the
Commission shall IH' pa id by the Commission through contributions
Illud(' hy I lit, Cont rart ing Pnrt ies in the form and proportion recorn-
1H\'lIdt'd hy Llu- Commission und approved by tho Cout ract ing Parties.
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12. An annual budget of joint expenses shall be recommended by
the Commission and submitted to the Contracting Parties for approval.
13, The Commission shall authorize the disbursement of funds for
the joint. expenses of the Commission and may employ personnel and
acquire facilities necessary for the performance of its functions.
ARTICLE III
1. The Commission shall perform the following functions :
(a) In regard to any stock of fish specified in the Annex, study for
the purpose of determining annually whether such stock con-
tinues to qualify for abstention under the provisions of Article
IV. If the Commission determines that such stock no longer
meets the conditions of Article IV, the Commission shall recom-
mend that it be removed from the Annex. Provided, however,
tliat with respect to the stocks of fish originally specified in the
AIlIWX , no determinnt ion or recommendation as to whether
such stock continues to qualify for abstention shall be made for
fin years after the entry into force of this Convention .
(h) To permit later additions to the Annex, study. on request of a
Contracting Partv, any stock of fish of the Convention areu. the
grr-a t cr part of which is harvested by one or more of the Con-
trar-t iIl~ Parties, for tilt' purpose of determining whether such
stock qualifies for abst ent ion under the provisions of Article IV.
If the Commission decides that the particular stock fulfills the
conditions of Art icle n' it shall recommend, (1) that. such stock
he added to the Annex, (2) that the appropriate Party or Parties
abstain from fishing such stock and (3) that the Party or Parties
part iciput ing ill the fishing of such stock continue to curry out
neressary conservation measures .
(c) In rcgurd to any stock of fish in the Convention area;
(i) Study, on request of any Cont rnct ing Part.y concerned, any
stock of fish which is under suhstunt ial exploitation by IWo or
mort> of the Contracting Parties , nlld which is not covered by U
conserve I ion agreerncn t bet ween such Parties existing a I the
t irne of the conclusion of this Convention, for the purpose of
determining need for joint conservation measures;
(ii) Der-ide and recommend necessary joint. conservat ion
nu-usures includ ing auv rcluxnt ion thereof 10 be taken us 11
result of such 51 udy, Provided , however, tha t only the 1111 I ional
sect ions of t he Con t ruct injr Part ies engaged ill subsiu nt ial
exploitation of such stock of fish may par-ticipate ill such de-
cision ann recommends Iion. TIH' decisions and recommenda-
tions shall be reported regulurly to all the Contracting Parties,
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but shall apply only to the Contracting Parties the national
sections of which participated in the decisions and recom-
mendations.
(iii) Request the Contracting Party or Parties concerned to
report regularly the conservation measures adopted from time
to time with regard to the stocks of fish specified in the Annex,
whether or not covered by conservation agreements between the
Contracting Parties, and transmit such information to the
other Contracting Party or Parties.
(d) Consider and make recommendations to the Contracting
Parties concerning the enactment of schedules of equivalent
penalties for violations of this Convention.
(e) Compile and study the records provided by the Contracting
Parties pursuant to Article VIII.
(f) Submit annually to each Contracting Party a report on the
Commission's operations. investigations and findings, with
appropriate recommendations, and inform each Contracting
Party, whenever it is deemed advisable, on any mat t cr relating
to the objectives of this Convention.
2. The Commission may take such steps, in agreement with the
Parties concerned , as will enable it to determine the extent to which
the und ert akings agreed to by the Part ios under t ln- provisions of
Article Y, Section 2 and tht> measures recommended h.,- tile Commission
under the provisions of this Article and accepted by the Parties
concerned have been effective.
3. In the performance of its functions , the Commission shall,
insofar as feasible, utilize the technical and scientific services of, and
informat ion from , official agencies of the Contracting Parties and their
political sub-divisions and may. when desirable and if available,
utilize the services of, and information from, any public or private
institution or organizution or any private individual,
ARTICLE IV
1. In making its recommendations the Commission shall be guided
by the spirit and intent of this Convention and by the considerations
below mentioned.
(a) Any conservation measures for any stock of fish decided upon
under the provisions of this Convention shall be rceornmended
for equal application to all Parties enguged in suhst ant ial
exploitation of such stock.
(b) Wilh regard to any stock of fish which the Commission de-
termines reusonahly satisfies all the following conditions, a
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recommendation shall be made as provided for in Article III,
Section 1, (b).
(i) Evidence based upon scientific research indicates that more
intensive exploitation of the stock will not provide a substantial
increase in yield which can be sustained year after year,
(ii) The exploitation of the stock is limited or otherwise
regulated through legal measures by each Party which is sub-
stantial1y engaged in its exploitation, for the purpose of main-
taining or increasing its maximum sustained productivity; such
limitations and regulations being in accordance with conserva-
tion programs based upon scientific research, and
(iii) The stock is the subject of extensive scientific study de-
signed to discover whether the stock is being fully utilized and
the conditions necessary for maintaining its maximum sus-
tained productivity.
Provided, however, that no recommendat ion shall be made for
abstent ion hy a Con tracting Party concerned with regard to: (l) any
stock of fish which at any time during the twenty-five years next
preceding the entry into force of this Convention has been under
suhstant ial exploitation by that Party having regard to the conditions
referred to in Section 2 of this Article; (2) any stock of fish which is
harvested in grea t er purt by a country or countries not purty to this
Convention: (3) wa t ers in which there is historic intermingling of
.: fish ing operut ions of the Parties concerned, intermingling: of the stocks
of fish exploited bv these operations, and a long-established history
of joint conservation and regulation among the Parties concerned so
that there is consequent impracticability of segregating the opera t ions
and administering control. It is recognized that the conditions
specified in su bdivision (3) of this proviso apply to Canada and the
United States of America in the waters off the Pacific Coasts of the
Unit ed States of America and Canada from and including the waters
) of the Gulf of Alaska southward and, therefore , no recommendation
shall he made for abstention by either the United States of America or
Canada in such waters.
2. 1n any decision or recorumendut ion allowances shall be made for
the effect of strikes, wars, or except ional economic or biological con-
ditions which may 1111 Y{' introduced temporary declines in or suspension
of productivity, exploitation, or manngcrnent of the stock of fish
concerned.
ARTICLE V
1. The Annex a tl uelH,d hereto forms an in tcgral part of this Con-
vention. All references to "Convention" shall he understood as
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including the said Annex either in its present terms or as amended in
accordance with the provisions of Article VII.
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that any stock of fish originally
specified in the Annex to this Convention fulfills the conditions pre-
scribed in Article IV and accordingly agree that the appropriate Party
or Parties shall abstain from fishing such stock and the Party or
Parties participating in the fishing of such stock sha.ll continue to
carry out necessary conservation measures.
ARTICLE VI
In the event that it shall come to the attention of any of the Con-
tracting Parties that the nationals or fishing vessels of any country
which is not a Party to this Convention appear to affect adversely the
operations of the Commission or the carrying out of the objectives of
this Convention, such Party shall call the matter to the attention of
other Contracting Parties. All the Contracting Parties agree upon the
request of such Party to confer upon the steps to be taken towards
obviating such adverse effects or relieving any Contracting Party from
such adverse effects .
ARTICLE VII
1. The Annex to this Convention shall be considered amended from
the date upon which the Commission receives notification from all the
Contracting Parties of acceptance of a recommendation to amend the
Annex made by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of
Article III, Section 1 or of the Protocol to this Con vention.
2. The Commission shall notify all the Contracting Parties of the
date of receipt of each notification of acceptance of an amendment to
the Annex.
ARTICLE YIII
Th e Contracting Parties agree to keep as far as practicable all
records requested by the Commission and to furnish compilations of
such records and other information upon request of the Commission.
No Con tracting Party shall be required hereunder to provide the
records of individual operations.
ARTICLE IX
1. The Contracting Parties agree as follows:
(a) With regard to a stock of fish from the exploitation of which
any Contracting Party has agreed to abstain , the nationals and
fishing vessels of such Contracting Party are prohibited from
engaging in the exploitation of such stock of fish in waters
specified in the Annex, and from loading, processing, possessing,
or transporting such fish in such waters.
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(b) With regard to 8. stock of fish for which a Contracting Party
has agreed to continue to carry out conservation measures, the
nationals and fishing vessels of such Party are prohibited from
engaging in fishing activities in waters specified in the Annex
in violation of regulations established under such conservation
measures.
2. Each Contracting Party agrees, for the purpose of rendering
effective the provisions of this Convention, to enact and enforce
necessary laws and regulations, with regard to its nationals and fish-
ing vessels , with appropriate penalties against violations thereof and
to transmit to the Commission a report on any action taken by it
with regard thereto.
ARTICLE X
1. The Contracting Parties agree, in order to carry out faithfully
the provisions of this Convention, to cooperate with each other in
taking appropriate and effective measures and accordingly agree
as follows :
(a) ,Yhen a fishing: vessel of a Contracting Party has been found
in waters in which that Party has agreed to abstain from ex-
ploitation in accordance with the provisions of this Convention,
the duly authorized officials of any Contracting Party may
board such vessel t-o inspect its equipment , books, documents,
and other articles and question the persons on board .
Such officials shall present credentials issued by their respec-
tive Governments if requested by the master of the vessel.
(b) "When any such person or fishing vessel is actually engaged in
operations in violation of the provisions of this Convention,
or there is reasonable ground to believe was obviously so
engaged immediately prior to boarding of such vessel by any
such official, the latter may arrest or seize such person or
vessel. In that case, the Contracting Partv to which the
official belongs shall notify the Contracting Party to which
such person or vessel belongs of such arrest or seizure, and
shall deliver such vessel or persons as promptly B!' practicable
to the authorized official!' of the Contracting Party to which
such vessel or person belongs at a place to be agreed upon by
both Parties. Provided, however, that when the Contracting
Party which receives such notification cannot immediately
accept delivery and makes request, the Contracting Party
which gives such notification may keep such person or \"E'5sE'1
under surveillance within its own territory, under the condi-
tions agreed upon by both of the Contracting Parties.
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(c) Only the authorities of the Party to which the above-mentioned
person or fishing vessel belongs may try the offense and impose
penalties therefor. The witnesses and evidence necessary for
establishing the offense, 80 far as they are under the control
of any of the Parties to this Convention, shall be furnished as
promptly as possible to the Contracting Party having juris-
diction to try the offense.
2. With regard to the nationals or fishing vessels of one or more
Contracting Parties in waters with respect. to which they have agreed
t o continue to carry out conservation measures for certain stocks of
fi:-:h in accordance with the provisions of this Convention , the Con-
t rfH·t ing Parties concerned shall carry out enforcement severally or
jointly. In that. case, the Contracting Parties concerned agree to
rl'JlOrt periodically through the Commission to the Contracting Party
whic·h has agreed to abstain from the exploitation of such stocks of
li..h on the enforcement conditions, and also, if requested, to provide
0pi'0rt unity for observation of the conduct. of enforcement.
;;, TII(OContracting Parties agree to meet , during the sixth year of
lilt' operut.iou of this Convention, to review the effectiveness of the
,·,If,'rc·('II1('nt provisions of this Article and. if desirable, to consider
1111 IIIIS by wh ich thev may more effectively be carried out.
ARTICLE XI
1. This Convention shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in
n",'onllllH'( ' with their respective constitutional processes and the
iI,:' I rumen tc; of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible at
Tokyo.
~ . This Convention shall enter into force on the date of the exchange
.. f 1'111 ili,'u t ione- ,p] It shall continue in force for a period of ten years
rllld t lu-n-uft er until one year from the day on which a Contracting
J·lIrt .1 shull gi\'(' notice to the other Contract ing Parties of an intention
..r t r-rrniuu t ing the Convention, whereupon it shall terminate as to all
('''Ill flll'ling Purt ies,
1:--: W!T:--: E S:- \\'Hl::HEOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries , duly au-
t Ilfll'lZl'd, have signed the present Convention.
I J 1111" 12, 1!153.
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Annex
1. With regard to the stocks of fish in the respective waters named
below, Japan agrees to abstain from fishing, and Canada and the
United States of America agree to continue to carry out necessary
conservation measures, in accordance with the provisions of Article
V, Section 2 of this Convention:
(a) Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis)
The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United
States of America in which commercial fishing for halibut is
being or can be prosecuted. Halibut referred to herein shall
be those originating along the coast of North America.
(b) H erring (Clupea paUasii)
The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United
States of America, exclusive of the Bering Sea and of the waters
of tile Korth Pacific Ocean west of the meridian passing through
the extremity of the Alaskan Peninsula, in which commercial
fishing for herring of North America origin is being or can be
prosecuted.
(c) Salmon (Oncorhynchus qorbuscha, Oncorhsmch u» keta, Oncorhsm-
elms kisutch , Oncor}'y71chus nerka, Oncor}'ylldus tschaunttscha)
The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the Uni ted
States of America, exclusive of the Bering Sea and of the waters
of the Korth Pacific Ocean west of a provisional line following
the meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka
Island; in which commercial fishing for salmon originating in the
rivers of Canada and the United States of America is being or
can be prosecuted.
') \Yith regard to the stocks of fish in the waters named below I
CI1I1udu and Japan agree to abstain from fishing, and the United
Stat p,.; of America ag-rees to continue to carry out necessary con-
I','ITU t ion measures, ill accordance with the provisions of Article V,
SI'(,t ioll 2 of this Convention :
Salmon (Oncorhynchus qorbusclia, 0llcorhyncJ.us keta, O~or}(Y71chus
kisutch , Oncorlojnclru» nerka and Oncorlumdvus tschawytscha)
The Convention area of the Bering Sea east of the line starting
from Cape Prince of Wales on the west coast of Alaska, running
westward to 168°58'22.59" 'Wes t Longitude : thence due south
to n point 65°15'00" North Latitude; thence along the gre at
circle course which passes through 51° North Latitude and 167°
East Lonpit ude, to its intersection with meridian 175° West
Longitude ; thence south along a provisional line which follows
this meridian to the territorial waters limit of Atka Island; in
which commercial fishing for salmon originating in the rivers or
the United States of America is being or can be prosecuted.
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DONE in triplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both
equally authentic, at Tokyo this ninth day of May, one thousand
nine hundred fifty-two.
tJNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ROBERT MURPHY
CANADA:
A R MENZIES
JAPAN:
K.OK.UAKI
K HIROKAWA.
{SEAL]
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[SEAL] {SE:\ LJ
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE NORTH PACIFIC
OCEAN
The Governments of the United States of America, Canada and
Japan, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agree upon the
following stipulation in regard to the International Convention for the
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, signed at Tokyo on
this ninth day of May, nineteen hundred fifty-two.
The Governments of the United States of America, Canada and
Japan agree that the line of meridian 1750 West Longitude and the i
line following the meridian passing through the western extremity of
Atka Island, which have been adopted for determining the areas in
which the exploitation of salmon is abstained or the conservation
measures for salmon continue to be enforced in accordance with the
provisions of the Annex to this Convention, shall be considered as
provisional lines which shall continue in effect subject to confirmation
or readjustment in accordance with the procedure mentioned below.
The Commission to be established under the Convention shall, as
expeditiously as practicable, investigate the waters of the Convention
area to determine if there are areas in which salmon originating in the
rivers of Canada and of the United States of America intermingle
with salmon originating in the rivers of Asia. If such areas are found
the Commission shall conduct suitable studies to determine a line or
lines which best divide salmon of Asiatic origin and salmon of Canadian
and United States of America origin, from which certain Contracting
Parties have agreed to abstain in accordance with the provisions of
Article V, Section 2, and whether it. can be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt that this line or lines more equitably divide such salmon than
the provisional lines specified in sections 1(c) and 2 of the Annex.
In accordance with these determinations the Commission shall recom-
mend that such provisional lines be confirmed or that. thev be changed
in accordance with these results, giving due consideration to adjust-
ments required to simplify administration.
In the event, however, the Commission fails within a reasonable
period of time to recommend unanimously such line or lines, it is
agreed that the matt.er shall b<, referred to 0. special committee of
scientists consisting of three competent and disinterested persons, no
one of whom shall be a national of a Contracting Party, selected by
mutual agreement of all Parties for the determination of this matter.
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It is further agreed that when a determination has been made by a
majority of such special committee, the Commission shall make a
recommendation in accordance therewith.
The Governments of the United States of America, Canada and
Japan, in signing this Protocol, desire to make it clear that the pro-
eodure set forth herein is designed to cover a special situation. It is
not, therefore, to be considered a precedent for the final resolution of
any matters which may, in the future, come before the Commission.
This Protocol shall become effective from the date of entry into
force of the said Convention. Pl
Ix WIT:\"ESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
this Protocol.
DO~E in triplicate at Tokyo this ninth day of May, one thousand
nine hundred fifty-two.
l7:\ITED STATES OF A~rERICA:
ROBERT ~lrRPHY
C:\:\;\ D.-\.:
A R ~lEXZIES
.1;\ 1'.-\:\:
K. OKAZAKI
K. HIROKAWA.
, .lu r.c 12. 1953.
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APPENDIX VI I
By TilE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
~'"
A PROCLAMATION ",.L
~
0'1
~
MULTILATERAL
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
'",'u('ol amending the convention oj May 9, 1952, as amended,
agreed minures and memoranda oj understanding.
Sj,,,,.dat Tokyo April 25, 1978j
RII,ijicatioll advised by th e Senate oj ti,e United States oj America
October 11,1978;
Hlllijied b)' tlie President oj ti,e United States oj America !fovem-
ber2,19i8;
Hu,ijica,;ons excllangedat Tokyo February 15,1979;
fwdoimed by ti,e PrelJident oj the {'nited States oj America
Murcll 14, 1979j
fll1rrt'd into force February 15,1979.
COt\SIPERING TIlAT:
The Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Jli,h
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, together with related Agreod .
Minutes and Memoranda of Understanding, were done at Tokyo on '
April 25,1978, the texts of which are hereto annexed; _
The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of
October 11,1978, two-thirds 01 the Senators present concurring therein
gave its advice and consent to ratification 01 the Protocol, logt.the;
with related Agreed Minutes and Memoranda of Underatanclinl('
The President of the United Stales 01 America ratified the Protocol'
together with related Agreed Minutes and Memoranda 01 Undflr:
standing, on November 2,1978, in pursuance of the advice and COIlllt.ol
of the Senate: ,
The instruments of ratification of the Protocol were exrhanPd ' "
Tokyo on February 15, 1979; and accordingly the Protocol, lo~('lber
with related Agreed Minutes and Memoranda of UnclellitandiQc.
entered into for ce on February 15, 1979j , .
1"0\\', THEREFORE, I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United Stat..
of America, proclaim and make public the Protocol, together ,,'ilh re-
lated Agreed Minutes and Memoranda of Understanding', to the end
that they shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and ah"r
February 15, 1979, by the United States of America and by tho cili~llt.
of the United States of America and nil other persons subject to ll.t
j urisdict ion I hereof.
1:\ TEl';TDlONY \\·UEREOt', I have signed this proclamation ancll'lll~"
the Senl of the United Stutes of America to be affixed.
])0:'\£ at the city of Wn shinglon this fourteenth day of ~hrrll
(SEAl.) in the )'t'llr of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seveut) -
nine and of the Independence of the United 5111\.-:' of
Am eri ca the two hundred third.
th~IMY CAIlUIl
By the President :
CYI\U8 \' At\CE
Secretary of State
f-'
0),
~
· PROTOCOL AMENDING
THE ItT£RNATIONAL CONVENTiON FOR THE
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
The GOvernments of the United States of America,
canada and Japan,
Having regard to the Interna~ional Convention for the
HIgh Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific OCean, aigned at
fokyo on the ninth day of Hay, nineteen hundred And fifty-
t~, its Annex and the Protocol thereto[l] (hereinafter re-
ferred to AS -the Convention-),
Sharing the view that the Convention has served to
promote and coordinate scientific utudieu relating to the
f16hery resources of the North Pacific Ocean and its
adjacent seas, And has aided in the conservation of these
fishery resourC~b,
Taking into account that each of the Contracting
PArties has established new fishery jurisdiction in the
Conv~ntion Area,
Acknowlecging that certai~ provisions of the Conven-
tion are not compa t Lbl e with such jurisdiction, and
Desirous of amending the Convention,
Have agr~ed as follows:
I TI.\S 2i80, -H93, 4992, 113&'1; -1 usr 880; 11 UST 1603; 18 UST 372; H UST
...·.:l.
ARTICLB I
The Convention ahall be amended to reAd as followal
-The Governmenta of the United States of Amerioa,
Canada And Japan have agreed a. follows.
Article I
1. The area to which this Convention applies,
hereinafter referred to aa -the COnvention aroa-, shall
be all vaters, other than territorial vators, of the
North Pacific Ocean which for the purposes bereof
shall include the adjacent aea••
2. Nothing in this COnvention ShAll be deemed to
affect adversely (prejudice) the claims or position of
any Contracting Party in regard to the limits of terri-
torial waters or to the jurisdiction of 'a coastal atat.
over fisheries.
3. For the purposes of this Convention the term
-fishing vessel- shall mean any vessel engaged in catch-
ing fish or processing or tranuporting fish loaded in
the Convention area, or any vessel outfitted for such
activities, or any vessel in normAl support of another
vessel as described above.
Article II
1. The Contracting Parties shall maintain the 1. The location of the Commission's headquArter.
The Commission may hold public hearings.9.
camera.
8. Each ContrActing Party may estAblish An
Advisory Committee for its national section, to be
composed of persons who ahAl1 be well informed con-
cerning North Pacific fishery problems of common
concern. Each such Advisory Committee shall be
invited to attend all sessions of the Commission
except those which the Commission decides to be ~
3. Each national aection shall have one vote.
All proposals, recommendations and other decisions
~f the Commission shall be made only by a unanimous
vote of the three national sections.
InternationAl North Pacific Fisheries Commission, here- shall be dete~ined by the Commission.
inafter referred to AS -the Commission-.
2. The Commission ShAll be composed of three
national 5ections, each consisting of not more than
tour members appointed by the Governments of tho re-
.pcctive Contracting Parties.
~
0'1
W
4. The Commission may decide upon and amend,
•• occasion may require, by-laws or rules for the
cor.d~ct of its me~tin9a.
s. The Commission shall meet At least once
each year and at such other times as may be re-
quested by A majority of the national sections.
Each national section may Also hold public hearings
within its own country.
10. The official languaqes of the Commission shall
be Japanese And English. Proposals And data may be aub-
mitted to the Commission in either languago.
11. Each Contracting Party shall determine and pay
Vice-Chairman and Secretary from different national
aections. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman And Secretary
Ihall hold office for a periOd of one year. During
lucceeding years selection of A Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and Secretary from the national sections
ahall be made in such a manner AS will provide each
Contracting PArty ir turn with representAtion in
those offices.
6. The Commission shall select a Chai~an,
the expenses incurred by its national section. Joint
expenses incurred by the Commission shall be paid by ~hc
Commission through contributions made by the Contractin9
Parties in the form And proportion recommended by the
Commission and approved by the Contracting Partie••
12. An annual budget of joint expenses shall be
recommended by the Commission and aubmitted to the
Contracting Parties for approval.
13. The Commission tihall authorize the ditiburse-
1Il"I.t of funds for the joint expenses of the Commission
~l1cl rr.ay erapLoy personnel and acquire facilities neces-
.~rY for the performance of its functions.
junctions:
1.
Article III
The Commission shall perfonm the following
(a) provide for scientific titudies and for
coordinating the collection, exchange
and analysis of ticientific data regard-
ing anadromous species, including data
(c) recommend, when necessary, amendment of
the Annex to this Convention,
(d) coordinate scientific studies to deter-
mine the continent of origin of anadroroou.
species migrating in the waters south of
(6- North latitUde, and following three
years of such studies make re~ommenda-
tions if appropriate in accordance with
sub-paragraph (c) above relating to the
conservation of salmon of North American
origin,
regarding the continent of origin of
these spccieb, and provide a forum for
cooperation among the Contracting Parties
~ with respect to these species!
0)
~
(bl pending the establishment of an inter-
national organization as referred to in
Article IV, provide a forum for coopera-
tion among the Contracting Parties with
respect to the study, analysis and ex-
change of scientific infonmation and
vic~s relating to the stocks of non-
anadromous species of the Convention
area, including inform3tion and views
relating to all relevant factors
affecting these stocks, the promotion
of scientific research designed to fill
gaps in kno~ledge and the compilation
and dissemination of statistics and
r ecor d s i
(e) consider and make proposals to the Con-
tracting Parties concerning the enactment
of schedule~ of equivalent penalties for
violations of this Convention which occur
outside thp 200 nautical mile fishery
zone of any Contracting Party,
(f) compile and study the records provided by
the Contracting Parties pursuant to
Article VIII,
(g) submit annually to each Contracting Party
A report on the Commission's operations,
investigations and findings, with appropri-
ate proposals, and inform each Contracting
Party, whenever it is deemed advisable,
on any matter relating to the implementa-
tion of this Convention,
r
(hI consider the results of reviews undertaken either in its present terms or as amended in accordance
by the Contracting Parties pursuant to
Article XI and make proposals as appropri-
Co=~ission shall, insofar as feasible, utilize the techni-
cal and scientific services of, and information from,
official agencies of the Contracting Parties and their
political sub-divisions and may, when desirable and it
av~ il,ble, utilize the services ot, and information trom,
aa~' public or private institution or organiZAtion or Any
of this Convention.
with the provisions of Article VII.
The Contracting Parties agree that in fishing2.
to this Convention and that any infringement of these
measures shall be deemed to be in violation of the terms
tracting Parties shall abide by the conservation me~sures
3. The nationals and fishing vessels of the Con-
for anadromous species in the Convention area, they shall
respect the conservation measures specified in the Annex
specified in the Annex to this Convention.
ate.
In the performance of its functions, the2.
Fc~vate individual. Article VI
Article IV In the event that it shall come to the attention of
......
0\
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1~e Contracting Parties shall work towards the
es.a~lishr.ent of an international organization with
broacer membership dealing with species of the Con-
any of the Contracting Parties that the nationals or
fishing vessels of any country which is not a Party to
this Convention appear to affect adversely the operations
of the Commission or the implementation of this Convention,
ve~tic~ area other than anadromoua species. Progress
to,arcs this end shall be reviewed during the consulta-
ll~~S provided for in Article XI. When such an inter-
Il ~:ic~al organization becomes functional, the functions
of tl.e Commission under the provisions of Article III,
~~~asraph 1., sub-paragraph (bl shall be terminAted and
such Party shall call the ~atter to the attention of other
Contracting Parties . All the Contracting Parties agree
Upon the request of such Party to confer upon the steps
to be tak~n towards obviating such adverse effects or re-
lieving any Contracting Party from such adverse effects.
Article VIr
tra nsferred to the new organization.
1. The Annex to this Convention shall be considered
Article V amended from the date upon which the Commission receives
part c~ this Convention. All references to the Conven-
tioa shall be understood aa including the said Annex
1. The Annex attAched hereto forma an integral
notification from all the Contracting Parties of accept-
Ance of a recommendation to amend the Annex made by the
Comrnrniss ion in accordance with the provisions of Article
Ill, paragraph 1•• SUb-paragraph Ie).
Article VIII
Tte Contracting Parties agree to keep as far as
I : 0 n upon request of the Commission. No Contracting Party
, ~_ ,, : 1 ce required hereunder to provide the records of
i r, '} hHties of the date of receipt of each notification
,:! " cceptance of an' amendment to the Annex.
suffer the minimum interference
board vessels fishing for anadromollG
species of the other Contracting
Parties to inspect equipment, logs,
cocuments, catch and other articles
and question t~e persons on board
for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of this Convention.
Such inspections and questioning
shall be made so that the vessels
The COm4ission shall notify all the Contract-2 .
f l .,clicable all records requested by the Commission and
: ~ tur~ish compilations of such records and other informa-
" , '; -: ;: :': '11 operations.
Article IX
and inconvenience. Such officials
shall present credentials issued
by their respective Governments it
~ ·A.':Lr,: ion area I..,..
m
m
1. The COutracting Parties agree that within the requested by the master of the
vessel.
('II each Contracting Party shall enforce the
provisions of this Convention within its
(ii) l"hen any such person or fishing
vessel is actually engaged in
200 nautical mile fishery zone in accord- operations in violation of the
ance with its domestic law; provisions of this Convention, or
(~) outside th~ 200 nautical mile fishery
zone of any Contracting Party, any Con-
tracting Party may enforce the provisions
of this Cor.vcnlion in accordance with
there is reasonable ground to
believe was obvicusly so engaged
prior to boarding of such vessel
by any such official, the latter
Day arrest or seize such person
the following:
or vessel and further investigate
(il The duly authorized officials the rircumstances if necessary.
of any Contracting Party may The Contracting Party to which
the official belongs shall
....
Cl'I
-J
riotify promptly the ContrActing Party
to which such person or vessel belongs
of such arrest or seizure, And shall
deliver such person or vessel AS
promptly as prActicable to the
authorized officials of the Contract-
ing Party to which such person or
vessel belongs at a place to be
agreed upon by both Parties. Pro-
vided, however, that when the Con-
tracting Party which receives such
notification CAnnot immediAtely
Accept delivery, the Contracting
PArty which gives such notification
may keep such person or vessel
under surveillance within the waters
of the Convention Area or within its
own territory under the conditions
agreed upon by both the Contracting
Parties.
tiii) Only the authorities of the Con-
tracting Party to which the Above-
mentioned person or fishing vessel
belongs may try the offense And
impose penalties therefor. The
witnesses and evidence necessary
for establishing the offense, &0
fAr as they are under the control
of any of the Contracting Parti~a
to this Convention, shall be
furnished as promptly AS possible
to the Contracting Party having
jurisdiction to try the offense
and shall be tAken into ACCOunt,
and utilized as appropriate, by
the executive Authority of that
Contractinq Party having jurisdic-
tion to try the offense.
(cl the Contracting Parties shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that
their fishing vessels allow and
assist boardings and inspections
carried out in accordance with this
Convention of such vessels by the
duly authorized officiala of Any
Contractinq Party, And cooperate in
such enforcement action as may be
ulldertClk.dn.
2. Each Contracting Party agrees, for the
purpose of rendering effective -the provisions of
this Conv~ntion, to enact and enforce necessary
laws And regulations. with appropriate penalties
against violations thereof, And to transmit to
the Commission a report on any action taken by it in
regard thereto.
Article X
The Contracting Parties agree that a scientific
I fog ram is necessary to carry out the provisions of
lhis convention. To this end the Contracting Parties
~grce to establish such a program to coordinate their
scientific research activities with respect to
~~adromous species in the Convention area as well as
Article XII
1. This Convention shall continue in force until
one year from the day on which a Contracting Party
shall give notice to the other Contracting Parties of
an intention of terminating the Convention, whereupon
it shall terminate as to all Contracting Partie8.
Nations Conference on the Law of tnt: ~ea.
by the Contracting Parties upon the conclusion of a
multilateral treaty resulting from the Third United
fishery operations conducted by Japanese nationals and
fishing vessels in the waters of the Convention areal
~
0"'1
00
l'i,ccies of marine mammals incidentally caught in fish-
ill') for anadromous species. In this regard, the Con-
Ir.1cting Parties agree to exchange scientists in order
I ~ c ~ (fY out scientific observations with respect to
I~.i~ c..;.tches and methods of operation. The Contracting
I'drli as shall establish procedures to facilitate such
cbservc.tions.
Article XI
2.
1.
This Convention shall be subject to review
ANNEX
The following measures shall apply to 8alQOn
,..:1 taticns whellcver necessary, or not lat~r than
; ';:l , ' days following the request of any of them,
" . orco r to review tht: implementation of this Con-
: _I t a t i ons , at a time and place to be mutually agreed
~;0~, not lat~r than ninety days following notice by
" " J Cc ncr ac t Lnq Party of its intention to terminate
. !~ Convention in accordance with the provisions of
Article XII, paragraph 1. of this Convention.
1.
':I..n t ion.
2.
The Contracting Parties agree to hold con-
The Contracting Parties agree to hold con-
ta) North of 56 0 North Latitude, east of
175 0 East Longitude and outside the
United States fishery conservation zon~,
beginning on June 26 (Japan Standurd
Time) (1500 June 25 GMT) of each year,
the Japanese mothership fishery shall
conduct no more than 22 mothership fleet
days in the area between 175· East l~n9i-
tude and 180 0 Longitude and no more than
31 mothership fleet days in the area
between 180· Longitude and 175· West
Longitude.
(b) ~North of 46° North Latitude, between
17S· East Longitude and 170· East Longi-
tude, and outside the United States
fishery conservation zone, salmon
fishery operations shall not begin
before June 1 (Japan Standard Time)
(lSOO Hay 31 GMT) of each year.
Governments of Japan and the United Stat••
shall conduct joint research, shall co-
operate to determine the effect of the
Japanese salmon fishery on marine mammal
populations, And shall work to reduce or
eliJuinate the incidental catch of
marIne mammals in the fishery.
(c) West of 17S o East Longitude, and within (d) Except for the areas specified in Ca}
increase in fishing efficiency.
day is defined as one mothership with no more than forty-
one catcher-boats present during a portion of anyone
calendar day in the areas specified in paragraph 1. Ca) of
this Annex. Any increase in the number of catcher-boat.
assigned to a mothership will be reflected in a pro-
portional reduction in the number of authorized flep.t
days. Yoodifications to gear or fishing procedures which
might affect current fishing efficiency shall be under-
taken only after consultations among the three Contract-
ing parties. In such consultations the Contracting
Parties shall examine the necessity of change in the
nurr~er of authorized fleet days to take account of Any
~
0"1
1.0
the United States fishery conservation
zone, »almon fishery operations shall
not begin before June 10 (Japan Standard
Time) (1500 June 9 GMT) of each year.
Fishing vessels engaged in this fishery
shall be required to have on board a
registration permit which shall be issued
by the Government of the United States.
Such vessels ~y be required by the
Government of the United States to
accept on board scientific observers
and to bear the expenses incurred in
such boardinq. The requirement of
the C~v~rnment of the United States
that Japanese fishing vessels engaged
in this fishery have on board a
Certificate of Inclusion relating
to the incidental taking of marine mammals
shall be suspended for the period ending
June 9, 1981 duri~g which period the
2.
above, there shall be no salmon fishery
operations east of 17S· East LongitUde.
unless such fishery operations are
agreed to for A temporary period among
the three Contracting Parties.
For the purposes of this Annex, a mothership fl"l
3, Ea~ of 170· Eost Longitude the southern limit AGREED HINUTES
of the Japanese mothership fishery and the northern
li~it of the Japonese landbased fishery shall remain
~l 46· North Latitude, West of 170· East Longitude
Ih(· southern limit of the Japanese mothership fishery
a; !.,.11 not extend south of 46· North Latitude, an:1 the
/h fthcrn limit of the Japanese landbased fishery shall
not extend north of 48· North Latitude."
The representatives of the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the
Government of Japan have agreed to record the follow-
ing in connection with the InternationAl Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Inter-
• scientific research vessel of the Government of
2. It is understood that the Government of
the Government of Canada, no more than three
the above-mentioned scientific research vessel.
It is understood that the Government ot1.
Japan is prepared to allow, upon the request of the
Government of the United States of America and/or
scientists of the Government of the United States
of America and/or the Government of Canada to board
Japan to conduct research with respect to the conti-
nent of origin of anadromous species migrating in the
waters of the Northern Bering Sea.
commercial salmon fishery in the Northern Bering Sea
Japan intends to send throughout the period of the
national Convention for the High Seas Fisheries ot
the North Pacific· Ocean signed this dayl
':o " .f,,·M, l anguage s , all texts be t ng equally authentic,
~ u ' : " '" d and seventy-eight.
of r ~titication or approval.
. ' . ~y~ this twenty-fifth d~y of April, nin.t.(~
l'l'l{[. in t r Ip Lt cat e , in the Eng Lt sh , French ..nd
ARTICLE II
This Protocol shall be ratified or approved by
II,,' Contracting Parties to the Convention in accord-
~ I .:~ with their respective constitutional processes,
"~ ,; the instruments of ratification or approval sh ..ll
I.· · (xchanged e s SOon AS possible at Tokyo. This
I' ~tccol shall come into torce on the date of the
ex::~. e nge by all the Contracting Parties of instruments
111 IHTla:SS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being d:Jly
.~t~~rize:1 by their respective Gove~enta, have signed
this Protocol.
I-'
-J
o
" ,. ':i!E GO'.'ER-"ll·:EllT OF TtiE , -CiJ,i~rl:.17~·, 1':ISEl.l!
Y. ~ I;i GOVERN:,~,£{fJ f f:ANhllA.c, :. ISEAL)
" r c-: J. ' . r-1
',..'. ..,.S.(. ·A<../ C,a :(.4 ·",,/
;: T ;I ~ C;::\'I:R.'l:-IENT UP JAPAN : I SEAI.)
J lN1~ J> ~cUL 1'1
l. It is understood that the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of
Canada undertake to bear expenses incurred in such
boarding of their respective scientists .
4. It is understood that the Government of
, ~I il 'hnd J. Mnnsllcld.
'1II\lI:\! Ituukiu .
• :O;UIIllll ~lJllodn.
Japan is prepared to facilitate temporary vi.its by
~the above-mentioned 6cientiuts to Japanese mother-
Mhips and/or catcher-boats engaged in salmon fishery
operations for collecting scientific information
~ith re5pect to the catches of anadromous species.
It is also understood that for the Above-mentioned
aciel1tists visiting motherships and/or catcher-boats
from the above-mentioned scientific research vessel
the tollowing re6trictions will applYI
(al The total number of visits made
by these 8cienti6ts shall not exceed
eight days for the waters north of
56 P North Latitude, between 175-
East Lonqitude and 180' Longitude,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The Delegations of the Governments of the united State.
of Acerica, Canada and Japan have agreed to record the
following in connection with the International Conven-
tion for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Inter-
national Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the
~orth Pacific Ocean signed this day, in order to further
research studies on anadromous Salmonidae in the Conven-
tion areal
1. The Government of Japan will provide the
fol19~ing statistics to the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission:
.....
-J
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and ten days for the waters north
of 56- North Latitude, between 180-
Longitude and 175- West Longitude •
(bl Such visits 6hall be timed in such a
manner as to minimize adverse effects
on the research activities of the
above-mentioned scientific research
vessel.
Tokyo, April 25, 1978
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
~~ITED ~ICAQ
FOR TH.E GOV~NT OF ~: pJ......'
b!/£~/~~
FOR 'i'HE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN:
JJ lMlM' ..>6~
A.
B.
For the landbased driftnet fishery,
statistics by 2- x 5- INPFC statisti-
cal area snd ten-day period by species
in numbers and tonnage, with corres-
ponding effort in tans fished, by
mesh size, within six months of annual
termination of the tishery.
For the mothership gillnet fishery,
catch statistics on a ten-day basia
by l' x I" statistical area by
species in numbers 'a nd tonnage with
corresponding effort in tans fished.
and with summary information on mesh
sizes used. within six months of
annual termination of the fishery.
~
-...J
!'J
C. Age composition and maturity data on
salmon sampled in the areas of the
landbased driftnet and mothership
fisheries in the detail determined
necessary for scientific studies perti-
nent to continent of origin determina-
t Lons ,
2. The Governments of the United States of
America, Canada and Japan intend to provide to the
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission;
A. ' Scale and/or fish samples requested
by the Commission for special
scientific studies.
FOR TIlE DELEGATION or
TKE GOVERNMENT OF TIlE
Wl~~'.
FOR THE DELEGATION OF
:l:72]~
FOR TKE DELEGATION OF
TKE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN:
- -c;( .') [I]
<7r/v~
B. Statistics on the all salmon fish-
eries of the North Pacific Ocean and
~djacent seas for continued publica-
tion in the Annual Statistical Year-
book.
C. Catch, tagging. oceanographic and
associated biological data collected
by res~rch vessels of the three
Contracting Parties in at least the
same detail and timeliness as in
recent years.
Tokyo, April 25, 1918
; .
I T. Nakajima.
......
-..J
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
1ne Delegations of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Japan have agreed to record
the following in connection with Article X or and Para-
graph 1. (cl of the Annex to the International Convention
tor the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
as amended by the frotocol Amending the International
convention for the High Seas Fisheries or the North Pacific
ocean signed this day (hereinafter referred to as "the
convention").
1. The Government of Japan will provide the follow-
ing statistical data to the Government of the United States
of ~m~rica within six months of annual termination of the
titeheryl
A. For the land-based driftnet salmon
fishery in the waters east of 160 degrees
East longitUde, number of Dall porpoise
(Phocoenoides dalli), taken by 2" x 5-
INPFC statistical area and lO-day period.
B. Within six months of annual termination
of the Japanese salmon fishery, incidental
CAtch data for all clAsses of research
vessels by 2- x 5- INPFC statistical ar ••
And lO-day period with corresponding effort
in tans fished And metric tons of salmon
harvested.
3. Scientists of the Government of the United St4t~&
of America and the Government of Japan will independently
or jointly study data on incidental catch of Dall porpot.~
per tan of gillnet and incidental CAtch per ton of
salmon harvested, with a view to determining suitability
at such data as indices of Dall porpoise abundance, and
biological data and samples of Dall porpoises collected
by the Japanese salmon fishery and research vessels to
develop the information on life history, stock differen-
tiation, status and trends .
4. Scientists of the Government of the United Sta',·,
The Government of Japan will provide:
A. By January 1, 1979, available past incidental
2.
B. For the mothership gillnet salmon fishery,
.
number and species of marine mammals,
particularly Dall porpoise, ~aken by 1- x
1" statistical area and lO-day period.
catch data for all classes of research
vessels, to the extent possible .by 2- x 5"
INPFC statistical area and lO-day period with
corresponding effort in tans fished and metric
tons of salmon harvested.
of America And the Government of Japan will consult '011 tIl
regard to the research programs of Japanese salmon rf:!Ie ." \'I i
vessels including sighting surveys on Dall porpoises,
with A view to developing the most effective program to
determine the stAtus and trends of their populations .
They ·will also consult on methods to reduce or eliminAt~
their incidental catch in the Japanese mothership gillnet
salmon fishery pursuant to the p~ovisions of paragraph 1.
(c) of the Annex to the Convention. The first s~ch con-
sultation will be held prior to the 1978 J4panese sal~n
fishing seAson.
~5. Scienti8ts of the Government of the United States
ot America and the Government of Japan will conduct for
the period ending June 9, 1981, annual sighting aurveys on
oall porpoises on Japanese salmon ~esearch vessel.
operating in the Convention area with a yiew to obtain-
ing adequate .ighting data to provide estLmatea of
abundance. The sightin~ data collected will inclUde,
~ alia, time of observation, lOCAtion, number aeen,
distance and direction from vessel, sea .tate~ wind
direction and strength, and visibility.
A. The Government of Japan will ensure for
the period ending June 9, 1981, that
nationals and fishing vessela of Japan
conducting salmon fishery operations
within the united States fishery conser-
vatton zone make every effort to return
to the motherships, where feasible, all
D~ll porpoises captured incidentally by
gillnets of the Japanese salmon fishery
for collection of biological data and
samples. In this connection, the Govern-
6. The Government of Japan intends to allow for ment of Japan will require that accurato
.....
-..J
.Po
the period ending June 9, 1981, up to two acientists of
the ~overnment of the United States of America on board
each of no less than three salmon research vessels of the
~vernment of Japan for the studies on Dall porpoise.
Scientists of the Governmenc of the United States of Ar.ocrlcA
~ay be accepted on board additional Japanese salmon relcArch
v~ssels. The Government of the United States of America
will bear expenses incurred in such boarding of &clentlltl.
7. Scientists of the Government of the United
Stat~s of America ~ill analyze the Dall porpoise sighting.
~a ta collected by its Pelagic Fur Seal InvestigAtion. And,
.~ possible, by other sources to develop informAtion
on ~tock differentiation, distribution and abundAnce
in the eastern North Pacific Ocean.
records be kept of the number of Dall
porpoises captured but not returned to
the aao t he r ah Lp and the circumstances pre-
venting their return. The Government of
Japan will ensure for the above-mentioned
period that the scientists of the Govern-
menc of the United States of America
Accepted pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph 1. lc) of the Annex to the Con-
vention on board ,e ac h mothership operating
within the United States fishery conservAtion
zone be allowed to collect appropriate marine
mammal data. It is understood that the
total number of scientists of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America on board
8. To obtain adequate specimen material for each mothership will, in Any case, be no sora
biological studiesl than two.
to ensure ~t
conducted with
Tokyo ,. April 25, 1978
between scientists of the Government of
the United States of America and tho
Government of Japan.
10. The Government of Japan intends
cooperative DAII porpoise research be
use of an appropriAte Japanese vessel not later than the
1979 SAlmon fishing season, unless it is Agreed that SUch
~eseArch CAn be Accomplished in another manner •
Scientists of the Government of the United
• view to obtaining a representative
sample of Dall porpoises captured inci-
dentally in these areAS.
appropriate measures for the period end-
ing June 9. 1981, to collect biol09ical
data And sAmples from Dall porpoises
captured incidentally by the Japanese
mothership gillnet salmon fishery in the
areas specified in ParAgrAph 1. (a) and
(~) of the Annex to the Convention, with
The~vernment of Japan intends to take
A.
B.
9.
.....
-,..,)
lJ1
States of AmericA will examine the Acoustic
characteristics of gillnets And of the Dall
porpoise in an effort to determine appropri-
ate gear modifications that contribute to
reducing incidental mortAlity.
z~.~fl..Q).~- /. #e~ ..~_~
FOR THE DELEGATION OF THE FOR THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
B. Scientists of the Government of Japan will
review past research data to determine if
variations in gear resulted in reduced
incidental catch rates.
; .
C. Scientists of the Government of JapAn
will conduct field trials of proposed
gear modifications to determine their
usefulness in redUcing incidental catches
when A program is mutually Agreed upon
APPENDIX VIII
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
~Iell1orandum of Understanding
Between the
C:"ITED STATES OF A)IERICA
and J.-\P.-L'i
Rela ting to the Protocol
of April 25, 1978
Signed at '\t""ashiogton June 3. 1981
JAPAN
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
Jlemorandum of understanding relating to the protocol of April 25,
19i8.
Signed at Washington June 3, 1981;
Entered into force June 3, 1981.
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ME~ORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The Representatives of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Japan have agreed to record the fol-
lowing in connection with Article X and Paragraph l(c) of the
Annex to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries
of t~e ~o r t h Pac ific Ocean, as amendedrll (here lnafter referred to as
"the Convention") by the Protocol Amending the International Con-
vention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
signed on April 25, 1978-r~1 This memorandum of understanding is in-
tended to cover the per iod until June 9, 1984, and as long as the
Japanese gillnet salmon fishing vessels are perm~tted to fish in
the United States Fishery Conservation Zone (hereinafter referred
to as "the U.S. FCZ").
l. The Government of Japan ~il l prov~ce the !ollo~ing statisti-
cal data to the Government of the Uni:ej States .it~~n six mont~s
of a~nual termination of the f~s~ery:
(a) for the ~o th e r s ~ ~ ~ gillnet sai~6n Eis tery, nu~t e r and
species of all ma r ine ~amma l s , particularly Dall's por-
po~se (P hoccenoides dal ii), taken by l' x 1" :~PFC sta-
tistical area and la-day per~od.
(b ) For the land-based gill~et sal~on fishery, nu~ber and
species of all ~arine mammals, par~~cularly Dall's por-
;;:oise. taken by 2" x S" I:IPFC s tatistical area and la-day
period.
(c) :or salmon research vessels, number and s;;:ecies of all
marine mammals, particularly Dall's por;;:o~se, taken by
1" x 1" INPFC stat~stical area and la -day ;;:er~od ~ith
correspond ing effort in number of tans used.
' T I .\ ~ :':7."111. Hfl:J. -!!J!)~. ;i3S;;. D2.J~; -! rST :J~S; 11 rsr 1.-;03; 13 l"ST 372;
1-1: r::,T !J,j:1;:10 {;:,T lou.i.
'TL\::l D:.: I:': ; ::U l':,T W!).-;. S~e pp. Itll1-tlf;1I roe tho memorandum nt under-
sta ndlrur appended to the prutocot, whidl t hi s memoruudum of undeestundlng
updates.
TUS 10164
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(d) The numbers of marine mammals, partlcularly Oall's por-
poise, taken, include those .. hich:
(il Become entangled in s~l~on gillnets but are lost
(drop out) as the gillnets are hauled;
(ii) Become entangled but escape alive or are released
alive during hauling;
(iii) ~re captured and brought aboard during hauling.
2. Scientists of the United States and Japan will consult annu-
ally with a view to developing the most effective research program
for determining the status and trends of pOFulations of marine mam-
mals concerned. particularly Dall's por~olse. They will also con-
sult on a joint program of research le~dlng to methods of reducing
or eliminating the incidental take of ~all's porpoise in the Japan-
ese ~othership gillnet salmon fishery.
J. Scientists of the ~nited States and Japan will exchange all
data un der the programs referred to in ~aragr~ph 2, and will inde-
~endently or jointly analyze such d~~~, including:
(a) :ata on incidental take ot :all'5 ~or~oise and other mar-
ine mammals, as indicated i n ~~ragraph 1 above;
(0 ) Sighting data to deter~i~e :a1l's ~orpoise abundance;
( =) Biological data taken f~o~ ~all's ~or~oise to study life
history, to estimate biolcg ical and reproductive para-
meters. and to determine st~ck differentiation, if any;
(dl Data on results of all e~perl~ents and field observations
aimed at reducing or eli~lnatlng the incldental take of
Dall's porpoise.
~. Su~mary research reports will ce s~b~itted to annual ~eetings
of ehe r~ P fC Ad Hoc Commlttee on ~arine ~acmals or to SCheduled
T.e e t l ng s of its Scientific Subco~mieeee. final reports will be
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made available to the both governments concerned no later than
february 1, 1984.
5. To monitor incidental take of marine mammals and verify the
data on incidental take of marine ma~Als in the Japanese ~~ther­
ship gillnet salmon fishery:
(a) The Government of Japan will take necessary measures to
ensure, for the period covered by this memorandum, that
marine mammal scientific observers of the United States
will be accepted on board catcherboats to make observa-
tions of incidental take of marine mammals and to record
data on environmental conditions and on gear characteris-
tics, throughout the duration of the operations withln
the U.S. FCZ.
(b) The Government of Japan will take necessary measures to
place Japanese scientific observers on board catcherboats
to make observations of incldental take of marine mawmals
and to record data on environwental conditions and on
gear characteristics throughout the fishing season inside
and outside the U.S. FCZ.
(e) T~e Government of Japan will take necessary measures to
ensure that for each catcherboat and each set made with-
in and outside the U.S. FCZ, accurate records in accord-
ance with the categories defined in paragraph l(d) will
be kept of the number and location of Oall's porpoise
taken and that these records will be provided on a dally
basls to Japanese inspectors and the marine mammal scien-
tlsts of the United States on board che motherships re-
ferred to in paragraph 7(0) while mothershl~ fleets are
operating within the U.S. fCZ and co the Japanese inspec-
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tor9 while ~othership fleets are operating outside the
U.S. rcz .
(dl The Govern~ent of Japan will take necessary measures to
ensure that captains of motherships and catcherboats will
assist the marine mammal scientific observers and the
scientists of the United States to report information on
a daily basis concerning the accumulated take of marine
mammals and other observer data collected.
6. To obtain adequate sighting data for estimating abundance:
(a) Scientists of the United States and of Japan will conduct
for the period covered by this memorandum annual sight-
ing surveys for Oall's porpoise on Japanese salmon re-
search vessels operating in the Convention area.
(b) Scientists of the United States and of Japan will cooper-
ate ~ith a view to developing procedures for conducting
Oall's por?oise sightings, a standardized data collec-
tion format, and training programs. so as to ensure that
sighting data collected are compatible. The sighting
data collected ~ay include. inter alia. duration and
time of obse~vation. location. number sighted. distance
and direct~on fro~ vessel. sea condition. wind direction
and strength. and Visibility.
(cl The Government of Japan intends to allow. for the period
covered by this memorandum, scientists of the United
States on coard Japanese salmon research vessels for stud-
ies of Oall's ?orpoise. The Government of the United
States intends to bear expenses incurred in such board-
ing of scientists.
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7. To obtain adequate .pecimen mAterial for biological studies:
(a) The Government of Japan will take necessary measures to
ensure for the period covered by this memorandum that
nationals and fishing vessels of Japan conducting salmon
fishery operations within the U.S. FCZ make every effort
to return to the motherships, where feasible and consis-
tent with the laws of both countries, all dead marine
mammals incidentally entangled in the gillnets of the
Japanese salmon fishery for collection of biological data
and samples.
(b) The Government of Japan will take necessary ~easures to
ensure for the above-mentioned period that scientists of
the Government of the United States will be accepted on
board motherships operating in the U.S. FCZ to collect
appropriate marine mammal data and samples.
(cl SClentists of the ~nited States onboard Japanese salmon
research vessels wlll be allowed to collect biological
data and samples from all incidentally taken mari~e mam-
mals, particularly Oall's por~olse.
(a) The Government of Japan will take necessary measures to
ensure that Japanese crew memcers wlll work with scien-
tists of the United States oncoard xotherships and will
be trained in me t ho d s of collection of bioloqical data
and samples. These trained crew members will collect
needed biological data and samples as far as feasible
under supervision of the Japanese inspectors when mother-
ship fleets are operatinq outside the U.S. FCZ.
8. The Government of Japan will develop a system for the ?eriod
covered by this memorandum to collect data and biological samples
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of Oall's porpoise taken in the land-based gillnet salmon fishery.
in order to estimate incidental take of oall's porpoise by this
fishery by area, sex, and color type. The biological sa~ples may
include teeth, reprOductive tissues. skele~al materials. and tis-
sues for electrophoretic analyses.
9. with a view to reducing mortality and serious injury ra~e of
marine mammals by the salmon gillne~s ~o insignifican~ levels. sci-
entists of Japan will conduct field experiments of gear mo~ifica­
tions or of other methods of reducing or eliminat ing the inciden-
tal take of marine Mammals in the Japanese Mothership 1illnet sal-
mon fishery.
10. The GOvernment of Japan in~.ends ~o pursue. a policy to reduce
the incidental ~ake of marine mammals ~o the ~reatest ex~en~ feasi-
ble. taking into account the results of research and technological
capabili~ies. The Gover~~ent of the United States and the ~overn­
~en~ of Japan will annually review progress ~ade towar1 the reduc-
tion of inciden~al ~ake of ~arine o~~Ma l s .
11. The GOvern~ent of Ja?an intends to ensure that coooerative
Oall's porpoise research be conducted with use of an appr~priate
Japanese vessel during t~e 19~1 sal~on fiShery season and be con-
tinued annually thereafter.
12. The GovernMent of the United States and the GOvernMen~ of
Japan will consult with each other on the specifics of the progr3~s
to be carried out referred to in paragraph 2. pr ior to each ~ishing
season. The specifics on numbers of Japanese scienti~ic observers
referred to in paraqraph 5(b). and marine mammal scientific ob-
servers and sc ientists of the United States referred to in para-
graph ·5 ( a ) and "'(b) will be confirmed i n 'Jritinq by both ~o'/ern­
nents.
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Done a~ Washington, this Jrd day of June, 1981 in duplicate.
'Theodore George Kronmiller.
, Yoshio Hatano.
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